Rationality and time: A multiple-self model of personal identity over time for decision and game theory. by Heilmann, Conrad
R a t io n a l it y  a n d  T im e
A Multiple-Self Model of Personal Identity over Time for 
Decision and Game Theory
Conrad Heilmann
A thesis submitted to the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method of 
the London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy, December 2010.
UMI Number: U61B442
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U613442
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
rases
F
British Library oi PeMie* 
ana EccnorweSowo*
D eclaration
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of
the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other
the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly 
identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation 
from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis 
may not be reproduced without the prior written consent of the author. I warrant 
that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of 
any third party.
than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case
Conrad Heilmann
2
A bstract
This thesis presents extensions to formal theories of rationality in order to analyse 
intertemporal decisions. It offers multiple-self models of the decision-maker’s per­
sonal identity over time. These models complement decision and game theory and 
axe used to develop the new accounts of time discounting, backward induction, 
and preference change that are presented in this thesis.
The first part of the thesis develops multiple-self models of personal identity 
over time. These models depict a rational decision-maker as a series of different 
but interconnected temporal selves. The models allow one to relax the assumption 
that a rational decision-maker is a diachronically stable entity. Moreover, they 
structurally cohere with key problems and distinctions in theories of personal 
identity over time.
In the second part of the thesis, three problems of time in decision and game 
theory axe analysed. Firstly, the problem of time discounting is considered. Gen­
eral foundations of time discounting axe given in a measurement-theoretic frame­
work. In the multiple-self interpretation of a decision-maker, the discounting 
factor represents the degree of connectedness between temporal selves in a per­
son. Secondly, the reasoning method of backward induction in interactions over 
time is considered. Sufficient conditions for backward induction are given by 
formulating a belief revision policy on the basis of intrapersonal connectedness 
of players. Thirdly, preference change is considered. A new characterisation of 
diachronic inconsistency in terms of conflicts in intrapersonal connectedness is 
given.
The multiple-self models presented here allow one to represent the internal 
temporal structure of decision-makers. They capture problems of the interplay 
between rationality, identity, and time, thereby elucidating new accounts of time 
discounting, backward induction, and preference change. More generally, this 
thesis offers a new approach to modelling the intertemporal aggregation of value, 
which possesses broader relevance for decision theory, the foundations of econom­
ics, social epistemology as well as environmental ethics.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Intertem poral D ecisions
Time plays an important role in many decisions. Indeed, intertemporality is 
prominent when deciding between small gains in the short-term and large gains 
in the long-term, and when deciding whether to do something earlier or later. 
Such intertemporal decisions play a highly significant role in the everyday fife 
of individuals as well as in collective decision-making. For individuals, decisions 
about education, career path, migration, or investment in housing come to mind. 
For collectives, such intertemporal decisions include investments in education, 
pension systems and infrastructure, as well as dealing with environmental prob­
lems like climate change or biodiversity. Intertemporal decisions are important 
because they have a profound influence on the lives of the individuals and col­
lectives concerned with them.
Consider the collective decision of how to deal with climate change. This 
decision has a strong intertemporal aspect, as the available courses of action 
differ in how the costs and benefits associated with them are distributed over 
time. One possible course of action is to incur costs in the short-term, by adopting 
measures to reduce carbon emissions, such as high taxes on fuels and investing 
in technology such as renewable energy. Such costs in the short-term might 
be outweighed by future benefits; for instance, if natural disasters and other 
possible side effects of global warming are mitigated. Other courses of action axe 
also possible, such as not incurring costs in the short-term by not adopting any 
measures to counter climate change, with possible higher costs in the long-term. 
Assessing those different courses of action requires us, amongst other things, to
14
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specify in what sense future costs and benefits of decisions are significant today. 
Do future benefits count less than present benefits, or are they to be evaluated on 
equal terms? How are we to factor in the possibility that what we think beneficial 
or costly today might not be considered so in the future?
Similar questions arise in intertemporal decisions of individuals. Consider 
an undergraduate student who decides whether to pursue further study or get 
a job instead. The consequences associated with each of these prospects will 
occur at different times. Moreover, it is likely that the two prospects have quite 
different consequences in the short-term and in the long-term: when pursuing 
further study, the student might have less money in the near future, and possibly 
a loan to pay after her studies. But in the long-term, the student might be able 
to earn more money because of her higher qualifications and she might lead a 
more satisfied fife because of that. By getting a job instead of further study, 
she will earn more money in the short-term, but she might not be able to earn 
so much in the long-term. Even if the student is clear about how she values the 
kinds of jobs and studies available to her, the intertemporal aspect of the decision 
might still puzzle her. Should she think of the consequences in the far future as 
less valuable? How should she account for the fact that she might change her 
mind later about one of the possible courses of action? When individuals make 
decisions with a long-term impact, such aspects will matter a great deal.
The above examples suggest that intertemporal decisions are important and 
give rise to complex theoretical and practical questions. Not all of the questions 
that can be raised about such decisions will be treated in this thesis -  indeed, I 
limit its scope to discussing three particularly interesting problems of intertem­
porality in decisions and games, and more generally to suggesting extensions to 
standard decision theories to better deal with such problems of intertemporal­
ity. Before discussing the latter, we turn to introducing the three particularly 
poignant problems of intertemporality in decisions and games.
1.2 Three Problem s o f T im e in D ecisions and G am es
Intertemporal decisions with a much smaller significance than handling climate 
change or choosing a career path already exhibit three interesting problems of 
intertemporality. Take the decision of a group of friends whether to go out for 
dinner tomorrow night or rather next week. Even in such everyday decisions,
15
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consequences occur at different times, which raises the question of how this fact 
impacts evaluations of decision-makers. More specifically, we can ask the follow­
ing three questions.
(i) What is the significance of the fact that one dinner takes place later than 
the other one?
(ii) In what sense can decision-makers anticipate and deal with the fact that 
other decision-makers might surprise them over time?
(iii) How are decision-makers to deal with the fact that they might change their 
minds about possible courses of action?
These axe the kinds of questions raised by intertemporality in decisions and 
games that this thesis addresses. In the following, we look at these three problems 
in more detail, and explain each of them by using a variant of the dinner example 
just introduced.
1.2.1 Temporal D istance and T im e D iscounting
The first problem of intertemporality is called the problem of temporal distance. 
Consider the dinner example. Suppose that the comparative quality of the dinners 
is not at issue; the two dinners are the same, except in when they will actually take 
place. What can we say about this temporal distance between the two dinners? 
Intuitively, there is an obvious difference between the two prospects of having 
dinner at different times. Hence, it is possible that the friends react in a different 
way. For instance, one of the friends could dislike waiting for social occasions and 
hence be rather impatient about the dinner taking place. In contrast, another 
one of the friends might get a lot of pleasure out of knowing that the dinner will 
be taking place, enjoying the anticipation of the occasion. Furthermore, some of 
the friends could foresee a lot of work-related commitments in the next week and 
think it unlikely that they will be able to join for the later dinner. Others amongst 
the friends could fear that not everyone will make it to tomorrow’s dinner due to 
the short notice, and so on. That is to say, the mere fact that alternatives axe 
different as to when they materialise can have a strong impact on their evaluation.
Many of the aforementioned phenomena associated with temporal distance 
can be accommodated straightforwardly. For instance, those dealing with un­
certainties and those dealing with people’s different subjective attitudes can be
16
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modelled by standard decision-theoretic frameworks. Yet, once all such features 
are taken into account, it remains an open question as to whether temporal dis­
tance as such can change our goodness evaluations.
Here, the heavily contested concept of time discounting has been proposed 
to deal with temporal distance, by postulating weights on future outcomes to 
reduce their value (Frederick et a l , 2002). One question of this thesis is to 
develop foundations of time discounting, giving an exact description of how the 
notion of time discounting can be described and specifying on what kinds of 
assumptions it rests. In economics, time discounting is frequently employed to 
deal with temporal distance, such that goods occurring later in time are weighted 
less than those occurring earlier. In this context, the question arises in what way 
should goodness be weighted according to temporal distance. This has led to 
debates about the correct interpretation and method of time discounting. On the 
other hand, in philosophy, the position is by and large that temporal distance 
should not have an impact on the evaluation of an outcome (Sidgwick, 1907; 
Rawls, 1971; Broome, 1991, 1999), with Parfit (1984) being the most famous 
exception to this view. This thesis asks what kinds of evaluation of temporal 
distance can be represented by time discounting functions. In order to answer this 
question, we develop a general representational framework for time discounting 
that allows us to clarify existing theories, making transparent the requirements 
for the construction of well-founded time discounting functions.
1.2.2 Interaction over Tim e and Backward Induction
The second problem of intertemporality is called the problem of interaction over 
time. Suppose there is an element of strategic interaction between the friends who 
want to participate in the dinner: will everybody who has committed to coming 
turn up, and is one of the dinners more likely to attract a larger number of friends? 
For instance, it could be the case that more of the friends initially say that they 
prefer the later dinner but then do not come, as more attractive ways to spend 
the evening have become available to them in the interim. In deliberating about 
this problem and similar ones, each amongst the friends will make assumptions 
about the other friends’ motivations. More specifically, hypothetical reasoning 
of this type will rely on what the friends know about each other and what kind 
of assumptions they make about each other. For instance, thinking about the 
other friends’ previous actions in similar situations can become relevant when
17
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considering one’s own decisions. Furthermore, whether other decision-makers will 
be consistent over time and whether they will commit to decisions once made is 
also highly relevant to forming one’s own evaluations. That is to say, hypothetical 
reasoning as described above requires one to entertain situations in which one is 
surprised by other decision-makers, such as when they do not stick to their plans.
The question of how to characterise decision-makers’ interactive beliefs and 
possible changes in belief when facing surprises has been a key problem in models 
of hypothetical reasoning, in particular in discussions about the key reasoning 
method of backward induction. Epistemic game theory models dynamic interac­
tions and provides a rich framework for its description with a focus on the role 
of knowledge (Brandenburger, 2007). Indeed, epistemic game theory character­
ises the epistemic assumptions of solution concepts in dynamic games, making 
transparent the hypothetical reasoning of the decision-makers. In this context, 
the reasoning method of backward induction is central, in which a decision-maker 
firstly entertains what she would choose at the last possible decision in a dynamic 
game and then works her way backwards to the beginning of the game (Perea, 
2007). When determining possible courses of action in such a way, the decision­
maker has to entertain situations which could only arise if another decision-maker 
is irrational (Stalnaker, 1998). How to keep the belief in the other decision­
makers’ rationality when entertaining such situations has been a pressing problem 
in the foundations of game theory (Binmore, 1987). This thesis shows how an 
enhanced representation of the temporal stability of decision-makers can improve 
the characterisation of backward inductive reasoning.
1.2.3 Tem poral D ynam ics and Preference Change
The third problem of intertemporality is called the problem of temporal dynamics. 
Let us focus on the deliberations of one decision-maker in the dinner example. 
Crucially, whatever decision one has taken, there will be time for reflection on 
the decision once the opportunities for the respective dinners arise and again 
when they have gone. It could be the case that after having decided to have 
the dinner next week, the decision-maker changes her mind about that decision. 
Furthermore, it could also be the case that she happens to lose interest in any 
social exchange with the friends, for instance because she realises that other 
friends are more important to her. It could also be the case that, upon learning 
that her two best friends can only come to either one of the dinners, she is
18
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in a conflict as to which of the dinners she would prefer. In general, we can 
thus say that there are interesting temporal dynamics when decision-makers are 
given the chance to re-assess their decisions, revise their preferences, or remain in 
conflict about the decision. Some of those dynamics can be quite easily modelled 
within standard decision theory. In particular, decision theories allow for decision­
makers to update their beliefs in light of new information. Yet, some of the 
dynamics mentioned before are not so easily analysable in terms of information, 
such as when decision-makers change their tastes. Such problems of changing 
and conflicting preferences remain contested in both philosophy and economics 
(Stigler and Becker (1977), Bradley (2009b)) .
A particular kind of preference change, commonly referred to as dynamic 
inconsistency, occurs when a decision-maker has contradictory preferences over 
time. One of the concerns of the thesis is to analyse preference change by an 
account that improves on the explanation of dynamically inconsistent preferences 
of decision-makers over time. In this context, Schelling (1980, 1984) and Ainslie 
(1992, 2001) have proposed to draw on the metaphor of persons as ‘multiple- 
selves’ in order to analyse dynamic inconsistency, such that different selves have 
opposing preferences. In the more recent behavioural economics literature, such 
approaches have been combined with hyperbolic discounting functions, modelling 
dynamic inconsistency as being produced by the interaction of short-sighted and 
far-sighted selves, for instance in Thaler and Shefrin (1981) and Fudenberg and 
Levine (2006). This thesis presents a modelling approach that is simpler yet 
achieves the same aims as the aforementioned ones, and makes transparent in 
what way the description of dynamically inconsistent decision-makers requires us 
to depart from normative decision-theoretic accounts.
1.3 T im e in D ecision  and Gam e T heory
This thesis addresses the three problems of (i) temporal distance and time dis­
counting, (ii) interaction over time and backward induction, and (iii) temporal 
dynamics and preference change. Considering these three problems also raises 
the question of how standard decision-theoretic accounts can be used to analyse 
them. This, in turn, leads to a general concern about how standard decision- 
theoretic accounts can be extended in order to better analyse the three problems 
of intertemporality.
19
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1.3.1 E xtensions for D ecision Theory
Standard decision-theoretic accounts take a subjectivist approach to analysing 
decisions. They embark from a sparse and idealised representation of an indi­
vidual’s mental state by way of a pair of probability and value functions. The 
probability function represents the individual’s beliefs and the value function 
represents the individual’s desires. Decisions can then be analysed on the basis 
of such two-factor models. More specifically, the expected goodness of possible 
courses of actions can be evaluated by combining the beliefs of the decision-maker 
with the desirability she assigns to the different options. Formulating rational­
ity conditions on the structure of beliefs and desires yields accounts of rational 
decision-making. Moreover, decision theories not only present powerful tools to 
analyse decisions, they also give subjectivist foundations for economics and social 
sciences. Indeed, the latter can be based on a decision-theoretic analysis of their 
choices, interactions, and collective actions.
Yet, standard decision-theoretic representations of individuals do not offer 
tools to explicitly consider separate attitudes towards the future, such as those 
implied by time discounting functions, and possible changes in tastes. Hence, 
it is natural to investigate how standard decision-theoretic frameworks can be 
enriched in order to widen their scope and applicability. Let us now recall the 
three problems of intertemporality and their discussion in the literature. It seems 
that all three problems have in common that a direct application of a standard 
decision-theoretic framework does not give conclusive answers to them.
Consider the problem of time discounting for temporal distance. Decision- 
theoretic representations permit a wide range of individual desirability attitudes: 
it is just as permissible to take the future as less important, as equally important, 
or even as more important than the present. That is to say, attitudes towards the 
future can simply be regarded as being a matter of personal taste. However, note 
that in analysing real-world intertemporal decisions, the question arises whether 
evaluations of temporal distance can motivate time discounting factors that lower 
goodness evaluations at future time points. Standard decision-theoretic accounts 
do not directly permit us to discuss the evaluation of time distance as a separate 
concern, contrary to how it is often regarded in real-world intertemporal decisions, 
such as climate change for collectives, or career path for individuals. This raises 
the question what kind of extensions to decision theory are required to discuss 
time discounting in its framework.
20
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Now consider the problem of backward induction in interactions over time. 
Standardly, game theory assumes the sequential stability of the preferences as well 
as plans of action of individuals. Yet, precisely such stability assumptions need 
to be locally relaxed in order to account for surprise information in hypothetical 
reasoning: if someone faces another individual who deviates from her plan of 
action, then this new information needs to be accommodated within the existing 
beliefs of the individual. Here, epistemic game theory provides tools to model 
hypothetical reasoning of decision-makers about each other’s actions. However, 
the modelling devices of epistemic game theory require us to specify in what way 
individuals revise their beliefs about each other. This raises the question of how 
epistemic models of dynamic games can be amended such as to accommodate 
surprise information that is key to backward inductive reasoning.
Finally, consider the problem of preference change in temporal dynamics. 
Many applications of decision-theoretic frameworks embark from the assumption 
that an agent’s preferences are stable over time. An important tool to deal with 
some types of changes is the so-called ‘updating’ of beliefs in light of new inform­
ation or evidence. That is, by learning new propositions, an individual can revise 
her beliefs so as to correctly represent her knowledge about the world. However, 
changes of preference can also occur in less laudable circumstances, for instance, 
when individuals change their tastes without apparent motivation and when they 
contradict themselves over time. From a decision-theoretic point of view, such 
changes in preference are irrational. Yet, real-world decision-makers change their 
tastes and contradict themselves quite persistently, such as when failing to adhere 
to a healthy diet. This raises the question of how such preference changes can be 
described in order to better understand how individuals persistently violate the 
assumption of dynamic consistency.
The discussion of the three problems of intertemporality in the context of 
decision and game theory suggests that they not only present important ques­
tions from a practical point of view. They also fall outside the scope of a direct 
application of standard decision theories. This establishes a second key concern 
of this thesis, over and above providing accounts of the three problems of inter­
temporality: namely to ask how decision-theoretic representations of individuals 
can be enriched in order to enable analysis of intertemporal decisions.
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1.3.2 M ultiple-Self M odels o f Personal Identity  over T im e
This thesis proposes the modelling device of ‘multiple-self models of personal 
identity over time’ to suitably extend decision theory in order to analyse the 
three problems of intertemporality from a decision-theoretic point of view.
Multiple-self models introduced in this thesis depict a decision-maker as a col­
lection of temporal selves, and characterise their degree of connectedness. More 
precisely, temporal selves capture the idea that a decision-maker exists at dif­
ferent points in time, with possibly changing characteristics. The notion of con­
nectedness describes the degree of stability between temporal selves, i.e. the 
degree to which temporal selves have similar characteristics. In a general sense, 
these multiple-self models will allow us to capture decision-makers as temporally 
extended persons, offering precise descriptions of their stability over time. This 
provides a structure to express what to take as relevant about the changing nature 
of decision-makers.
From a decision-theoretic point of view, the concepts of temporal selves and 
connectedness can be interpreted reductively. On such an interpretation, at each 
point in time, the temporal self is depicted as a rational decision-maker that is 
constrained by standard decision-theoretic consistency assumptions. The degree 
of connectedness describes in what sense the different temporal selves axe similar 
to each other. In Chapter 2, we will discuss in detail how such a reductive 
multiple-self model relates to standard decision-theoretic representations, and we 
will give different variants of multiple-self models that can complement decision- 
theoretic representations of decision-makers.
Furthermore, the multiple self-models proposed here axe also closely related 
to theories of personal identity over time. Such theories of personal identity 
over time offer accounts of how persons change and how we can understand 
such change (Noonan (1989), Kolak and Martin (1991), Shoemaker (2008), Olson 
(2008)). More specifically, theories of personal identity over time ask how one 
can describe a person at different times as qualitatively a somewhat different 
person yet numerically (or quantitatively) as still the same person. We discuss 
those accounts of personal identity over time and take them as possible sources 
of motivation for modelling the influence of time on decision-making. We will 
argue in Chapter 3 that there is a structural coherence between multiple-self 
models and key distinctions and questions in theories of personal identity over 
time. Hence, we show how it is possible to constrain multiple-self representations
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of decision-makers with insights from theories of personal identity over time.
More generally, the multiple-self models introduced in this thesis can be in­
terpreted as relaxing the assumption of temporal stability that is often made in 
applications of decision theories. This suggests that while the multiple-self models 
depict insights into decision-makers’ personal identity over time, we axe not re­
quired to endorse them as metaphysical views of the ontology of decision-makers. 
Rather, the models can be viewed as structures that offer a more permissive 
representation of the decision-maker’s deliberations about time. That is to say, 
in order to apply the aforementioned models as extensions to formal theories 
of rationality, no additional assumption is made other than to accept them as a 
method of relaxing stability assumptions that axe often made in their application. 
Applying such a description of temporally extended decision-makers to intertem­
poral decisions allows much richer interpretations of the new accounts of time 
discounting, backward induction, and preference change presented in this thesis.
1.4 T hesis O verview
The thesis is divided into two paxts. Paxt I develops the multiple-self approach, 
showing how multiple-self models can enrich decision theory (Chapter 2), and how 
they structurally cohere with philosophical theories of personal identity over time 
(Chapter 3). Paxt II provides three accounts of temporal problems in decisions 
and games: foundations of time discounting (Chapter 4), sufficient conditions for 
backward induction (Chapter 5), and dynamically inconsistent preference change 
(Chapter 6). Chapter 7 offers conclusions.
1.4.1 Part I
Paxt I develops multiple-self models of personal identity over time. It is ar­
gued that such modelling devices both present extensions to decision theories 
and structurally cohere with key distinctions in theories of personal identity over 
time.
C h ap te r 2. M ultip le-Self M odels. Chapter 2 discusses how decision theor­
ies usually represent decision-makers and how such representations can be 
enriched in order to capture changes in decision-makers over time. We in­
troduce the device of multiple-self models that allows us to conceive of a 
decision-maker as a collection of temporal selves and their connectedness. In
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a reductive interpretation, temporal selves are sets of preferences and their 
connectedness is determined by similarity of preferences. In a non-reductive 
interpretation, temporal selves are seats of a broader range of psychological 
features, such as preferences, memory, emotions, etc. We show how such 
an extended representation of decision-makers can capture the influence of 
time on decision-making and how it relates to existing proposals of under­
standing individuals as ‘multiple-selves’.
C h a p te r  3. P ersonal Id en tity  over T im e. Chapter 3 shows how multiple- 
self models structurally cohere with key questions and distinctions in the­
ories of personal identity over time. We suggest that those theories can be 
viewed as competing answers to three questions: (i) instances, the question 
of what is significant for a person to exist at a given point in time -  this 
can be captured by the notion of temporal selves in a multiple-self model, 
(ii) persistence, the question of what is significant for a person to exist over 
time -  this can be captured by the notion of connectedness in a multiple- 
self model, and (iii) criteria, the question of what establishes instances and 
persistence of persons -  this can be captured by an interpretation of tem­
poral selves and connectedness in a multiple-self model. That is, given a 
sufficiently rich specification of a multiple-self model, it can be motivated 
and constrained by specific theories of personal identity over time.
Multiple-self models of personal identity over time will be used in the second 
part of the thesis to improve our understanding of three problems of time in 
decision and game theory. While many of those discussions do not directly hinge 
on endorsing multiple-self models as a premise, we will show how for each of those 
problems, they offer valuable modelling devices that give additional insights into 
how intertemporality can be analysed by decision and game theory.
1.4.2 Part II
Part II discusses three problems of intertemporality in decision and game theory.
C h a p te r  4. F oundations of T im e D iscounting. Chapter 4 investigates how 
time discounting functions analyse temporal distance in intertemporal de­
cisions. We identify two goals that theories of time discounting may have: 
one, postulating a correct time discounting function, and two, offering an
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accurate underlying conceptual motivation. We proceed by presenting a 
general representation framework for time discounting which outlines the 
requirements that well-founded time discounting functions have to fulfil. 
This general framework is used to analyse both existing accounts of time 
discounting, as well as Parfit’s dictum of time discounting because of a 
weak connectedness to future selves. More generally, the requirements for 
time discounting theories developed here demonstrate that time discounting 
factors are restricted in the kinds of conceptions they can express.
C h ap te r 5. B ackw ard Induction . Chapter 5 analyses the problem of inter­
action over time; in particular, the sequential structure of dynamic games 
with perfect information. A three-stage account is proposed, that specifies 
set-up, reasoning and play stages of dynamic games. Accordingly, we define 
a player as a set of agents corresponding to these three stages. Moreover, 
the notion of agent connectedness is introduced which measures the extent 
to which agents’ choices are sequentially stable. A type-based epistemic 
model is augmented with agent connectedness and used to provide suffi­
cient conditions for backward induction. Moreover, an existence result is 
obtained ensuring that these conditions are indeed possible. Our epistemic 
foundation for backward induction makes explicit that the epistemic inde­
pendence assumption involved in backward induction reasoning is stronger 
than usually presumed. Furthermore, in the three stage-account, players 
can explicitly be understood as multiple-selves, which permits one to in­
terpret low agent connectedness as stemming from imperfect connectedness 
between selves.1
C h a p te r  6. P reference C hange. Chapter 6 analyses temporal dynamics and 
gives an account of dynamic inconsistency. Two families of approaches to 
dynamic inconsistency are identified: firstly, those that use hyperbolic dis­
counting functions to describe dynamically inconsistent decision-makers as 
myopic, and secondly, those that postulate multi-selves models that capture 
different motivations and time horizons which can lead a decision-maker to 
(fail to) control himself in the face of temptation. In order to achieve a 
simpler characterisation of dynamic inconsistency, we reconsider both hy­
perbolic discounting and multi-selves models in the more general model
1This chapter is based on a joint paper (Bach and Heilmann, 2009) with Christian W. Bach
(University of Maastricht, Netherlands) to which both authors contributed equally.
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of connectedness in the multiple-self. A simple specification of this model 
can motivate hyperbolic discounting, and an extended version of it can be 
used to reformulate the multi-selves models, using a less complex structure 
that can be better motivated. Moreover, the latter allows us to distinguish 
between conflicts in connectedness and conflicts in goodness evaluation.
1.4.3 O utlook
This thesis is divided into two parts, with the latter part focusing on three specific 
problems in intertemporal decisions and games, and the former part developing 
modelling devices that facilitate the analysis. However, this does not entail that 
all the accounts, arguments, and formal results in those three accounts necessarily 
depend in any way on accepting the modelling devices as premises. Naturally, 
the three accounts differ in how fax they draw on the multiple-self models in their 
analysis.
In light of this, there are two modes of reading this thesis. Firstly, there is a 
‘thin’ reading which focuses on the three accounts of intertemporality in decisions 
and games and understands them as isolated solutions to specific intertemporal 
problems. On this reading, Chapter 4 provides general foundations of time dis­
counting, Chapter 5 proposes new sufficient conditions for backward induction, 
and Chapter 6 analyses dynamic inconsistency. Indeed, the individual chapters 
in Part II are intended as, by and large, self-contained treatments of received 
problems in their respective areas of enquiry.
Secondly, there is a ‘thick’ reading of the thesis, which centres around the 
multiple-models of personal identity over time developed in the first part. On 
this reading, those models can be taken as a general proposal for modelling inter­
temporality in decisions and games, for which the three accounts offered here are 
applications, demonstrating the usefulness of the multiple-self models through 
the additional insight they allow us.
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M ultiple-Self M odels
Sum m ary. This chapter discusses how decision theories usually represent decision­
makers and how such representations can be enriched in order to capture changes 
in decision-makers over time. We introduce the device of multiple-self models 
that allows us to conceive of a decision-maker as a collection of temporal selves 
and their connectedness. In a reductive interpretation, temporal selves are sets 
of preferences and their connectedness is determined by similarity of preferences. 
In a non-reductive interpretation, temporal selves axe seats of a broader range of 
psychological features, such as preferences, memory, emotions, etc. We show how 
such an enriched representation can capture the influence of time on decision­
making and how it relates to existing proposals of understanding individuals as 
‘multiple-selves’.
2.1 Introduction
Decision-theoretic accounts provide representations of decision-makers’ states of 
mind. Indeed, their models combine a formal characterisation of beliefs and 
desires to analyse the decision-making of individuals. Such two-factor models 
are widely applied, and also used to provide foundations in economics and so­
cial science, for instance by motivating utility functions in economics, and by 
providing foundations for methodological individualism. The widespread use of 
decision-theoretic accounts is due to their sparse and therefore highly flexible rep­
resentation of decision-makers: only some assumptions on the structure of beliefs 
and desires axe needed to formulate models of rational decision-making.
Naturally, such models can also be used to analyse intertemporal decisions.
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Yet, as briefly alluded to in the introduction of this thesis, the sparse structure 
of standard decision-theoretic representations does not enable us to discuss how 
to conclusively evaluate all aspects of the problems of (i) temporal distance,
(ii) interaction over time and (iii) temporal dynamics in greater detail. This 
chapter briefly introduces the main features of decision-theoretic representations 
of decision-makers and proposes an answer to the following question: how can 
decision-theoretic representations be enriched so as to be applicable to the three 
problems of time decisions and games?
We begin the chapter by reviewing the basic elements of standard decision- 
theoretic representations of decision-makers, focusing on the capacity of such 
accounts to analyse intertemporal decisions. Extensions to decision theory are 
introduced that have been proposed in the literature to deal with some aspects 
of such decisions. Yet, further extensions of decision-theoretic frameworks are 
required in order to answer the kinds of questions about intertemporal decisions 
posed in this thesis.
In a second step, we introduce accounts from a that rather diverse literature 
that have attempted to provide more enriched models of individuals by drawing 
on the metaphor of the ‘multiple-self’ (Elster, 1986). Such accounts view indi­
viduals as consisting of several different selves in order to analyse their conflicts 
of motivation. However, as pointed out by Frederick et al. (2002) when discussing 
the role of multiple-self accounts in the analysis of intertemporal decisions, ‘most 
of these multiple-self models have not been formalized’.
This chapter introduces ‘multiple-self models’ that enrich standard decision- 
theoretic representations of decision-makers to improve on this deficiency. They 
represent the temporal dimension of prospects by a model of the decision-maker 
as a collection of interconnected temporal selves. Such models are used to de­
scribe the decision-maker’s attitudes to the temporal aspect of prospects. That 
is, multiple-self models provide tools to widen the scope of decision theory to 
analyse intertemporal decisions in greater detail.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 discusses how decision-makers are 
represented in decision-theoretic accounts and shows that extensions are required 
to deal with the three problems of time identified in the introduction of this 
thesis. Section 2.3 reviews how the notion of the ‘multiple-self’ has been employed 
in the literature. Section 2.4 introduces multiple-self models that characterise 
a temporally extended decision-maker as a collection of temporal selves which
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are connected to each other, and proposes different kinds of interpretation of 
connectedness. Section 2.5 briefly concludes.
2.2 T im e and D ecision  T heory
This section reviews standard accounts of the representation of decision-makers 
and some proposed extensions, focusing on the capabilities of such accounts to 
analyse intertemporal decisions. In particular the problems of temporal distance, 
interaction over time, and temporal dynamics are considered. This sets the scene 
for presenting the device of multiple-self models later in this chapter.
2.2.1 Standard D ecision-Theoretic R epresentations
Decision theories offer tools for characterising how decision-makers evaluate pro­
spects. In general, prospects are assumed to be rich descriptions of ‘complete 
world histories’, i.e. sets of possible worlds. For example, take the prospect of 
going to the beach. A maximally rich description of this prospect encompasses all 
events that can possibly be associated with it, such as going sw im m ing, finding a 
space on an overcrowded beach, eating ice-cream, seeking shelter from the rain, 
and so on. Decision theories formulate two-factor models that combine beliefs 
and desires in an attempt to characterise the attitudes of decision-makers to such 
prospects. Indeed, such two-factor models of decision-makers’ states of minds 
are employed to give a quantified characterisation of an individual’s beliefs and 
desires.
Imagine a decision-maker who evaluates the prospect of going to the beach. 
In a decision-theoretic analysis, her attitudes to these prospects are characterised 
by her beliefs and desires. That is, her beliefs, such as how likely it is that the 
beach will be overcrowded, are combined with her desires, such as how much the 
individual enjoys swimming. For instance, her desire to go swimming might be 
combined with a high degree of belief that the beach will be overcrowded. If 
other prospects are available to the individual, such as staying home, then those 
might be evaluated as better overall by her than going to the beach because of 
her high degree of belief that the beach will be overcrowded.
In a general sense, an individual’s attitudes to prospects can be described 
by combining her beliefs and desires. More formally, decision-theoretic accounts 
postulate structural conditions on beliefs and desires sufficient for representing
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the decision maker’s beliefs by a probability function p, and her desires by a 
value function v. These functions are defined over a set of prospects, such that 
(p , v)-models give a quantified representation of beliefs and desires with regards 
to prospects (Bradley, 2009a,b). The above ingredients of a decision-model can 
be understood as the core idea that underlies decision-theoretic frameworks. This 
core idea has been specified in greater detail in different decision theories.
In order to obtain such a representation, many decision theories embark from 
the notion of a preference ordering over a set of prospects. That is, decision­
makers are assumed to rank different prospects in terms of their desirability. If 
such preference orderings satisfy some structural assumptions, such as weak or­
dering and independence conditions, they can be represented by a utility function. 
If the latter is weighted with the decision-maker’s probability function, we obtain 
an expected utility representation of the decision-maker’s preferences. That is, 
a decision-maker prefers prospect A  over prospect B  iff a larger expected utility 
is associated with prospect A  than with prospect B. To obtain expected utility, 
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) employ an objective notion of probability, 
whereas more recent frameworks, such as Savage (1972), Jeffrey (1983), Joyce
(1999), and Bradley (2007b), interpret the probability function as a represent­
ation of subjective degrees of belief. In the following, all those aforementioned 
decision theories will be referred to as (p, v)-representations of a decision-maker’s 
mental states. Such representations of belief and desire are, in their most basic 
forms, reductive and sparse as they only require a few structural assumptions. 
They offer a highly idealised and flexible representation of the states of minds of 
individual decision-makers.
The most important and entrenched variant of extending the basic framework 
as introduced so far is by so-called Bayesian conditionalisation, or updating. In­
deed, Bayesian conditionalisation can also be viewed as part of the core decision 
theory, as marked by the fact that most of the above accounts are often called 
‘Bayesian’ decision theories. In this method, new probabilistic information re­
ceived by the decision-maker is integrated into the existing probabilistic beliefs 
by applying some variant of Bayes’ theorem (Howson, 1997). Hence, theories of 
Bayesian updating are able to deal with cases where new information is acquired. 
This is arguably a vital extension to the static (p, ^-representation, as it allows 
one to  correctly model the states of minds of decision-makers who learn, who 
communicate with others, or receive cues from their environment. Recall the ex­
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ample of the individual evaluating the prospects of going to the beach and staying 
home. Imagine she learns that her neighbours will be throwing a big party, or 
that she listens to the weather report. Conditionalising her beliefs on such new 
information will arguably be a better representation of her attitudes, if she is 
rational.
We will call the elements of decision-theoretic representations as introduced 
so far a ‘standard’ account. That is, a standard account combines an evaluation 
of prospects by beliefs and desires, given by the maximisation of a preference 
ordering over prospects represented by an expected utility function, with Bayesian 
conditionalisation to model the acquisition of new beliefs. We will now discuss 
whether such a standard account can be applied directly to analyse intertemporal 
decisions, and what kinds of extensions have been proposed in order to do so.
2.2.2 Intertem poral D ecisions and Games
This section shows that a direct application of standard decision-theoretic ap­
proaches is not sufficient to provide full answers to the three problems of inter- 
temporality in decisions and games raised in the introduction of this thesis. We 
discuss some extensions to decision theory that have been offered in the literature 
and suggest that while they answer some variants of the three questions posed 
here, further extensions to decision theory are needed.
Time Distance
The problem of time distance in intertemporal decisions arises when events asso­
ciated with prospects are distributed over time. Indeed, there are intertemporal 
decisions, such as the decisions between the two dinners at different days, in which 
time distance plays a very important role.
To discuss how time distance can be analysed by applying standard decision- 
theoretic frameworks, firstly recall that the quantified representations of beliefs 
and desires are defined over prospects. A temporally extended prospect, such as 
a specific career path an individual can choose, is described by a set of all possible 
world histories that can be affected by the career path. Indeed, on this reading, 
this includes all possible consequences of this career path, such as what kind of 
fife the individual will lead, what kind of people she will meet, and so on. Such 
a maximally rich description of prospects, however, is not without its problems. 
Once all consequences are spelled out, it leads to the conclusion that ‘a person has
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only one decision to make in his whole life. He must, namely, decide how to live, 
and this he might in principle do once and for all’ (Savage, 1972, 83). To avoid 
such problems, decision theories usually make assumptions that permit them to 
characterise more isolated decision situations. Savage (1972), for instance, goes 
on to describe how decision theories based on such a ‘lifetime-decision’ assump­
tion would not be applicable to practical decision-making, and indeed attempts 
to define ‘small worlds’ in which practical decisions can be analysed. This discus­
sion of prospects illustrates that standard decision theories start from a rather 
general characterisation of decision-makers and prospects, without prescribing 
much structure.
How can time distance aspects of prospects be evaluated in decision-theoretic 
frameworks? In the standard accounts, intertemporal aspects are not modelled 
explicitly. That is, prospects can extend through time, and the decision-maker 
can adopt any attitudes to those, as long as those are within the confines of the 
structural assumptions that axe needed to obtain expected utility representations. 
In particular, the decision-maker can take any attitude to time distance. That is 
to say, it is a matter of desirability attitude, or personal taste, how a decision­
maker is influenced by distance in time. Therefore, decision theory does not 
assume that the present is inherently more, equally or less valuable than the 
future, or vice versa. If an agent is very patient, then the beliefs and desires 
that reflect this are just as admissible as the beliefs and desires of an agent who 
dislikes waiting.
In other words, decision theory does not offer structure for considering time 
distance separately. The beliefs and desires represent the agent’s attitudes, and 
assuming specific attitudes to time that are separate from those is not part of 
standard decision-theoretic frameworks. However, there axe many decisions in 
which the time aspect is of overwhelming importance, for instance those about 
handling climate change for collectives, or choosing a career path. A direct ap­
plication of standard decision-theoretic frameworks as introduced above will not 
yield a detailed analysis of the intertemporal aspects of such decisions.
The above discussion suggests that in order to evaluate time distance, exten­
sions to  decision theory axe required that can facilitate such an analysis. The 
multiple-self model proposed in the next section provide such an extension, of­
fering a  structure in which to model the deliberations of a decision-maker about 
temporal distance. We will discuss how it can be used to evaluate time distance
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in Chapter 4. Other proposed extensions to decision theory, such as the concept 
of discounted utility in economics, will also be considered in detail in Chapter 4, 
and discussed in the context of the multiple-self model.
Interaction over Time
The problem of interaction arises when there is an interdependence between sev­
eral decision-makers, such that the consequences of their decisions depend on 
each other. Rational interaction of decision-makers is analysed in game theory, 
which builds on standard decision-theoretic frameworks and furnishes additional 
structure and assumptions to consider the interdependence of players’ choices. 
Interactions over time are analysed as dynamic games in the so-called extensive 
form, which will be introduced formally in Chapter 5.
The extensive form makes use of standard decision-theoretic accounts in order 
to model interaction over time; in particular, it is assumed that each player 
in the game is endowed with a utility function. Furthermore, the concept of 
belief updating is highly relevant, as dynamic games are marked by the fact that 
new information can become available at different stages in the game. More 
specifically, consider that interactions over time require extensions to standard 
frameworks of belief updading in two key respects.
Firstly, the beliefs involved in the characterisation of rational interactions are 
complex, as higher-order beliefs are needed to characterise a player’s beliefs. That 
is, we are not only interested in the player’s beliefs as such, but also in what she 
believes about her opponents, what she believes her opponents believe about her, 
what she believes her opponents believe what she believes about them, and so 
on. Here, the research programme of epistemic game theory offers us modelling 
devices that can characterise such higher-order beliefs (Brandenburger (2007), 
Perea (2011, forthcoming)). In Chapter 5, this approach will be will introduced 
formally.
Secondly, one of the most pressing questions in the analysis of interaction 
over time consists in the problem of accommodating seemingly contradicting be­
liefs, such as when players are faced with surprise information. For instance, a 
standard assumption in dynamic games consists in the belief in the rationality 
of opponents. However, the reasoning method of backward induction requires to 
entertain situations that could only arise due to an irrational move by an op­
ponent (Stalnaker (1998). How to reconcile such surprise information with the
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belief in the opponent’s rationality has been a pressing problem in game theory. 
Binmore (1987)). In Chapter 5, we will give a characterisation of a new belief 
revision policy that deals with this problem.
More generally, considering belief hierarchies and surprise information are 
two problems of interaction over time that have led to extensions to standard 
frameworks. The multiple-self models that will be introduced in the next sections 
will help to further motivate such extensions, and will be used to interpret the 
sufficient conditions for backward induction developed in Chapter 5.
Temporal Dynamics
Temporal dynamics is perhaps the problem of intertemporal decisions that has re­
ceived the most attention in terms of extensions to decision theory. Two families 
of extensions axe particularly important: firstly, those extensions that analyse the 
problem of changing desires, by generalising standard decision-theoretic frame­
works. Secondly, those extensions that deal with sequential decisions over time. 
We discuss each of those in turn and suggest that while they can treat a variety 
of problems associated to temporal dynamics, the description and explanation of 
dynamic inconsistency still requires further extensions.
Firstly, recall that Bayesian conditionalisation can model learning processes 
of decision-makers. Consider the example of choosing between the earlier or 
later dinner. For instance, in between the two possible dinners, a decision-maker 
could leaxn that the restaurant has received a damning review by an important 
critic, which could influence the attitudes of the diners. Temporal dynamics that 
are associated with the decision-maker receiving new information can hence be 
analysed with such tools. Applying such standard decision-theoretic tools in game 
theory and microeconomics more generally often comes with the assumption that 
the decision-maker’s tastes are not supposed to change over time, and are not 
influenced by time in an explicit way. As Stigler and Becker (1977, 76) put 
it: ‘...one  does not argue over tastes for the same reason one does not argue 
over the Rocky Mountains -  both axe there, will be there next year, too . . .  ’. 
Embarking from this methodological proposition, Stigler and Becker (1977) then 
develop models of taste changes in which they axe explained by belief changes. 
More generally, the application of decision-theoretic frameworks in economics is 
almost exclusively based on stable tastes.
However, temporal dynamics axe not restricted to a decision-maker acquiring
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new beliefs. It could also be the case that an agent changes her tastes or desires, 
rather than her beliefs. (We will henceforth use the terms taste and desire in­
terchangeably) . Recent generalisations of the concept of Bayesian updating also 
investigate an application of this method to desires, i.e. the value function (Brad­
ley, 2007a, 2009a,b). In such applications of Bayesian updating, more complex 
and realistic cases of changes of decision-makers’ minds can be accommodated 
for, such as changes of taste, for instance due to habituation, training and exper­
ience (Bradley, 2009b, 222f., for a list of examples). This account thus extends 
the standard decision-theoretic and Bayesian conditionalisation approaches and 
can deal with more complex temporal dynamics that are marked by taste change.
A related extension to standard frameworks in order to explain taste changes 
consists in introducing more structure in the model that yields the probability 
and value evaluation. Consider the recent model by Dietrich and List (2009), 
who introduce the idea that consequences can have different features, which can 
but need not become salient for the decision-maker. Hence, while there is only 
ever one (p , i>)-pair activated, a whole collection of those objects is possible, as 
and when different features of the world become salient, for instance when an 
individual grows up and develops different tastes to those he or she had as a 
child. In similar spirit, one can also make such an assumption directly about the 
decision-maker, such that it consists of a collection of those different (p, v)-items in 
the background, as, for instance, the idea of avatars suggested by Bradley (2009b). 
Hence, if one assumes that each point in time is associated with more than one 
probability and value evaluation, considering collections of such evaluations -  
possibly indexed by points in time -  makes it possible to extend on the analysis 
of temporal dynamics by standard representations.
A second family of approaches deals with a different aspect of temporal dy­
namics, namely that of sequential decisions. Sequential decision theory deals with 
the normative assessment of a particular kind of preference change, commonly 
referred to as dynamic inconsistency. This type of preference change refers to 
decision-makers which reveal contradictory preferences over time. For example, 
take the decision whether to go home after work, or whether to go to the pub. 
Imagine that a decision-maker knows that if he will go to the pub, he will drink 
too much and regret it the next day. Sequential decision theory deals with the 
normative assessment of such choices. On the one hand, proponents of so-called 
‘sophisticated’ choice recommend to factor in the foreseen preference change in
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the deliberations, recommending to go home. On this account, going to the pub 
(and regretting it afterwards) is brandished as naive or myopic (Hammond (1976), 
Steele (2007)). On the other hand, proponents of so-called ‘resolute’ choice recom­
mend to find ways to prevent the momentary preference change from happening 
(such as McClennen (1990)). For a comprehensive overview and assessment of 
sequential decision theory, see Steele (2007).
Apart from the normative assessment, there is also the descriptive and ex­
planatory question as to why real-world decision-makers often reveal dynamic 
inconsistency. That is, how can we describe and explain dynamically incon­
sistent preferences of decision-makers over time? Here, Schelling (1980, 1984) 
and Ainslie (1992, 2001) have proposed to draw on the metaphor of persons 
as ‘multiple-selves’ in order to analyse dynamic inconsistency, such that different 
selves have opposing preferences. The next sections presents a modelling approach 
to multiple-selves that is simpler yet achieves the same aims as the aforementioned 
ones, and makes transparent in what way the description of dynamically incon­
sistent decision-makers requires us to depart from normative decision-theoretic 
accounts, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
2.2.3 E xtending D ecision Theory
The above review has shown that standard decision-theoretic representations 
‘stay silent’ on many aspects of intertemporality. This feature is by no means 
problematic in itself -  indeed, part of the appeal of decision theory is the fact that 
its structure is simple and general. However, when analysing intertemporal de­
cisions, extensions of decision theory that pay particular attention to the temporal 
dimension could widen its scope. If we were to take only a standard decision- 
theoretic approach to intertemporal decisions, then it would not be possible to 
discuss in greater detail in what sense discounting for temporal distance can be 
rational and how exactly it can be employed, how relaxing stability requirements 
in game-theoretic frameworks can be interpreted, and how to model dynamically 
inconsistent decision-makers. Yet, as the initial review of these problems in the 
introduction suggested, such topics are subject to considerable debate, and also 
of practical importance.
In order to accommodate the influence of time in decision theory, it is natural 
to nevertheless stay close to its framework. That is to say, the subjectivist char­
acter of decision theory need not be given up in order to model the influence of
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time. In this context, it is interesting that Savage (1972) called his derivation of 
Bayesian decision theory ‘personalistic’ decision theory, and subjective Bayesian- 
ism as a whole was known as ‘personalism’ before terms like individualistic and 
subjectivist became more common (Teller, 1975; Zellner, 1982). This suggests 
that Bayesian decision theory is linked to the assumption of a decision-maker 
as a single individual. In fact, this feature of the theory is of great importance 
for its foundational role in economic theory and other social sciences that rest 
on methodological individualism. It is therefore natural to account for time in 
the context of normative decision theory in a subjectivist manner, developing an 
account of the internal temporal structure of the decision-making individual.
The multiple-self models introduced in this chapter axe proposed to offer such 
a structure, which is intended as a minimal addition to decision-theoretic frame­
works. Before introducing the multiple-self models, we review the rather diverse 
literature that has used the metaphor of the ‘multiple-self’ in various ways.
2.3 M ultip le-Self A ccounts
This section reviews accounts that employ the notion of multiple-self. Charac­
terising persons as a collection of distinct and interconnected entities has been 
considered in many different philosophical traditions as well as in psychology, 
literature and economics. The main motivation of those accounts is to provide 
a more complex understanding of individuals. However, as ubiquitous as the 
presence of the multiple-self notion is, as elusive it has proven to be in terms 
of theoretical characterisation. This motivates the development of multiple-self 
models in the next section.
2.3.1 E lster’s R eview  of M ultiple-Self Theories
In a general sense, the idea of a multiple-self is that of a person consisting of 
several distinct yet interconnected entities. Elster (1986) provides a review of 
philosophical, psychological and economic theories of the multiple-self, whose ac­
counts differ on a number of dimensions. We consider the comprehensive overview 
of such theories offered by Elster (1986), before discussing how the multiple-self 
model relates to the accounts in the literature.
T h e  loosely in teg ra ted  self. Elster (1986, 3) suggests that in many cases, 
multiple-selves ‘turn out to be little more than failures of coordination and integ­
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ration’, such as an individual with beliefs and motivations that contradict each 
other, or beliefs and motivations that differ with regards to which realm of life 
they are applicable to. Indeed, once individuals realise such contradictions, they 
could resort to standard techniques such as revising their beliefs to resolve them. 
Hence, a ‘loosely integrated self’ might not have any more significance than a local 
or momentary departure from the idealised decision-maker as usually presumed 
in applications of Bayesian decision theories.
Self-deception and  weakness of will. In the philosophical literature, 
multiple-selves are mostly associated with cases of self-deception and weakness 
of will. That is, the concept of several selves within one person is evoked in 
cases in which decision-makers act irrationally, act against their best interest, or 
hold conflicting attitudes (Elster, 1986, 6). There axe two fundamentally differ­
ent modes of inquiry regarding these problems: one concerns the possibility of 
its existence (Davidson, 1980, most prominently) and another one concerns its 
resolution (such as Ainslie (1992, 2001)).
F austian  selves. The famous ‘two souls’ within the Faust-chaiacter give 
the label for a type of multiple-self in which one part of the person has higher- 
order intentions whereas the other part has desires that clash with those. Such 
conflicts between the two Faustian selves can be superficial (i.e. potentially be 
resolved by deliberation) or very deeply seated, such as in prolonged inner con­
flicts. Schelling (1980, 1984) has proposed to view individuals in conflicts as two 
such opposing selves and has proposed to apply game-theoretic tools to model 
potential resolution of their conflict.
H ierarch ical selves. Elster (1986, 11) also shows that it is possible to 
characterise the hierarchical nature of the Faustian selves more generally -  and 
open the possibility for more than two selves in such a hierarchy within the person. 
On those accounts, the asymmetry between selves can be further characterised by 
differences in power, scope or relevance of the selves. For instance, considering 
the hierarchical approach of meta-preferences (or second-order preferences), a 
new type of preference is introduced that orders the preferences according to 
higher-order considerations. In Jeffrey (1983, 214), an agent can have a first-order 
preference that ranks smoking over not smoking. For his second-order preference, 
however, the same agent could prefer not to have that preference. Such models 
of second-order preferences are used to capture different types of motivations, 
i.e. those that concern betterness of alternatives and those that concern how an
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agent would like to view the betterness of alternatives.
T he  F reud ian  legacy. Freud’s theory provides the famous labels of the 
‘id’, ‘ego’, and ‘superego’. Elster (1986, 20) characterises these three concepts as 
‘agents’ that are assigned different tasks in the person. He explains how these 
three agents map onto the tasks -  or ‘territories’, in his terminology -  of the ‘con­
scious’, ‘preconscious’, and ‘unconscious’. Those concepts exemplify tripartite 
ontologies of persons and provide a metaphorical vocabulary for inner processes 
and dynamics, such as deeply rooted conflicts and their resolutions.
Split b ra in  - sp lit m ind? The finding that the two hemispheres of the 
human brain can operate independently has, in theories of personal identity over 
time, given rise to many thought experiments that involve a split brain, which 
will be briefly discussed in the next chapter. Elster (1986, 23ff.) takes this as 
starting point to discuss whether ‘cognitive compartmentalisation’ of different 
degrees really does imply a divided self: he maintains that goals and motivations 
need not differ in a person who has abnormal communication between the two 
hemispheres of her brain (although this is possible). Cases in which cognitive 
compartmentalisation has such drastic effects seem to fall outside the scope of 
what a reasonably general theory of persons would want to cover.
P ara lle l selves. Elster (1986, 17f.) labels cases in which a person seems to 
enter a different state of mind with the notion of ‘parallel selves’. That is, in cases 
of vivid imagination, such as daydreaming or in cases of concentrated cognitive 
effort, such as reading, the self of a person seems to be divided between two 
profoundly different worlds. Such consideration are important because they can 
help to characterise how person’s imagine future situations and devise strategies 
accordingly, for instance against anticipated regret.
H om o oeconom icus and  hom o sociologicus. Elster (1986, 25f.) main­
tains that we can have different selves in private and in public, such that private 
utility-maximisation (according to an inner homo oeconomicus) can conflict with 
social norms and desired altruistic behaviour (according to an inner homo soci­
ologicus). The divide between such motivations has been widely debated in a 
number of disciplines. For instance, in a series of papers, Akerlof and Kranton
(2000) have explored the role of social identities for economics behaviour, at­
tempting to bridge the gap between the traditional homo oeconomicus and homo 
sociologicus accounts.
Successive selves. Elster (1986, 13f.) also considers the case of successive
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or temporal selves which is the focus of the multiple-self models introduced later, 
and discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.
The ‘no-self’ theory . Finally, Elster (1986, 28ff.) describes approaches 
that axe extremely reductionist as those that deny that there is such a thing as a 
self, labelling those theories ‘Neo-Buddhist’. In this category, he includes Hume 
(1739) and Parfit (1984) who endorsed ‘disintegrating’ views of individuals as 
vast collections of selves. In so doing, Elster concludes that they effectively deny 
that there is such a thing as the self.
In yet a further step to generalise the idea of a multiple-self, dropping even the 
assumption that there is a common person in the background of the multiple-self 
has been considered:
‘A man is said to be the same person from childhood until he is 
advanced in years: yet though he is called the same he does not at 
any time possess the same properties; he is continually becoming a 
new person ... not only in his body but in his soul besides we find 
none of his manners or habits, his opinions, desires, pleasures, pains 
or fears, ever abiding the same in his particular self; some things grow 
in him, while others perish.’ (Plato, Symposium)
Indeed, this first step to consider one person at different times really as a 
new person can be further developed into one where introspective processes of 
persons are compared to groups of distinct individuals. This idea already plays 
a prominent role in Plato’s Republic, when he compares the inner structure of 
the Republic and that of the Soul (Pettit, 2003). Indeed, in the Republic, Plato 
regards the individual as state-like and the state as a super-individual. -  While 
this view has important consequences for moral philosophy and political theory, 
it has remained metaphorical in the context of rational agency.
Now consider the following two dimensions of comparison of those accounts. 
Firstly, multiple-self accounts differ in how literally they take the notion of the 
multiple-self. Some theories use it as little more than a metaphor, whereas other 
theories go as fax as associating multiple-selves with different physical entities 
and mental processes in individuals.
Secondly, the theories differ in the way they perceive of the different selves. 
Some theories explicitly assume a duality or tripartite of selves, others postu­
late a collective of selves and yet other theories conclude that from the notion 
of multiple-self follows that there is no self at all. Furthermore, some theor­
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ies explicitly state distinct tasks for specific selves (‘planning self’, ‘short-term 
interest self’, etc.) while others allow do not introduce explicit distinctions. Ad­
ditionally, theories also differ concerning the dimensions on which they perceive 
a multiplicity of selves: selves can be explicitly perceived of as successive, paral­
lel, temporal, or as determined by contexts, social roles and so forth. Moreover, 
the relation or ‘interaction’ between selves is perceived differently, ranging from 
strict hierarchies, models of competition between selves, to complete equality of 
influence.
2.3.2 Towards M ultip le-Self M odels
The brief review of multiple-self accounts shows that the literature on multiple- 
selves is not only interdisciplinary but very diverse in its aims and scope. Fur­
thermore, the terminology of the multiple-self seems to invite a metaphorical 
employment of the notion. While multiple-self accounts introduced in the previ­
ous section capture important intuitions about conflict and diverging motivations 
in a decision-maker, their disparate nature makes it hard to compare them to each 
other and to relate them to decision-theoretic representations of decision-makers.
The multiple-self models provided in the following section aim to improve on 
these deficiencies. In a general sense, the focus of the multiple-self models intro­
duced below is to analyse the influence of time on decision-making by providing a 
simple structure which can be related to standard decision-theoretic approaches. 
Some of the above accounts, such as those that introduce successive selves and 
different social roles will be compatible with some of the models introduced.
Yet, not all of the above accounts will be compatible with such an approach. 
More precisely, the simple and general structure that we will introduce can be 
used in conjunction with standard decision-theoretic accounts. That is, we do 
not claim here to develop a new account of rational agency. Rather, we build 
on decision-theoretic account of rational agency and attempt to enrich it with 
multiple-self models.
2.4 M ultip le-Self M odels for D ecision  Theory
This section introduces multiple-self models as a tool to analyse the time dimen­
sions of decisions. Firstly, we introduce the basic concepts of ‘temporal selves’ 
and ‘connectedness’, and present reductive and non-reductive interpretations of
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these concepts. Finally, we discuss how multiple-self models relate to decision 
theory in greater detail.
2.4.1 Selves, Connectedness, and their Interpretation
The multiple-self model introduced here has three main components: temporal 
selves, connectedness, and their interpretation. Intuitively, temporal selves refer 
to the fact that decision-makers extend over time, and connectedness refers to the 
idea that many characteristics of decision-makers stay stable over time or only 
change very little. Finally, the interpretation of both temporal selves and their 
connectedness makes clear what we mean when we employ those terms.
T he Sim ple M ultip le-Self M odel A simple multiple-self model is a tuple M  = 
{S, c) where
o S  = {So, S i , Sk} is a set of temporal selves, drawn from some set
E,
o c : S x S —>[0,1] is a function that assigns degrees of connectedness 
to all pairs of selves Si, Sj E S.
Firstly, consider temporal selves. We can depict those selves as being drawn 
from some abstract set E such that each of the temporal selves in the set S  
corresponds to a point in time, as depicted in the following table.
Time to t i tk
Selves So Si Sk
Table 2.1: Temporal Selves in a Simple Multiple-Self Model
We can now ask in what sense the temporal selves are related to each other. 
The second component of the model is hence the idea that there is a degree 
of connectedness between the temporal selves. Connectedness characterises how 
strongly two temporal selves axe connected to each other. For instance, for many 
decision-makers, it is a plausible assumption that each self is perfectly connected 
to itself, such that c^j =  1. Furthermore, for heavily idealised characterisations of 
decision-makers, the connectedness is perfect between all possible pairs of selves. 
Note that the assumptions of depicting temporal selves as a finite set and postu­
lating a function in the above models are introduced for illustrating the kinds of
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specifications of multiple-self models that will be employed in later parts -  that 
is, the assumptions will be varying depending on the context of application.
Finally, consider that the temporal selves and their connectedness axe the two 
concepts in this model that require an interpretation. The latter will require us 
to specify what kinds of objects temporal selves are taken to be and how we char­
acterise their degree of connectedness. This, in turn, will motivate more specific 
discussions about how to obtain numerical values for degrees of connectedness. 
We now consider ‘reductive’ and ‘non-reductive’ interpretations. Reductive inter­
pretations conceive of selves as sets of preferences and of connectedness as their 
degree of similarity. That is, they give interpretations that axe closely related to 
concepts that are already contained in decision theory. Non-reductive interpret­
ations conceive of selves as seats of a broad range of psychological features and 
of connectedness as capturing their degree of similaxity. Before explaining those 
two kinds of interpretations in greater detail, we give an example to show how 
the multiple-self model relates to standard decision theories.
Consider the individual who chooses her career path. Take the evaluation 
of the prospect of studying for a postgraduate degree after having earned an 
undergraduate degree. This prospect is temporally extended, that is, there is a 
collection of possible events at different points, such as studying for a postgradu­
ate degree, graduation, entering the labour market, and having a career based on 
having earned a postgraduate degree. Naturally, such a prospect can be subjec­
ted to a decision-theoretic analysis, by characterising the individual’s attitudes to 
this prospect by her beliefs and desires. Indeed, the above model does not alter 
such a decision-theoretic analysis.
Rather, it adds a second step after considering such an analysis; namely, the 
multiple-self model allows one to express attitudes to time distance. That is to 
say, a decision-maker might not only form attitudes that can be characterised by 
beliefs and desires, but might also deliberate about the time distance that is in­
herent in the prospect. Precisely such deliberations can be modelled by temporal 
selves and connectedness. That is, a decision-maker could, due to introspection 
or by considering her past, form attitudes about her connectedness over time. It 
is then also possible that the decision-maker combines her beliefs and desires with 
connectedness to evaluate intertemporal prospects. That is to say, rather than 
changing decision-theoretic analysis, the multiple-self model offers an extension 
to it in order to better characterise attitudes to time distance.
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Connectedness thus understood offers a variety of applications in the analysis 
of intertemporal decisions. Firstly, it can be used to motivate time discount­
ing according to the general foundational framework developed in Chapter 4. 
Secondly, connectedness can give an explanation of a belief revision policy that 
underlies the new sufficient conditions of backward induction provided in Chapter 
5. Thirdly, when using an extended multiple-self model, connectedness can be 
used in an analysis of dynamic inconsistency that is given in Chapter 6.
We will now turn to explain the different features of the multiple-self model 
in greater detail. In the next section, we discuss the non-reductive and reduct­
ive interpretations of temporal selves and connectedness, before discussing more 
complex variants of multiple-self models, and how they relate to decision theory.
2.4.2 R eductive and N on-R eductive Interpretations
This section explains the kinds of interpretations of temporal selves and connec­
tedness in more detail. Firstly, consider reductive interpretations of temporal 
selves. In such interpretations, we can understand temporal selves as character­
ised by standard decision-theoretic representations; that is, as a set of preferences. 
Connectedness between temporal selves thus conceived can then be determined 
by the similarities of those preference sets.
Such preferences could range over prospects, as in standard applications of 
decision theories. Then, we would have to assume that every temporal self could 
perform an evaluation of full world histories. However, such a broad domain of 
preference does not have to be assumed in order to characterise the similarities 
and differences of temporal selves. It is practical to assume a smaller domain, 
such as specific events or consequences. Note that such consequences need not 
be prospects, but can also be simple propositions, such as ‘I am eating icecream’ 
or ‘I am working hard’, which different temporal selves may evaluate differently. 
In a general sense, all that is required in order to characterise temporal selves 
with decision-theoretic tools is a domain of objects which can be evaluated by all 
temporal selves.
A reductive interpretation allows us to give a more specific motivation of the 
connectedness function, as we can explain how the degree of connectedness can 
be quantified. This also suggests that the degree of connectedness is independent 
of the temporal prospect in question: it evaluates the degree to which preferences 
are stable over time, given a domain of preference on which such a stability
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can be compared. That is, if temporal selves can be characterised by sets of 
preferences, and a common domain over which attitudes of temporal selves can 
be compared exists, then a connectedness function as introduced above can be 
given by comparing those different sets of preferences.
More formally, the function c measures the degree of connectedness between 
the temporal selves relative to some normalised measure of distance, difference 
or similarity between the attitudes of temporal selves. That is, q j  is determined 
by a measure of difference between the attitudes of S{ and Sj. To give a simple 
example, the degree of connectedness can be obtained by a normalised Hamming 
distance between two sets.
R eductive  C onnectedness M easured  by th e  H am m ing  D istance. Consider 
a small set of consequences Q = {a,b,c,x,y , z}  which is evaluated by Si 
and Sj.
•  Si has the following preference ordering: { a y  b y  c y  x y  y y  z}.
•  Sj  has the following preference ordering: {a y  b y  c y  x ~  y ~  z}.
• The two orderings determine 15 binary relations and 3 of those are 
different, therefore the Hamming distance between those two sets is
3.1
• The connectedness can be determined by considering a normalised 
Hamming distance: Ci,j = 1 — ^  =  -8
As briefly reviewed earlier, decision theories are well equipped to model changes 
in beliefs. Here, we assume that changes in preference between temporal selves 
as considered above are due to taste change. Reductive connectedness is hence a 
characterisation of the extent of taste changes between selves. According to such 
a procedure, we can establish similarity of preference between temporal selves, 
expressed as degree of connectedness c. We will explain in the next chapter of this 
thesis how such similarity of preference can be motivated by reductive accounts 
of psychological connectedness put forward by theories of personal identity over 
time.
Now consider non-reductive interpretations. Here, we can take temporal selves 
and connectedness as reflecting maximally rich descriptions of individuals that
1The binary relations between the pairs x y , y z , x z  are changed and the ones between the 
pairs ab, be, cx, ac, bx, cy, ax, by, cz, ay, bz, az  are unchanged.
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exist over time. That is, we can take selves to be characterised by a wide range of 
physical and psychological features, and connectedness to reflect their degree of 
sameness over time. For the purposes of describing a decision-maker over time, we 
might nevertheless limit such a non-reductive description to a few salient features 
that are conceptually close to the kinds of characterisations in decision theory. 
That is, in a non-reductive sense, we can take temporal selves at each time -  and 
their degree connectedness -  to be determined by a broad range of psychological 
features, such as emotions, and feelings of empathy for other selves as well as 
memories. In order to describe such features more precisely, we will show in 
the next chapter of this thesis that conceptual content of theories of personal 
identity over time can be employed in this regard. More specifically, theories 
that characterise the connectedness between selves due to a continuity of private 
memories (Section 3.4.1), feelings of empathy (Section 3.4.2) or social relations 
(Section 3.4.2) can be used to describe non-reductive connectedness.
Note that adopting one of the reductive and the non-reductive interpretations 
does not change the way in which the multiple-self model relates to standard de­
cision theory. In both interpretations, the model is applied in addition to a 
decision-theoretic analysis to capture time distance. In the reductive interpreta­
tion, time distance is associated with the degree of taste change in the decision­
maker, and in the non-reductive interpretation, the changes that determine the 
degree of connectedness are more complex.
As such, the multiple-self model is rather coarse-grained, as it summarises 
attitudes to time distance in a single degree of connectedness that is independent 
of the prospect in question. In order to relax this assumption, we now consider 
more complex multiple-self models.
2.4.3 Dual M ultip le-Self M odels
This section considers another type of multiple-self model that will be relevant 
in some applications in the later parts of the thesis. Recall that in the above 
specification of the multiple-self model, a simple variant has been given, where 
there is one self at each point in time. Here, in order to consider more complex 
attitudes to time, we consider a dual multiple-self model in which there are two 
sets of selves at each point in time.
Indeed, a dual multiple-self model specifies two sets of temporal selves which 
can differ according to both their degree of connectedness and the interpretation
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that is given.
T he  D ual M ultip le-Self M odel A dual multiple-self model of personal iden­
tity is a tuple Md = (A , C ) where
o A  contains two personalities, labelled P  and D that each consist of 
temporal selves, drawn from some set II:
A J P o  P . .  f t )
\  Do D... Dk j
o C = {cp ,cD} is a set of connectedness functions for the respective 
personalities.
According to such a dual model, it is also possible for a decision-maker to 
have a more complex structure to his identity. That is, we introduce two dif­
ferent temporal selves for each time point. Such a model allows us to consider 
deep ambiguities and conflict in the decision-maker’s deliberations about inter­
temporal decisions. For instance, it may be possible that the decision-maker 
has different social roles that induce different attitudes to time, such that when 
an individual considers her role as mother of her children she has a higher de­
gree of connectedness to her future selves than when she thinks of her role as a 
professional.
Such a dual model can also be seen as giving a ‘disaggregated’ version of a 
simple model with one row of temporal selves. However, for most of the applica­
tions in this thesis, variations of the simple multiple-self model already suffice to 
analyse intertemporal decisions. We will introduce a more detailed motivation of 
the additional structure in a dual-self model in Chapter 6.
2.4.4 M ultiple-Self M odels and D ecision-Theoretic R epresenta­
tions
This section explains how the multiple-self models introduced above relate to 
decision-theoretic representations of individuals. First and foremost, note that 
the multiple-self models are proposed as extensions of decision theory. That 
is, they do not require a modification of existing decision-theoretic accounts. 
Rather, the models can be applied as a separate step in analysing intertemporal 
decisions, over and above a decision-theoretic analysis. Note that both steps do
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not interfere with each other in relevant ways: it is still possible for the decision­
maker to adopt any specific attitudes to intertemporal prospects as captured by 
beliefs and desires. In particular, the individual can, due to her desires or beliefs, 
still evaluate future consequences as equally, more, or less important as ones that 
are closer to the present. Yet, after having considered those attitudes, specific 
intertemporal attitudes can be characterised by connectedness.
Two Modes of Interpretation
To explain this in greater detail, consider two intuitively plausible uses of multiple- 
self models. Firstly, we can take such models to describe the deliberations of 
decision-makers about the intertemporal aspects of prospects. That is, a decision­
maker can deliberate how well future selves are connected to her current self. In 
this mode of interpretation, the attitudes expressed by the degree of connec­
tedness do not concern the evaluation of the intertemporal prospect, which are 
already given by beliefs and desires, but rather the kinds of changes that an in­
dividual considers relevant over time. The precise nature of those attitudes will 
depend on whether we assume a reductive or non-reductive interpretation of such 
deliberations.
Secondly, we can interpret such models from the theorist’s point of view. On 
this reading of the three components of the model, they axe a sparse representation 
of separate temporal attitudes of a decision-maker. This also makes it more 
plausible to introduce the kinds of similarity measurement procedures that we 
alluded to above, where preferences of different selves are compared.
These two modes of interpretation suggest that multiple-self models can ex­
tend the scope of decision theory if intertemporal decisions require us to analyse 
the temporal dimension separately. Intertemporal prospects such as a career path 
axe maxked by the fact that trade-offs made over time axe a much more salient 
feature than the kinds of properties that can naturally be evaluated by beliefs 
and desires. Indeed, ‘after’ having evaluated decisions by beliefs and desires, the 
question might still stand what kind of attitudes to adopt to time distance or 
temporal dynamics. For those kinds of decisions, multiple-self models provide 
extensions to decision theories.
49
CHAPTER 2. MULTIPLE-SELF MODELS
Correspondence
In the discussion of the multiple-self models, time indices were introduced to 
denote temporal selves (such as in a set of temporal selves S  = {SQ, S i , , S^}). 
It has been tacitly assumed that such time indices relate the idea of different 
instances of decision-makers to time (such as in Table 2.1). In most modelling 
contexts, time indices can be commonly assumed and such a formalisation does 
not pose additional problems. Yet, if we are to interpret the multiple-self models 
as capturing what is relevant about time for decision-making, such time indices 
need further interpretation.
To make this step of interpretation explicit, we introduce the concept of cor­
respondence between selves and a time-index. If such a correspondence holds, the 
temporal selves are associated with time points which means, in turn, that the 
evaluations they make are about the desirability and probability of objects that 
are also associated with the respective points in time. This correspondence to 
some externally given time-index is hence made explicit as an assumption. Vari­
ants of such a correspondence condition need to be assumed in order to attach a 
relevance to the time indices in the multiple-self models that goes beyond mod­
elling. For instance, if desirability and probability evaluations are to be weighted 
according to which temporal self they concern, then such a correspondence con­
dition will allow one to maintain that such weighting captures the influence of 
time on the evaluations. In the application of the multiple-self models in the 
next chapters, such a correspondence will be introduced explicitly as and when 
needed.
Separability
The multiple-self model requires us to accept a separability condition: just as 
decision theory implies separability of outcomes to draw a decision matrix and 
apply consistency requirements, an application of the multiple-self model implies 
a separability of times, most notably a separability of an agent at a time and the 
deliberation he engages in about his future selves.
Such a separability assumption is, in the context of analysing attitudes to 
time, not uncommon (for a detailed discussion, consider Broome (1991)). How­
ever, if we are to employ connectedness in conjunction with decision-theoretic 
concepts, the assumption of separability becomes stronger. That is to say, we 
have to endorse a temporal separability assumption concerning the beliefs and
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desires of decision-makers, as connectedness is defined relative to such time points.
For instance, consider the possibility of applying degrees of connectedness 
as weights on specific consequences or events. In such applications, which will 
be discussed in detail in Chapter 4, goodness experiences by a low-connected 
temporal self is slightly devalued. However, in order to perform such weighting, 
the goodness itself also needs to be subjected to separability. -  We will make 
such an assumption explicit as and when it is employed (and not already implicit 
in the frameworks that are amended with the multiple-self model).
2.5 C onclusions
This chapter has developed modelling tools to extend decision-theoretic repres­
entations of decision-makers. Embarking from a review of standard-decision- 
theoretic accounts, we have seen that those models stay silent on many crucial 
problems of intertemporality, such as how to evaluate time distance and how to 
model specific aspects of temporal dynamics.
Multiple-self models have been introduced to capture attitudes to intertem­
porality. Temporal selves and their connectedness can be used to give reductive 
and non-reductive characterisations of attitudes to time and intertemporality, and 
can be used alongside decision-theoretic evaluations of intertemporal prospects. 
Such multiple-self models can be seen as characterising an agent’s introspection 
about her stability over time; that is, they give a degree of connectedness which 
signifies the similarities and differences between different temporal selves. We 
have also shown that such models clarify the use of the metaphor of the ‘multiple- 
self’, which has been widely used to suggest psychologically more realistic models 
of decision-makers. In a general sense, the multiple-self models present a struc­
ture that requires us to make explicit what kinds of phenomena we associate 
with intertemporal decisions, i.e. whether we analyse time distance, or more 
complicated problems associated to temporal dynamics.
Before discussing three problems of intertemporality in decisions and games, 
which benefit from applying the device of multiple-self models, we consider how 
key questions and distinctions in theories of personal identity over time cohere 
with the general structure of multiple-self models.
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Sum m ary. This chapter shows how multiple-self models structurally cohere 
with key questions and distinctions in theories of personal identity over time. 
We suggest that those theories can be viewed as competing answers to three 
questions: (i) instances, the question of what is significant for a person to exist 
at a given point in time -  this can be captured by the notion of temporal selves 
in a multiple-self model, (ii) persistence, the question of what is significant for a 
person to exist over time -  this can be captured by the notion of connectedness in 
a multiple-self model, and (iii) criteria, the question of what establishes instances 
and persistence of persons -  this can be captured by an interpretation of temporal 
selves and connectedness in a multiple-self model. That is, given a sufficiently 
rich specification of a multiple-self model, it can be motivated and constrained 
by specific theories of personal identity over time.
3.1 Introduction
Persons change over time: we grow up, adopt new attitudes, and vary our phys­
ical appearance. Yet, despite such changes in physical and psychological char­
acteristics, we have the sense that we also stay the same persons over time: we 
retain ownership of past actions, and many of the aforementioned characteristics 
change only incrementally. Theories of personal identity over time elucidate our 
understanding of the seemingly contradictory nature of difference and sameness 
of persons. These theories aim to establish how and why a person at different 
times can still be the same person. This question has been considered in all 
philosophical traditions and many different accounts, theories and problems as­
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sociated with it have been brought to the fore. This chapter reviews parts of 
this literature, limiting itself to accounts in contemporary analytic philosophy. 
There is no particular view or argument that will be argued for in the process of 
this review: rather, the goal is to identify those contributions in the literature on 
personal identity over time that can motivate and constrain multiple-self models.
This chapter aims to show that several key distinctions and questions in theor­
ies of personal identity structurally cohere with multiple-self models as developed 
in the previous chapter. For this, we discuss theories of personal identity in a 
tripartite framework. More specifically, we suggest that those theories can be 
seen as competing answers to the following three questions: (i) instances, the 
question of what is significant for a person to exist at a given point in time, 
(ii) persistence, the question what is significant for a person to exist over time, 
and (iii) criteria, the question of what establishes instances and persistence of 
persons. This framework will sometimes be referred to as a model of personal 
identity over time. We will show how this framework is compatible with other 
taxonomies and frameworks for theories of personal identity theories that have 
been proposed in the literature.
Recall that the previous chapter has formulated multiple-self models with 
three elements: temporal selves, connectedness, and their interpretations. The 
review of theories of personal identity will show that the notion of selves can 
capture the concern in personal identity theories to specify what instances of a 
person axe, the notion of connectedness can capture the concern in personal iden­
tity theories to specify the persistence of persons, and the specific interpretation 
of connectedness and selves captures the concern in personal identity theories 
to specify a criterion of personal identity over time. In a colloquial sense, we 
might refer to this structural coherence as an isomorphism between the tripartite 
structure of multiple-self models and models of personal identity over time.
The structural coherence makes it possible to use the conceptual content of 
personal identity theories to motivate and constrain multiple-self models of per­
sonal identity over time. That is to say, we can use criteria of personal identity 
over time to give substantial content to the interpretation of selves and connec­
tedness in multiple-self models. We will call models that are enriched in such a 
fashion ‘multiple-self models of personal identity over time’. These models will 
be used to furnish additional insights into the three problems of time in decisions 
and games that are discussed in Part II of this thesis.
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This chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 gives a broad historical 
overview of the main debates in theories of personal identity over time. Section
3.3 introduces the framework instances, persistence, and criteria in greater detail 
and shows how it is an appropriate framework for capturing theories of personal 
identity over time. Section 3.4 gives an overview of memory and psychological 
criteria of personal identity over time that can be used to motivate and constrain 
interpretations in multiple-self models of personal identity over time. Section 3.5 
discusses problems of rational agency related to multiple-self models of personal 
identity over time. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 A  Stylised H istory o f T heories o f Personal Iden­
tity  over Tim e
The problem of personal identity over time has received widespread attention in 
all philosophical traditions and modes of inquiry. These contributions form a 
huge literature which is reviewed in Noonan (1989), Kolak and Martin (1991), 
Shoemaker (2008) and Olson (2008). Standard anthologies include Perry (1975a), 
Rorty (1976) and Martin and Barresi (2003). This section gives a brief historical 
account of how the most salient paradigms in theories of personal identity over 
time have emerged before analysing the accounts with regards to the three key 
concerns of personal identity theories alluded to in the introduction.
3.2.1 P lato  and D escartes versus Locke and Hum e
In the historical introduction to their anthology on personal identity, Martin 
and Barresi (2003) provide a broad division of the history of personal identity 
theories in analytic philosophy into three phases: firstly, from Plato up until 
Locke, secondly, from Locke to the 1960s, and thirdly, from the 1960s up to the 
present. Martin and Barresi (2003) admit and demonstrate that this three-phases 
view is rather coarse-grained, yet argue that it provides an understanding of how 
the main paradigms in theories of personal identity have emerged.
The first phase from Plato up until Locke is characterised by Martin and 
Barresi (2003, 6ff.) as being dominated by theories that present the so-called 
‘simple view’ of understanding the self as being constituted by an immaterial 
and indivisible substance, such as the soul or the Ego. Plato first developed the 
notion of the soul as constitutive of the self in Phaedo, where he characterises it
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as immaterial, indivisible and immortal. The concept is developed in discussions 
of human mortality, advancing the idea of the immortality of the soul. Thus, 
Plato’s Phaedo does not aim to advance a complete picture of the psychological 
reality of the human mind and its persistence.1 Indeed, in his review of different 
accounts of the soul, Lorenz (2009) maintains that
‘Phaedo’s conception of soul is narrower than our concept of mind...
The range of activities (etc.) that the soul is directly responsible for, 
and which may be described as activities of the soul strictly speaking, 
is significantly narrower than the range of mental activities. It does 
not include all of a person’s desires, nor need it include all emotional 
responses, or even all beliefs.’
This idea of a spiritual substance that makes up the essential identity of the self 
was taken up in accounts of Scholastic scholars and, notably, Rene Descartes 
(Martin and Barresi, 2003, 17ff.). On Descartes’ account of personal identity, the 
concept of the ‘Ego’ fulfils the role of the soul in Plato. The Ego is disembodied 
which means that it is an immaterial substance:
‘. . .1 thence concluded that I was a substance whose whole essence 
or nature consists only in thinking, and which, that it may exist, has 
need of no place, nor is dependent on any material thing; so that ‘I’, 
that is to say, the mind by which I am what I am, is wholly distinct 
from the body, and is even more easily known than the latter, and is 
such, that although the latter were not, it would still continue to be 
all that it is.’ (Descartes, 1637, Part IV).
Taking the soul, the Ego or some other purely mental entity as constitutive of the 
self, it follows that personal identity is an ‘unanalysable fact’ (Noonan, 1989, 16). 
This ‘simple view’ of personal identity has been challenged by a family of theories 
that maintain that personal identity needs further characterisation, starting with 
John Locke.
The second historical phase in theories of personal identity over time, from 
Locke to the 1960s, is characterised by Martin and Barresi (2003, 24ff.) as mainly
xNote that Plato also developed a much more psychologically minded concept of the soul 
in the Republic, which depicts the soul consisting of reason, spirit and desire and provides the 
basis for a much more detailed account of the psychology of the human mind. Farther, in the 
Symposium, Plato developed what appears to be a relational view.
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advancing the so-called ‘relational view’, i.e. understanding the self as changing 
process of physiological and psychological elements. In contrast to the ‘simple 
view’, which postulated a somewhat mythical idea of the self, such relational 
accounts lend themselves to further empirical analysis, such as collecting evidence 
for the sameness of psychological traits in a person. On Locke’s (1694) account, 
the continuity in consciousness ensures that a person is identical at different times 
and not on the substance of either the soul or the body: “. . .  wherein personal 
identity consists: not in the identity of substance, but, as I have said, in the 
identity of consciousness, . . . ” (Locke, 1694, Book II, ch. XXVII). (Note that due 
to changes in the use of those terms, Locke uses ‘consciousness’ here for what we 
now call ‘memory’).
Locke’s view has marked the beginning of many proposals of criteria of per­
sonal identity over time that focus on different psychological traits that are said 
to be crucial in defining what makes a person at a later time identical to the one 
at an earlier time. Hume (1739) takes an even more radical stance in emphas­
ising the relational perspective. Firstly, he is more forceful in denying the ‘simple 
view’, asking:
‘w h a t . . .  gives us so great a propension to ascribe an identity to these 
successive perceptions, and to suppose ourselves possest of an in­
variable and uninterrupted existence thro’ the whole course of our 
fives?’ . . .  [Persons are] nothing but a bundle or collection of different 
perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity 
. . .  (Hume, 1739, Book I, Part IV, ch. vi)
Secondly, he also subscribes to the memory criterion of personal identity, main­
taining that:
‘. .. memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and extent of this 
succession of perceptions, it is to be considered, upon that account 
chiefly, as the source of personal identity. Had we no memory, we never 
should have any notion of causation, nor consequently of that chain of 
causes and effects, which constitute our self or person.’ (Hume, 1739,
Book I, Part IV, ch. vi).
Discussing personal identity over time in terms of continuity of psychological 
features such as memory has yielded a number of distinct problems which axe
56
CHAPTER 3. PERSONAL ID E N TITY  OVER TIME
discussed in recent accounts. Indeed, these early theories discussed so far already 
broadly foreshadow the lines of inquiry in more recent debates.
3.2.2 Contem porary Debates: D ualism s and Criteria
The third, contemporary, phase of personal identity theories can be roughly char­
acterised by two families of developments. The first family of developments con­
cerns a detailed analysis of distinctions along the ‘simple versus relational view’ 
dualism, advancing related, but more specific dualisms such as ‘reductionism 
versus non-reductionism’ and ‘endurance versus perdurance’. The second family 
of developments concerns intricate debates about the correct criterion of personal 
identity, marked by the infamous methodology of thought experiments, such as 
the brain transplantation, fission and teletransportation cases.
We start with the first collection of developments that offer more detailed 
analysis along the ‘simple versus relational view’ dualism. The latter is closely 
related to the distinction between reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of 
personal identity over time, largely due to Parfit (1984). He maintains that theor­
ies of personal identity can be reductionist or non-reductionist: non-reductionist 
approaches share the concern to not limit the characterisation of personal iden­
tity to specific, empirically verifiable, factors like reductionist ones do. More 
specifically, reductionism endorses at least the first of the following two claims:
‘(1) that the fact of a person’s identity over time just consists in the 
holding of certain more particular facts, (2) that these facts can be 
described without either presupposing the identity of this person, or 
explicitly claiming that the experiences in this person’s fife are had by 
this person, or even explicitly claiming that this person exists. These 
facts can be described in an impersonal way.’ (Parfit, 1984, 210)
Non-reductionist accounts reject those claims and involve, in the terminology of 
Parfit (1984, 210), a ‘deep further fact’, for which the Cartesian Ego is an example.
In contrast, reductionist approaches reduce personal identity to analysable entit­
ies, aiming at an empirically more precise yet conceptually more pragmatic grasp 
of what personal identity over time consists in and how it can be well described.
Many theories will, if they endorse the simple view, also endorse non-reductionism, 
such as in Plato’s Phaedo and in Descartes. Conversely, the relational view is com­
monly aligned with reductionism, as in Parfit. This, however, is not always the
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case. For instance, Locke endorses both the relational view and non-reductionism. 
As pointed out by Quinton (1975) and Uzgalis (2009), even though Locke does 
endorse a criterion-based, relational discussion of personal identity, he also holds 
a more complicated ontology of persons which distinguishes between man, think­
ing substances and personal identity. Due to this distinction, Locke does not 
reject the notion of the soul (as, for instance, Hume does), but merely argues 
against it as establishing personal identity. That is to say, on a narrow definition 
of personal identity, Locke characterises it reductively by memory but also holds 
a non-reductive concept of personhood. Similarly, Lewis (1983) also endorses a 
relational view and non-reductionism.
Consider next the dualism of ‘endurance versus perdurance’. Many discus­
sions of personal identity will make reference to persons existing at specific points 
in time, such as ‘person A  at time t \ .  Such time-slices of persons or person-stages 
can be taken as merely empirical time-indexed reference to an enduring person. 
However, persons can also be understood as collections of separate yet interre­
lated time-indexed entities. Already foreshadowed in Hume (1739), this idea has 
gained further traction in virtue of the thought experiments mentioned above, 
due to Parfit (1984), and more generally due to the fact that the intricate ex­
amples require a precise analysis which is facilitated by referring to different time 
slices or stages of persons. In this context, the question of the ontological status 
of those person-stages or time-slices of persons has been considered. In short, 
perdurance accounts view persons as consisting in four-dimensional ‘space-time 
worms’ -  that is, three-dimensional, temporal parts (such as Parfit (1984), Lewis 
(1983)), whereas endurance accounts deny that such entities have any ontological 
significance (e.g. Shoemaker and Swinburne (1984)).
Naturally, theories of personal identity can be compared according to these 
three dualisms. In a simplified use of those dualisms, they do form two coherent 
collections; one advancing a ‘unifying’ and the other advancing a ‘decomposed’ 
picture of persons and personal identity over time. The unifying view would be 
held by theories that endorse all three of the simple view, non-reductionism and 
endurance. For example, Plato and Descartes can be characterised as endorsing 
all three of those views. A decomposed view would be held when endorsing all 
three of the relational view, reductionism and perdurance. This is indeed Parfit’s 
position. However, as already mentioned, the dualisms do not need to coincide in 
such a fashion. For instance, Locke endorses the relational view, non-reductionism
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and -  partly because of his non-reductionism -  does not strictly endorse either 
one of the concepts of endurance or perdurance. Shoemaker, on the other hand, 
agrees with Locke on the first two distinctions but also clearly rejects perdur­
ance (Shoemaker, 1963; Shoemaker and Swinburne, 1984). Finally, Lewis (1983) 
endorses a relational view, non-reductionism and perdurance. Hence, introdu­
cing such distinctions has enabled one to be much more precise in analysing and 
comparing different theories of personal identity.
The second family of contemporary developments in theories of personal iden­
tity over time concerns different criteria of personal identity and thought experi­
ments that demonstrate problems with such criteria. In the wake of Locke’s initial 
development of the relational view, various candidates for criteria that fulfil the 
relational view have been discussed, such as continuity of the body, the brain, 
as well as relevant physical and different psychological features (Noonan (1989, 
2-13), Olson (2008)). These will be reviewed and compared in detail later. In 
the context of contemporary debates regarding the plausibility of such criteria 
of personal identity over time, thought experiments have become an important 
tool (Martin and Barresi, 2003, 3), notably due to the ones put forward by Willi­
ams (1956), Williams (1970), Nagel (1971), Lewis (1983) and Parfit (1984). Such 
thought experiments, and their consequences, being by no means crucial to the 
task at hand in this chapter, will only be briefly revisited later.
This concludes a brief historical synopsis of important topics in theories of 
personal identities over time. The discussion already suggests that there are two 
key requirements of such theories: firstly, to align along a number of dualisms 
and secondly to endorse a specific interpretation that is upheld with regards to 
the positioning concerning those dualisms. This general picture will be further 
developed in a tripartite model in the next section. Some of the aforementioned 
concepts and problems will be further explained and analysed in this framework.
3.3 Three P roblem s o f Personal Identity  over T im e
This section offers a systematic discussion of personal identity theories along the 
three dimensions of (i) instances, (ii) persistence and (iii) criteria. The aim of 
this section is twofold: firstly, we aim to demonstrate how this framework co­
heres with taxonomies and distinctions that have been proposed in the personal 
identity literature. This will be achieved by relating the framework to specific
59
CHAPTER 3. PERSONAL ID EN TITY OVER TIME
accounts in the literature and re-describing the dualisms introduced in the pre­
vious section along the three dimensions. Secondly, we show how the threefold 
structure of the framework makes it possible to use conceptual content of theor­
ies of personal identity to enrich interpretations of selves and connectedness in 
multiple-self models.
Note that personal identity over time is a particularly challenging topic due 
to its complex nature, as it combines problems of personhood, identity and time 
-  all of which raise many problems on their own. For instance, personhood raises 
the questions of how a person can be defined and how persons can be adequately 
distinguished from one another, from animals and objects. Concerning identity, 
a key debate concerns the infamous dualism between qualitative non-identity and 
numerical identity. Finally, few philosophical problems have been e l s  contested as 
the nature and understanding of time itself. There axe thus many different ways in 
which the problem of personal identity over time can be understood -  depending 
on whether once focuses on one of the aforementioned aspects or whether one 
attempts to advance a specific all-encompassing view on the problem. These 
conceptual complexities motivate the introduction of the tripartite framework, 
in order to extract conceptual content from personal identity theories that is 
relevant for characterising and interpreting multiple-self models for the analysis 
of intertemporal decisions.
3.3.1 Instances, P ersistence and Criteria
The framework of philosophical theories of personal identity over time proposed 
here focuses on three key concerns which are referred to as (i) instances, (ii) 
persistence and (iii) criteria of personhood. These three dimensions are intended 
to broadly capture the main concerns of theories of personal identity as introduced 
in the previous section. We first introduce the framework and then discuss later 
how the distinctions already introduced relate to it.
In the proposed framework, there are thus three important dimensions to 
theories of personal identity over time:
• Instances of a person at a time. Theories of personal identity over time will 
make some claim2 about what they take to be significant about a person’s
2Such claims could be implicit or even dismissive of the importance of the problem of instances 
(or one of the other concerns).
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existence at a time. This will be referred to as the part of the theory that 
talks about instances of a person.
• Persistence of a person over time. Theories of personal identity over time 
will make some claim about what they take to establish for a person to 
exist over time. This will be referred to as the part of the theory that talks 
about persistence of a person.
•  Criterion of personal identity. Theories of personal identity will make some 
claim about what they take to substantively or materially establish in­
stances and persistence of a person. This will be referred to as the part of 
the theory that talks about a criterion for a person.
This minimal set of rather broad concerns about personal identity over time 
formulated in the framework stems from and is closely related to a number of 
similar proposals in the literature on personal identity over time that identify a 
set of questions or concerns, notably Perry (1975c), Parfit (1984), Olson (2008), 
as well as Quante (2007). For instance, in the introduction to his anthology, 
Perry (1975c) discusses personal identity along a dualism between qualitative 
non-identity and quantitative identity of persons (mapping onto instances and 
persistence) and its substantial interpretations. Many more fine-grained distinc­
tions can be made, including an analysis of the level on which claims axe made, 
e.g. whether the theories claim to make ontological, metaphysical or epistemic 
statements. These more fine-grained distinctions map on the basic three dimen­
sions outlined above. For instance, introducing further distinctions with regards 
to demarcating the ontological relevance of claims, Parfit (1984, 202) raises four 
questions: (1) What is the nature of a person? (2) W hat is it that makes a person 
at two different times one and the same person? (3) W hat is necessarily involved 
in the continued existence of each person over time? (4) What is in fact involved 
in the continued existence of each person over time? In the above framework, 
Parfit’s (1) maps onto (iii) criteria and Parfit’s (2) maps onto (i) instances and 
(ii) persistence in the framework adopted here. Parfit’s (3) and (4) enable him to 
discuss more specific concerns about the ontological status of persistence. More 
broadly, the overview of Olson (2008) mentions eight problems of personal iden­
tity, some of which directly map onto the three dimensions above, some of which 
provide more fine-grained distinctions. This suggests that the tripartite model 
proposed here is compatible with received frameworks in the literature.
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The framework introduced above lends itself to a characterisation of the du­
alisms introduced in the previous section. We start with re-describing the ‘simple 
versus relational view’ dualism. In the new terminology, a theory of personal 
identity over time holds the simple view iff it postulates exactly one criterion of 
personal identity over time, which alone establishes persistence, and instances are 
merely of descriptive or empirical significance. This is the case for theories such 
as Plato’s and Descartes’ which endorse the soul or Ego as the sole criterion of 
personal identity which alone establishes persistence. Instances do not figure bey­
ond an empirical referent in their theories, neither in the soul’s characterisation, 
nor in the analysis of its significance. Concerning the relational view, in the new 
terminology, a theory that advances a relational view postulates a number (com­
monly one) of criteria of personal identity over time, that can identify instances 
whose relations, in turn, can establish persistence. This holds true for accounts 
such as Locke’s, who identifies instances by the memory criterion and then asks 
whether there are suitable relations between instances (such as recollections of 
experiences) which establish persistence. The other dualism introduced in the 
earlier review will be re-described further below.
Note that it is neither argued that the framework captures all main concerns 
of theories of personal identity over time nor that it specifies necessary and suf­
ficient conditions of personhood. Rather, it allows one to describe, identify and 
compare personal identity theories in a way that they can constrain multiple-self 
models as introduced in the previous chapter. Indeed the fairly general structure 
of the personal identity model of (i) instances, (ii) persistence, and (iii) criterion 
structurally coheres with multiple-self models that specify temporal selves, con­
nectedness, and their interpretation.
The next two sections will further motivate and describe the three dimensions 
of the personal identity model, first discussing the relations between instances and 
persistence, and then focusing on the criteria.
3.3.2 Instances and Persistence
The relations between instances and persistence are at the heart of the dual­
ism of ‘endurance versus perdurance’ that was briefly introduced earlier. Before 
discussing this dualism in detail, it is helpful to consider another, much more fun­
damental dualism that has been discussed in the literature: the so-called dualism 
of identity between qualitative non-identity and quantitative identity. Discussing
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this dualism highlights how the concepts of instances and persistence adequately 
reflect key distinctions made in the literature.
In a first step, we remind ourselves that theories of personal identity over time 
can be seen as a specific way of talking about identity over time. That is to say, by 
analysing the problem of identity over time in general, fundamental constraints 
and categories can be found that also have to apply to the more specific problem 
of personal identity in some way. In theories that deal with the problem of 
identity, as reviewed in Sider (2000), Sider (2001), Lowe (2001) Noonan (2008), 
and Gallois (2008), the so-called dualism of identity and its possible resolutions 
play a major role. More specifically, theories of identity highlight the importance 
of addressing the dualism of identity as well as giving a substantive account 
such as a criterion or interpretation of the object whose identity over time is in 
question. For instance, Sider (2000, p.81) begins his discussion of recent work on 
identity by stating:
‘Let us divide our subject matter in two. There is first the ques­
tion of criteria of identity, the conditions governing when an object 
of a certain kind, a computer for instance, persists until some later 
time. There axe secondly very general questions about the nature of 
persistence itself.’
To illustrate the dualism of identity, take the example of the identity of a 
physical object like a chair: a successful theory of identity over time will be able 
to make statements about how we are to understand the qualitative changes in 
a chair over time while it will also be able to make statements about how we 
axe to understand the quantitative identity of the chair in question. We can call 
that the interpretation of the dualism of identity. Ideally, such an interpretation 
accommodates our twofold intuition that the ‘same’ chair can be of different 
quality, e.g. after furnishing a new upholstery or painting it, we still think it is 
the same chair in the sense of quantitative identity. Ideally, an interpretation 
of identity over time would also give adequate criteria of when we are no longer 
speaking about the same object but rather about two or more different objects 
(Gallois, 2008). Accordingly, theories of identity over time focus on answering 
two main questions, following the ‘dualism of identity’: one, how can there be 
qualitative non-identity over time and two, how can there be quantitative identity 
over time? Seeking an account of identity over time that allows one to answer 
both questions satisfactorily is the goal of any theory of identity, saying ‘what
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m atters’ when dealing with the dualism of identity. 3
This discussion is intimately related to the the dualism ‘endurance versus per­
durance’ discussed earlier. Insofar as instances and persistence axe mere place­
holders that signal the identity dualism, awaiting interpretation under a sub­
stantive criterion, they are unproblematic notions. However, even in the absence 
of a substantive criterion of personal identity over time, claims about the status 
of instances and persistence can be made that need to be supported. Consider 
the question of how exactly does persistence arise and in what way does it make 
reference to instances? Consider David Lewis’ characterisation of endurance and 
perdurance, as cited in Lowe (2001, 127):
‘something perdures iff it persists by having different temporal parts, 
or stages, at different times, though no one part of it is wholly present 
at more than one time; whereas it endures iff it persists by being 
wholly present at more than one time.’
Hence, taking persons to be perdurers relies on a four-dimensionalist ontology of 
persons where instances are interpreted as temporal parts that are existing over 
time, just as three-dimensional temporal parts. In contrast, taking persons to be 
endurers takes persistence as the fundamental ontological category and does not 
interpret instances of persons as temporal parts -  at most, they are interpreted 
as empirical, observable instances of a person’s life.
Hence, in the terminology of (i) instances, (ii) persistence and (iii) criteria, 
the dualism ‘endurance versus perdurance’ can be re-described as follows. Per­
durance accounts maintain that persons are collections of instances which can 
be persistent, and the persistence might be produced in virtue of some property 
that can be captured by a criterion. This is a position that, for instance, Hume 
(1739) and Parfit (1984) subscribe to, as both regard persons as collections of 
some instances (which can be identified by memory or psychological criteria) and 
which, under enough continuity under the criterion of personal identity, are said 
to persist. In contrast to the perdurance view, endurance accounts maintain that 
persons are persistent, possibly according to some criterion and unrelated to that
3In the terminology of Sider (2000, 2001), we can say that the stages 51 and 52 belong to 
some continuing F iff <j>, where 51 and 52 exhibit (i) qualitative non-identity, F  exhibits (ii) 
quantitative identity and <£ exhibits (iii) an interpretation. If we wish to focus on analysing 
qualitative non-identity, we provide an interpretation of 51 and 52 as being temporal parts of 
the continuing F; others regard 51 and 52 as different stages in the life history of the continuing 
F.
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we have epistemic or even empirical access to instances of them. This position is, 
amongst others, endorsed by Plato and Descartes whose accounts start off from 
a persistence perspective, according to their notions of the soul.
The discussion of the dualism of identity suggests the relevance of discussing 
the interpretation of (i) instances and (ii) persistence of persons and the way in 
which temporal parts of persons are significant for personal identity over time. 
In this context, Lewis’ point about the difference between discussing questions of 
‘identity’ or ‘similarity’ is helpful (Lewis, 1983, 157ff.). Lewis questions whether 
discussions of personal identity are really about identity. In his view, problems 
of identity are straightforward -  as no two things can ever be identical -  while 
problems of similarity or sameness can be more intricate. He views the problem of 
personal identity as being one of similarity, and hence one of degrees of sameness. 
In such an understanding of personal identity, the metaphysical problems asso­
ciated with endurance and perdurance become less pressing. It is indeed such a 
‘thin’ understanding of instances and persistence as characterising degrees of per­
sonal identity, for instance in virtue of some criterion of similarity or continuity, 
that is sufficient to motivate and constrain multiple-self models.
3.3.3 Criteria
In order to discuss the third element of the framework, that of criteria, we now 
turn to discuss what kinds of substantive criteria of personhood have been pro­
posed in the literature. As briefly mentioned in the historical overview, personal 
identity over time has been discussed with reference to variants and mixtures of 
physical and psychological criteria. The following criteria of personal identity are 
the most prominent ones and have either been taken to be the sole criterion of 
personal identity or combined and collated with other criteria (as presented and 
reviewed in Perry (1975a), Martin and Barresi (2003), Noonan (1989), Shoemaker 
(2008), and Olson (2008)):
• Thinking substance, the Soul or the Ego (Plato in Phaedo\ Descartes (1637); 
Chisholm (1976)),
• Physical criteria, such as sameness of the body, the brain or somatic same­
ness (Williams, 1956; Nagel, 1971; Thompson, 1997; Snowdon, 1990; Olson, 
1997, 2003),
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•  Sameness of memory, consciousness or quasi-memory (Locke, 1694; Hume, 
1739; Shoemaker, 1959, 1963),
• Psychological continuity (Parfit (1984, 205ff); Noonan (1989)),
• Continuity of empathy, intentions, or narrative (MacIntyre, 1984, 1989; 
Taylor, 1989; Schechtman, 2001, 2005; DeGrazia, 2005).
As the above fist suggests, many different criteria have been put forward by 
which one can say that a person stays the same person over time. For example, 
the bodily criterion of personal identity says that it is the same organism of a 
person that makes a person the same person over time. Other approaches argue 
that psychological connectedness is essential to being the same person over time.
Concerning those criteria, both reductionist and non-reductionist views have 
been proposed. In the context of the model of personal identity introduced here, 
the distinction between reductionism and non-reductionism can be re-described as 
a disagreement about the metaphysical scope of the above criteria. In the termin­
ology of (i) instances, (ii) persistence and (iii) criteria, on a reductionist account 
of personal identity over time, a number of empirical criteria (usually one) are 
employed to express facts about instances and/or persistence which, in turn, es­
tablishes personal identity. Such a view is endorsed, for instance, by Parfit (1984). 
On his account of psychological reductionism, sameness of psychological traits is 
the criterion that can establish persistence which completely captures personal 
identity. In contrast, on a non-reductionist account, personal identity cannot be 
fully established and captured by factual criteria of instances and/or persistence. 
Such a view is endorsed by Descartes and Plato, as mentioned earlier. It also 
holds for Shoemaker (1963) and Shoemaker and Swinburne (1984): even though 
they endorse a relational view of personal identity, they do not think that the 
characterisation captures personal identity completely. Similarly, Locke main­
tains that there can be a persistent soul besides a characterisation of instances of 
memory.
Discussing different criteria of personal identity over time, Noonan (1989) 
makes an important distinction between their substantial and empirical interpret­
ation. In his terminology, we can distinguish between ‘constitutive’ and ‘eviden­
tial’ criteria of personal identity. The debates briefly introduced in the previous 
chapter are significant and have attracted attention because they were taken to 
advance a substantive understanding of persons and their identity over time, in an
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ontological sense. The substantive interpretation of theories of personal identity 
over time sees them as advancing necessary and sufficient conditions for viewing 
one person at a specific point in time as identical to another person at a different 
time, in the most fundamental sense. However, one can also view some of the 
theories and criteria as merely advancing an ‘evidential’ interpretation. This is 
especially plausible for theories that are relational, reductionist and/or endorse 
perdurance and makes those accounts easier to accept. Note that for the purposes 
of motivating and constraining interpretations of multiple-self models with the­
ories of personal identity over time, such an evidential interpretation of criteria is 
already sufficient. That is, one can view theories of personal identity over time as 
providing simplified accounts of important features of personal identity over time 
without subscribing to the idea that they conclusively postulate metaphysical 
truths.
Before discussing in greater detail how criteria of personal identity over time 
can be used to motivate multiple-self models, we consider personal identity thought 
experiments in the framework of instances, persistence, and criteria.
3.3.4 Personal Identity  Thought Experim ents
This section suggests that the tripartite framework of the personal identity model 
does not imply that we are glossing over the intricate problems of personal identity 
encapsulated in thought experiments that have been suggested in the literature. 
Recall the fact that thought experiments and the problems that result from their 
discussion are an important methodological device in the literature on personal 
identity over time. In general, thought experiments are used to demonstrate how 
a specific criterion of personal identity can be shown not to hold in all cases, i.e. 
how it gives rise to a counter-intuitive conclusion or a paradox (Gendler (2000), 
Wilkes (1988)). That is to say, such thought experiments are used to expose the 
conceptual limits of different criteria of personal identity.
We consider a brief example of a thought experiment to demonstrate the de­
scriptive accuracy of the tripartite framework. Examples of hypothetical ‘fission’ 
of persons, such as discussed in Nozick (1981) and Parfit (1984), can be under­
stood as cases where a person divides into two (seemingly) numerically different 
persons and both of those are qualitatively identical to each other, as well as 
to the pre-person. Fission consists in manipulating important features of a per­
son in a way that results in more than one candidate for being identical to the
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former person: for example, we are asked to imagine that a person’s brain is 
extracted from her body and split in half. The original body is destroyed and 
the two hemispheres of the brain are transplanted into two identical bodies. As a 
result of such manipulations, two persons are now plausible candidates for being 
identical with the former person according to a number of criteria: both persons 
can give an account of being related through, for instance, psychological features, 
and through sameness of the brain. Yet, we would not necessarily think of those 
persons as persistent with the pre-person from which the brain was extracted, 
and it would be hard to tell which one of the candidates has stronger relations 
with the pre-person.
We show how such thought experiments can be suitably re-described in the 
framework. Firstly, consider one personal identity model P/Brain that gives per­
sonal identity as sameness of the brain. The above thought experiment shows 
that this criterion cannot account for some cases such as the above. Adopting 
a tripartite framework to characterise a personal identity theory that postulates 
sameness of the brain does not impinge on the validity of the above thought 
experiment.
Secondly, by invoking more than one personal identity model, we can even 
further re-describe the thought experiment to better understand its structure. 
Suppose there are, in the background, also candidate models of personal identity 
that advocate sameness of psychological features via P /p sych and sameness of the 
body via PiBody- Re-describing the example, it becomes clear that the problem 
of giving counterintuitive answers arises for P/Brain (and P /p sych) because same­
ness of the body breaks down, yet there is sameness according to the two other 
accounts. This re-description makes transparent that the thought experiment ex­
poses a tension between different criteria of personal identity. More specifically, 
it is used to show that sameness of the brain or psychological features cannot 
account for some cases such as the above.
Note that the very nature of those thought experiments -  and their methodo­
logical merit -  stems from explicitly ruling out such rich descriptions of personal 
identity according to the three PZ-models just introduced for additional explan­
ation. Indeed, the thought experiments axe usually used to show the limits of 
one specific criterion (in the above case, either one of sameness of the brain or 
psychological features) in giving an account of personal identity. All what we 
intended to demonstrate here is that the tripartite framework does not
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Yet, as mentioned before, the main use of the framework is to make precise 
and explicit the conceptual content of theories of personal identity over time for 
using it in multiple-self models. For this goal, the descriptive accuracy of the 
framework is the main concern.
This completes the task of demonstrating that the model of personal iden­
tity is an appropriate framework to discuss theories of personal identity, as it 
is compatible with key distinctions, dualisms, and problems as proposed in the 
literature. We will now turn to a more detailed discussion of those criteria that 
will be used to motivate multiple-self models.
3.4 Criteria o f Personal Identity  over T im e
Multiple-self models coheres with the structure of the framework of personal 
identity introduced here: temporal selves can be seen as giving a specification 
of instances, connectedness can give a characterisation of persistence, and their 
interpretation can give a criterion. This suggests that specific accounts of personal 
identity theories can be used to motivate and constrain multiple-self models.
This section considers what kind of conceptual content from personal identity 
theories can be used to enrich interpretations in multiple-self models. More spe­
cifically, this section reviews two categories of personal identity criteria that can 
both be broadly described as psychological criteria: those criteria that are close 
to the informational aspect of rational choice, such as memory and consciousness 
as well as those that are close to the valuational aspect of rational choice, such 
as preferences, tastes and empathy. For each of the two categories, reductionist 
and non-reductionist variants are discussed.
3.4.1 M em ory Criteria
This section discusses the conceptual content of an important family of criteria of 
personal identity over time, namely those that appeal to some variant of a memory 
concept to establish personal identity over time . 4  Firstly, different memory con­
cepts are reviewed, and secondly, both reductive and non-reductive uses of such
4 Note that in the literature on personal identity over time, memory criteria are often referred 
to as constituting psychological criteria, or as belonging to the class of psychological criteria. 
Here, in order to establish possible conceptual interpretations of sameness and similarity to use 
in models of temporally extended decision-makers, we make a further distinction according to 
what kind of psychological features the specific criteria advance.
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criteria are presented.
Memory, Consciousness, and Self-Knowledge
As briefly introduced earlier, on Locke’s account of personal identity, the con­
tinuity in ‘consciousness’ ensures that a person is identical at different times and 
not on the substance of either the soul or the body: . wherein personal identity
consists: not in the identity of substance, but, as I have said, in the identity of 
consciousness, . . .  ’ (Locke, 1694, Book II, ch. XXVII). The mental features that 
Locke (1694) is interested in here are similar to what we now refer to as ‘memory’ 
-  the recollection of one’s own past actions and events. Noonan (1989) describes 
the different meanings that have been ascribed to the term ‘consciousness’ and 
maintains that Locke has used it in a strong sense: ‘When one is ‘conscious to 
oneself’ knowledge of something is shared with oneself alone. In this use of the 
expression one may be thought of as a witness to one’s own acts’ (Noonan, 1989, 
43). Locke endorses the consciousness/memory criterion not only to describe 
persistence but also to characterise its strength and scope, as he maintains that 
‘. . .as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action 
of thought, so far reaches the identity of that person’ (Locke, 1694, Book II, ch. 
XIXVII). Noonan (1989, 43) characterises the conceptual content of Locke’s cri­
terion as ‘shared knowledge had by a present self of a past self’s actions which 
Locke thinks of as constituting personal identity.’
Numerous authors after Locke, starting with Butler and Reid, and stated 
more concisely in Shoemaker (1959) and Perry (1975b), have pointed out that his 
account is subject to a circularity objection: the first-person account of memory as 
self-knowledge already presupposes personal identity. That is to say, if we apply 
Locke’s memory criterion to establish personal identity, we ask: can a person, at 
a specific instance, remember to having been witness to her own acts at an earlier 
instance? Now, Shoemaker (1959) and Perry (1975b) argue that the candidates 
for such items of memory that could establish persistence need already belong to 
the person whose identity we want to establish, as we are asking for a person’s 
own acts. That is, in order for the memory criterion to establish personal identity, 
we already have to identify the right kind of candidate memories by some other 
criterion (Noonan, 1989, 56ff.).
‘Neo-Lockeans’ have formulated the concept of quasi-memory (or ^-memory, 
for short) in response to this problem. This is a more inclusive concept and
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separates the first-person account of memory from the act of remembering, such 
that the latter does not presuppose personal identity. On this account, a person 
has g-memory of some experience such as an action if she remembers having 
had such an experience, and if her memory of the experience was caused in the 
right way by the experience she remembers (Shoemaker (1959), Noonan (1989, 
144-162)). Thus separating the act of remembering from ascribing the memory 
to a particular instance makes it possible to use the memory criterion without 
circularity.
Hence, moving from an internalist account, such as Locke’s, to an externalist 
one, such as (/-memory, brings with it the qualifier that in addition to a criterion, 
an ‘appropriate’ causal link is needed in order to establish personal identity with 
the criterion. It is a separate discussion what constitutes appropriate causal links, 
and beyond the scope of this work. In a nutshell, the qualifier of ‘appropriate’ 
intends to rule out causal links that are invoked in thought experiments, such as 
brain transplants or teletransportation.
Memory: Reductionism versus Non-Reductionism
The memory and self-knowledge criteria introduced above can be interpreted in 
two fundamentally different ways. In a reductive interpretation of such criteria, 
it is maintained that they lend themselves to a propositional characterisation, 
whereas in a non-reductive interpretation, such a formulation is not taken to 
fully grasp what we mean by recollection of actions, thoughts and experiences. 
For example, take the past event of going to the theatre. In a reductive interpret­
ation, the experience of this event can be summarised as a proposition, whereas a 
non-reductive interpretation would maintain that not all what is relevant about 
the experience of going to the theatre can be reduced to such a propositional 
description.
Locke’s account is non-reductive as it is an internalist, or first-person account. 
However, it is possible to interpret Locke’s memory criterion in a reductive sense, 
when dealing with specific, propositional items of recollection (such as: ‘I went 
to the theatre and enjoyed it’). While this is still internalist, and therefore non- 
reductive, the kinds of memory items involved can be much more clearly defined. 
The Neo-Lockean concept of ^-memory, on the other hand, is externalist, and 
therefore completely reductive. More recent contributions on memory criteria 
have focused on developing the Lockean and Neo-Lockean concepts just described;
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on the one hand using more detailed characterisation of the concept of ‘self- 
knowledge’ (O’Brien, 2007; Evnine, 2008) to put forward reductionist memory 
criteria by drawing on the epistemic resources of persons, and on the other hand 
developing more detailed accounts of introspection and self-consciousness for non- 
reductive accounts (Cassam, 1999).
Summarising the above discussions on the different possible formulations of 
how memory can be relevant as a criterion of personal identity, we can identify a 
reductive and a non-reductive memory criterion. In a reductive memory criterion, 
memory is conceptualised as items of information, such as propositions that can 
be associated with a former instance of a person via an appropriate link. In a 
non-reductive memory criterion, memory consist in a private, and much broader 
sense of recollecting experiences which is irreducible to an informational account. 
In addition to a propositional, reductive characterisation of memory items, the 
introspection of a person constitute a fuller recollection of how it felt like to have 
the experience in question.
These two criteria can be used to motivate and constrain multiple-self models, 
for instance when endorsing an interpretation of connectedness between temporal 
selves as being due to memories. Accordingly, the two variants of memory cri­
teria allow us to interpret the connectedness between temporal selves as either 
being due to shared memories between temporal selves. Whereas the reductive 
criterion maintains that memory connectedness represents empirical facts about 
the memories involved, the non-reductive criterion denies this as it endorses a 
both more private and broader notion of remembering.
3.4.2 Psychological Criteria
This section reviews the conceptual content of psychological criteria, in the nar­
row sense of continuity of preferences, tastes, emotions, empathy and narrative. 
As the distinction between reductionism and non-reductionism is more deeply 
entrenched in this part of the personal identity literature, we first review psycho­
logical reductionism and then discuss non-reductionist critiques.
Psychological Reductionism
The most important discussions of personal identity over time in terms of reduc­
tionist psychological connectedness can be found in Parfit (1984). Building on 
the four questions of personal identity mentioned earlier, he formulates his psy-
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chological reductionism in two steps, first advancing a ‘psychological criterion’ 
and then introducing his concept of ‘relation R \
P a rf it’s Psychological C riterion . ‘(1 ) There is psychological continuity iff there 
axe overlapping chains of strong connectedness. 5 X  today is one and the 
same person as Y  at some past time iff (2 ) X  is psychologically continuous 
with Y , (3) this continuity has the right kind of cause, and (4) it has not 
taken a ‘branching’ form. (5) Personal identity over time just consists in 
the holding of facts like (2 ) to (4).’ (Parfit, 1984, 207)
In setting up this criterion, Parfit is permissive with regards to the conceptual 
content of psychological features -  he specifically includes memory in the fist of 
psychological features (Parfit, 1984, 220f.), yet is also adamant that it covers 
continuity of beliefs, desires and character traits. The latter, more inclusive 
interpretation of psychological features is explicitly endorsed by him for his more 
general criterion ‘Relation R \
P a rf it’s R ela tion  R. Psychological connectedness and/or continuity with the 
right kind of cause (any cause) (Parfit, 1984, 215).
This more general criterion fulfils two roles: one is to further push psycholo­
gical reductionism by allowing ‘any cause’, such as those that are used in thought 
experiments, to establish psychological connectedness and continuity. A second 
role is to generalise the content of what is understood as psychological features, 
explicitly including propositional attitudes, such as preferences, tastes and be­
liefs. That is to say, on this account, we can understand instances of a person 
establishing persistence if there is a similarity of psychological features, and if this 
similarity comes about by a cause that we are willing to accept as establishing 
persistence. There has been a large debate about the possible nature of such 
causes (Dancy, 1997), with much of it parallel to the debates about memory and 
g-memory. Hence, since Parfit’s Relation R  also provides an externalist account 
(via the permissiveness of the nature of causes that establish persistence), his 
criterion is also limited to -  and in fact proposed as — constituting a reductive 
account.
5Parfit distinguishes between connectedness and continuity. The first term means similarity 
between instances of a person and the second term means that there are a overlapping layers of 
connectedness.
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Reductionism and Non-Reductionism
Psychological reductionism as endorsed by Parfit (1984) has been criticised for a 
number of reasons (Dancy, 1997). Here, we deal with conceptual critiques that 
maintain that psychological reductionism fails to capture what we should take as 
relevant about the psychological features of persons. Almost all of the critiques 
can be taken as advancing the point that in order for reductive psychological 
continuity to hold, it must be enabled or produced in some way. That is to say, the 
features of persons captured by psychological reductionism are the results of much 
more complex processes that are unduly neglected in psychological reductionism.
There are two particularly relevant families of critiques in the context of mod­
elling decision-makers as temporally extended persons: firstly, there are critiques 
that focus on attacking psychological reductionism on ‘classic’ grounds, main­
taining that in order for psychological reductionism to hold, some fundamental 
psychological mechanism or capacity must be in place, be it a soul, an Ego, a 
continuity of empathy, or some sort of continuing mental life. Secondly, there axe 
critiques which argue that psychological features of persons are produced by and 
closely related to external relations, such as those to other people or to the phys­
ical world, and those which see psychological features as ingredients in a much 
richer and complex narrative of personal identity.
Concerning the first critique, it can be summarised as an appeal to the ‘com- 
monsensical intuition of essential self-unity’ (Belzer, 2005). As alluded to above, 
this intuition can be spelt out in two different ways in this context. One is to 
go back to the accounts of the simple view, according to which the soul or the 
Ego provides underlying self-unity. Another one is to give a fuller account of 
the mental life of a person, that does not amount directly to a rejection of the 
relational view, but insists on the presence of further mechanisms and capacities 
such as empathy or sympathy between instances of a person. For example, on 
the account that has been developed by Schechtman (2001, 2005), even though a 
person has changed (or will change) drastically with regards to her propositional 
attitudes, she could still have the feeling of psychological continuity, out of an 
understanding of how that instance of her person at a different time has enjoyed 
(or will enjoy) completely different things.
Concerning the second critique, Quante (2007) maintains that external rela­
tions, and specifically social ones, are vital in understanding persons, personhood 
and personal identity over time. In this view, the social nature of persons is a
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deeply entrenched feature of the human condition, and as such it can be said 
to contribute to what we understand ourselves to be, shaping our psychological 
features. MacIntyre (1984), MacIntyre (1989), and Taylor (1989) also maintain 
that psychological features axe produced by and embedded in the ‘narratives’ of 
person’s lives. Reductionist accounts of psychological features at best focus on 
the results of such complex narratives. In particular, they fail to recognise the 
underlying mechanisms by which persons change and persist over time. Note, 
however, that reductionism is not incompatible with endorsing the second cri­
tique -  it just gives a much more sparse characterisation of personal identity 
than the second critique endorses.
There are hence a variety of conceptual intricacies to the continuity of psy­
chological features, in particular their very subjective and complex nature, that 
have led many authors to believe that in order for such features to establish per­
sistence, a non-reductive account is needed. Perhaps less so than in the contrasts 
between reductive and non-reductive memory, the two variants of psychological 
criteria do not seem to be in strong opposition to each other -  it is certainly 
plausible to endorse a reductionist account on grounds of methodology without 
dismissing that there is an underlying non-reductive mechanism that produces 
those features.
To summarise the above discussions, psychological features provide persist­
ence criteria that can be used to motivate and constrain multiple-self models. 
Here we identify a reductive and non-reductive psychological criterion. In a re­
ductive psychological criterion, psychological features are seen as specific traits 
such as tastes or preferences that can be associated with former instances of a 
person via an appropriate causal link. In a non-reductive psychological criterion 
criterion, further mental features are required in addition to reductive ones, such 
as empathy, external relations or the narrative of the life of the person in question.
These two criteria can be used to motivate and constrain multiple-self models, 
for instance when endorsing an interpretation of connectedness between temporal 
selves as being due to their psychological features. Accordingly, the two variants 
of the psychological criteria allow us to interpret the connectedness between tem­
poral selves as either being due to similarity in their psychological features.
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3.5 M ultip le-Self M odels o f Personal Identity  over T im e
This section briefly summarises the multiple-self models of personal identity over 
time developed in both the previous chapter and the present one. In particular, 
we suggest a common terminology for the interpretations of temporal selves that 
will be used throughout the remainder of this thesis.
In Chapter 2, we have introduced the notions of temporal selves and connec­
tedness, and given an example of their formal structure. We considered a set of 
temporal selves and a connectedness function that gives degrees of connectedness 
between pairs of temporal selves. Furthermore, we pointed out that those objects 
need an interpretation. We considered a reductive interpretation which conceives 
of the degree of connectedness as measuring similarity of tastes between pairs 
of temporal selves, and a non-reductive interpretation which endorses a broader 
range of features. In the remainder of the thesis, we will keep the terminology 
of temporal selves and connectedness, yet adopt the more general terminology 
of psychological connectedness for the reductive interpretation, and empathy con­
nectedness for the non-reductive one.
In this chapter, we suggested that theories of personal identity can be used to 
motivate and constrain multiple-self models. That is to say, the interpretations 
in multiple-self models can be drawn from theories of personal identity over time. 
Indeed, psychological connectedness can be seen as giving a particular version of 
a reductive psychological criterion of personal identity. That is to say, we will 
from now on speak of psychological connectedness between temporal selves for 
a reductive interpretation. Similarly, empathy connectedness coheres with non- 
reductive psychological criteria, as discussed in an earlier section of this chapter.
Note that the above discussion would also permit to formulate a reductive and 
non-reductive memory interpretation of connectedness. However, for simplicity, 
we will focus on using the interpretations of psychological and empathy connec­
tedness in Part II of the thesis. More generally, the above criteria can provide 
substantial interpretations of what exactly is captured by the formal structure 
in multiple-self models. We will henceforth refer to multiple-self models whose 
interpretations axe given by one of the above criteria as ‘multiple-self models 
of personal identity over time’. That is, such models will follow the structure 
of multiple-self models as outlined in the previous chapters, yet their substant­
ive interpretation is compatible with conceptual content of theories of personal 
identity over time.
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In general, the discussion so far yields a threefold motivation of multiple-self 
models of personal identity over time: firstly, we can motivate their application 
as an enrichment of decision theory in order to model the temporal dimension of 
decisions, as argued in the previous chapter. Secondly, this chapter has shown 
that the structure of multiple-self models also makes accessible conceptual content 
from theories of personal identity over time, which can motivate the idea of con­
nectedness between temporal selves. Thirdly, we can motivate their application 
by the kinds of insight they will allow us into time and rational decision-making 
-  this will be demonstrated in the next three chapters.
3.6 C onclusions
The concern of this chapter was to identify a structure that both connects reason­
ably well with existing theories of personal identity over time in two respects: one, 
capturing the most important traits of these theories to flesh out their differences 
and similarities and two, providing a structure that allows one to model such 
traits in order to motivate and constrain multiple-self models. Having looked at 
some of the most important proposals in the literature of personal identity over 
time, the ‘personal identity triple’ of instances, persistence and criteria aims to 
express key questions and distinctions in the contributions in order to make them 
available for multiple-self models.
Concerning both the distinction between evidential and substantial interpret­
ation as well as regarding the distinction between similarity and identity, the 
metaphysically weaker understanding can be adopted in the following. This is 
due to the fact that in order to inform multiple-self models, an evidential un­
derstanding of the degrees of similarity of persons over time is already sufficient. 
This does not preclude assigning a greater significance, i.e. it is indeed possible 
to understand the models as providing substantive metaphysical foundations for 
the identity of changing decision-makers; yet, this is not necessary in order for 
the content of personal identity theories to have conceptual significance.
We have shown that many key dualisms and distinctions in theories of personal 
identity over time can be adequately described in a tripartite framework that 
structurally coheres with multiple-self models. This, in turn, makes it possible to 
consider the conceptual content of theories of personal identity over time in such 
models. We refer to those models as ‘multiple-self models of personal identity
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over time’ as they are capable of capturing substantive criteria that have been 
offered in the literature. Those enriched multiple-self models -  in addition to 
their capabilities to extend decision theories to analyse the temporal dimension 
of prospects -  are hence grounded in accounts of how persons both change and 
persist over time.
As with the modelling device of the multiple-self models, the enriched models 
are not required as premises for the following discussions of three particularly 
interesting problems of time in decisions and games. Yet, as we will attempt to 
show in the second part of this thesis, for each of those problems, multiple-self 
models of personal identity over time offer us additional insight into the role of 
intertemporality in decisions and games.
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Part II
Three Problem s of Tim e in 
Decisions and Games
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Chapter 4
Tim e D iscounting
Sum m ary. This chapter investigates how time discounting functions analyse 
temporal distance in intertemporal decisions. We identify two goals that theor­
ies of time discounting may have: one, postulating a correct time discounting 
function, and two, offering an accurate underlying conceptual motivation. We 
proceed by presenting a general representation framework for time discounting 
which outlines the requirements that well-founded time discounting functions 
have to fulfil. This general framework is used to analyse both existing accounts 
of time discounting, as well as Parfit’s dictum of time discounting because of a 
weak connectedness to future selves. More generally, the requirements for time 
discounting theories developed here demonstrate that time discounting factors 
are restricted in the kinds of conceptions they can express.
4.1 Introduction
It is standard practice in the analysis of intertemporal decisions to introduce 
weightings that reflect the value given to the temporal dimension of a prospect. 
Such weightings are performed by time discounting factors that make goods in 
the far future less valuable than those in the near future. Famously, time dis­
counting is a heavily contested concept (Loewenstein and Elster, 1992). There 
are two key problems: Firstly, there is no consensus on the correct functional 
form of discount factors, in particular, the properties of the discount rate that is 
often used in such functions are contested (Frederick et al, 2002). In its most 
basic use, the discounting rate remains the same regardless of how far prospects 
extend through time. This most commonly used form of discounting originated
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with Samuelson (1937) and is called exponential discounting, due to the shape 
of the value function it induces. More recently, ‘hyperbolic’ discounting, initially 
proposed by Ainslie (1975), postulates a declining discount rate, based on empir­
ical evidence. Secondly, it is contested what kind of conceptual interpretation of 
time discounting is the right one: can it be explained by time impatience, atti­
tudes towards risk and uncertainty, delay perception, or preference change? Each 
of these two key problems of time discounting can be understood both descript­
ively and normatively. Regarding the latter, it is often questioned whether time 
discounting is justified at all. Indeed, philosophers tend to deny the justifiability 
of time discounting (e.g. Sidgwick (1907), Rawls (1971), Broome (1991), Broome 
(1999)). Despite this, in the spirit of Ramsey (1928), time discounting is deeply 
entrenched in standard economic modelling:
‘It is assumed that we do not discount later enjoyments in compar­
ison with earlier ones, a practice which is ethically indefensible [... ] 
we shall, however, . . .  include such a rate of discount in some of our 
investigations.’
The aforementioned normative and descriptive debates concerning time dis­
counting have generated much disagreement, as reviewed by, for instance, Loewen- 
stein and Read (2003). This fact renders scientific and policy debates about inter­
temporal decisions, such as those related to pension systems, public investment 
and climate change, deeply challenging. In order to clarify the concept of time 
discounting, this chapter asks the following question: How can we make sense of 
time discounting factors; what do they measure and represent? In other words, 
how can we meaningfully assign numbers to time points that can be used as 
weights for goodness evaluations of consequences that are associated with those 
time points?
In order to address this question, this chapter investigates the construction 
principles of time discounting functions. Note how this concern is different from 
the question that asks how to correctly evaluate intertemporal prospects in a 
general sense. Intertemporal prospects can raise a number of complex questions. 
Consider again the example from the introduction of this thesis of an intertem­
poral decision about whether to go out for dinner tomorrow or rather next week. 
Evaluating the intertemporal prospect of the dinner next week raises many is­
sues, such as whether the dinner next week is an executable plan, whether fellow 
diners can be trusted to turn up, whether there will be regret for not having gone
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earlier, and so on. Rather than considering the full array of those kinds of issues, 
the concern of this chapter is to clarify the exact role time discounting can play in 
the evaluation of such intertemporal prospects. We will show that, given certain 
assumptions, time discounting can contribute time-indexed weights to evaluating 
the time distance aspect of intertemporal prospects. Returning to the example, 
time discounting factors can be used, once goodness evaluations about the dinner 
axe formed, to weight the expected goodness that this prospect provides. Yet, 
the explanatory scope of those weights is severely constrained by the assump­
tions that are required for their construction. In a nutshell, time discounting 
functions can serve as a coarse-grained evaluation of the influence of temporal 
distance on the evaluation of intertemporal prospects. Understanding the precise 
confines of the concept of time discounting is a key desideratum of the following 
analysis. The remainder of the introduction gives an overview of the structure of 
this chapter.
In Section 4.2, existing theories of time discounting are critically reviewed. 
Time discounting theories postulate time discounting functions that ascribe weights 
to time points, such that the present is assigned the unit weight and future time 
points axe assigned weights in the real interval (0 , 1 ), with time points in the 
fax future given smaller weights than those in the nearer future. We discuss the 
proposals of exponential and hyperbolic discounting, which introduce further re­
strictions on time discounting functions. Furthermore, different proposals for the 
conceptual motivation of time discounting are reviewed. We suggest that time 
discounting theories can be seen as competing answers to two questions: (i) what 
is the correct time discounting function, and (ii) what is the correct conceptual 
interpretation of time discounting factors given by such functions? These two 
questions can be asked on both a normative and a descriptive level, which yields 
four problems of time discounting. Such a division into four problems along the 
fines of functional form, conceptual interpretation, normative, and descriptive 
occurs also in other areas of enquiry, such as expected utility theory. In such 
contexts, representation theorems play a crucial role in clarifying answers to the 
four problems, as they provide a framework in which properties of functions and 
their conceptual interpretation can be specified.
Section 4.3 critically reviews existing representation theorems for time dis­
counting. We start by giving an introduction to measurement-theoretic frame­
works and highlight the crucial role of representation theorems. Frameworks and
82
CHAPTER 4. TIME DISCOUNTING
theorems of representation axe available for exponential discounting (e.g. Samuel- 
son (1937), Koopmans (1960), Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982)) as well as for 
hyperbolic discounting (e.g. Strotz (1956), Manzini and Mariotti (2007), Halevy 
(2008)). Crucially, these representation theorems are obtained by assuming spe­
cific interpretations of time discounting. For instance, psychological notions like 
time impatience are invoked, objects like time preferences are integrated into ex­
isting theories, or other phenomena such as delay perception, attitudes towards 
risk and uncertainty, or preference change axe used to motivate time discounting. 
We suggest that these frameworks treat aspects of intertemporality and goodness 
in a deeply entangled way, making it difficult to compare their relative merits in 
sufficient detail. Thus, in addition to the four problems of time discounting raised 
in Section 4.2, there is a more fundamental problem with time discounting theor­
ies, which lies in the absence of a representational framework for time discounting 
that would allow us to separate the evaluation of goodness and intertemporality 
to gain a precise conceptual understanding of time discounting.
Section 4.4 develops general foundations of time discounting that initially 
separates the the evaluation of intertemporality and the evaluation of goodness. 
For this, we firstly give a general definition of a time discounting function as the 
taxget of the representation. From the perspective of the representational theory 
of measurement, each weight that such a function gives has to be a numerical 
assignment to some salient qualitative property that is associated with a time 
point. We give a representation theorem that shows how a general time dis­
counting function can be constructed that fulfils this requirement. Crucially, this 
result is obtained without a pre-commitment to any conceptual view about time 
discounting: indeed, this representation framework states general measurement- 
theoretic conditions for the construction of well-founded discounting functions. 
These conditions make transparent the fact that -  from a measurement-theoretic 
perspective -  any time discounting theory needs to endorse a numerical represent­
ation of some qualitative evaluation of properties that can be associated with time 
points. We also show how specific time discounting functions can be recovered 
by introducing further constraints within the general framework.
Section 4.5 discusses that the four problems of time discounting in the general 
framework. That is, the problem of the functional form of time discounting and 
the conceptual motivation of time discounting axe discusses both descxiptively and 
normatively. It is shown that the general framework renders explicit the regularity
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conditions that are required in order to construct time discounting functions that 
axe both formally and conceptually well-founded. We also reconsider the time 
preference theories of discounting, which are frequently used in economics to 
motivate the concept of ‘discounted utility’, in the general framework.
Section 4.6 discusses two specific proposals for time discounting. Firstly, the 
general framework is interpreted with the dictum of Parfit (1984) that ‘my con­
cern for my future may correspond to the degree of connectedness between me 
now and myself in the future.’ In other words, the general representation the­
orem is interpreted as capturing the idea of connectedness in the multiple-self. 
Different interpretations of connectedness between selves axe compared with re­
gards to their plausibility of motivating time discounting. Indeed, by formalising 
Parfit’s claim, we can revisit objections to it posed by Williams (1970) and El- 
ster (1986). In a second step, we show that Paxfit’s claim supports a particular 
interesting interpretation of time discounting by the rate of preference change 
between temporal selves in a person. We show that if such a rate is constant, ex­
ponential discounting can be derived from the degree of preference change. This 
novel derivation of exponential discounting from preference change highlights the 
usefulness of the general framework of representation.
Section 4.7 concludes that the foundations of time discounting developed here 
make explicit what kind of assumptions are required in order to construct time 
discounting functions. Those assumptions delineate the evaluation of time dis­
tance from the kinds of evaluations that axe captured in theories of utility and 
probability. This makes precise the confines of the role of time discounting for 
the evaluation of the time distance aspect of intertemporal prospects. Indeed, the 
framework is instrumental in distinguishing time discounting from other concepts 
of that raise more complex problems of intertemporality, such as interaction over 
time, temporal dynamics, or plans.
4.2 T im e D iscounting
This section reviews standard accounts of time discounting, such as exponen­
tial and hyperbolic discounting theories, and characterises the main debates and 
foundational problems associated with them, posing four problems of time dis­
counting. This sets the scene for discussing the representation theorems of dis­
counting theories in the next section and the general representational framework
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developed and applied to those theories in the later sections of this chapter.
4.2.1 T im e D iscounting Functions
Discounting, in its most general meaning, is the lowering of the value of an object, 
good or prospect for a specific and separate reason. For instance, shops may lower 
the price of goods if a consumer purchases a large number or a specific bundle of 
them, policy-makers may disregard the opinion of someone with a vested interest, 
and individuals axe often less affected by the suffering of people that they do not 
know personally, and so on. Time discounting refers to the practice of weighting 
the value of an object, good or prospect with a factor that is related to the time of 
their occurrence. For instance, the prospect of getting a piece of fruit in a month’s 
time will be assessed by first evaluating the goodness of receiving the fruit and 
then applying a discounting factor that reflects the fact that the fruit will only 
be received in a month’s time. Thus, a time discounting factor is a weight that 
is supposed to capture the influence of the time dimension of prospects on their 
evaluation. More generally, time discounting factors axe time-indexed weights 
which axe applied to evaluations of goodness.
To understand how time discounting factors are commonly used, consider time 
discounting in the context of a standard (p, u)-framework. Take the prospect of 
having dinner today and assume that an agent evaluates this prospect in a way 
that reflects her rational preferences, for instance V (Dinner) =  10. Commonly, 
this can be taken to reflect an all things-considered subjective evaluation of the 
worthiness of today’s dinner for that agent. Now consider a variation of the 
example in which the dinner will take place tomorrow. In this case, we can take 
the information that the dinner takes place tomorrow as forming a completely 
new prospect and consider a new all things-considered subjective evaluation of the 
agent. However, another possibility is to take the initial evaluation of the dinner 
today V  (Dinner) =  1 0  and introduce a factor that reflects the fact that the dinner 
is held tomorrow, assuming that the dinners are otherwise identical. This is the 
idea of time discounting: the initial evaluation of a prospect is multiplied by a time 
discounting factor D(t). Such a time discounting factor D(t) is usually assumed 
to take a value between 0  and 1 , thereby diminishing the initial value ascribed to 
prospects. To continue with the example, the discounted value of having dinner 
tomorrow is calculated by multiplying the initial evaluation V  (Dinner) =  10 
with the time discounting factor for tomorrow D(tomorrow). If the latter is,
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say, D (tomorrow) =  .98, then the discounted value of the dinner tomorrow is 
D V (Dinner tomorrow) =  9.8.
Discounting factors can be given by discounting functions. Those functions 
assign numerical values to points in time. In a general sense, a discounting 
function can be described as a mapping from a set of time points T  C R to the 
real numbers, i.e. as a function D  : T —> R. T  can also be discrete, and in most 
applications it is assumed to be a set of non-negative integers, with 0  denoting the 
present and all other points representing points at future times. Either a finite 
horizon (i.e. T  =  {0,1,2, . . . ,  tmax}) or an infinite horizon (T = {0,1,2, . . .})  can 
be adopted. The number in R that is assigned to a time point by a discounting 
function is then used as a discounting factor for value that occurs at that point in 
time. For instance, analogous to the example above, if x$ is a consequence indexed 
by the point in time it occurs at (t =  3), then its discounted value D V {x 3 ) is 
obtained by weighting its initial evaluation V(xo) with the discounting factor 
D(3) e R such that D V (x 3 ) =  D(3)V(xo).
As a matter of convention, time discounting usually results in weighting future 
value slightly less than the same amount of these objects in the present or without 
discounting. For instance, in the aforementioned example, discounting usually 
leads to V ( xq) > D V (x 3 ). Furthermore, discounting factors are usually lower for 
points in time that axe further away. This reflects the idea that goodness at later 
times should be discounted higher than goodness at earlier times. Hence, most 
discounting functions axe decreasing, such that D(t) > D (t + 1). The range of 
the discounting function is usually restricted to a real interval such as (0,1]. Neg­
ative discounting factors would result in negative values and discounting factors 
larger than 1 would increase the value assigned to future consequences. While 
such values for discounting factors are not logically impossible, most discounting 
functions do not include such values. Again, this is a matter of convention, and 
reflects the idea that weighting goodness with a factor that is determined by its 
time of occurrence results in a slight devaluation of the goodness.
A general discounting function D  can hence be understood as a decreasing 
mapping from a set of time points T  to the real interval (0,1] such that D(0) = 
1. This is not intended to rule out the possibility of endorsing a more general 
discounting function such as D : T  —> R. Rather, such a function adequately 
reflects the common ground of many discounting function proposals and some of 
the conventions discussed above. Indeed, most time discounting functions in the
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literature as reviewed in the following section are a special case of this function, 
offering more specific restrictions on what values discounting factors can take. 
Note that those specific functions have two different roles: one is to give a more 
specific rule for assigning numerical values to time points than the above function 
and the second role is to facilitate an interpretation of those numerical values.
These two different roles lead indeed to the two key questions about time 
discounting: firstly, what is the correct functional shape of a time discounting 
function? Secondly, what is the conceptual motivation for time discounting? The 
next two sections will review how these questions have been answered in existing 
discounting theories.
4.2.2 Exponential and H yperbolic D iscounting Theories
The most important discounting functions are exponential and hyperbolic ones. 
We firstly discuss exponential discounting, followed by hyperbolic discounting.
Exponential discounting functions introduce a constant discounting factor 6 
which is used to calculate the discounting factor for each point in time. That 
is, an exponential discounting function De can be given by a mapping from time 
points to a real interval such that De(t) = 81, 0 < 5 < 1. In most derivations 
of exponential discounting, the constant S is given by a constant ‘discount rate’ 
r € [0,1] which relates to the discounting factor as follows: 6 = ( r + 7  )  • Hence,
frequently, exponential discounting is described directly by De(t) = ( i+ f  )  • This 
is indeed the case for most standard applications of exponential discounting in 
economics. We will refer to this particular variant of exponential discounting as 
‘constant-rate exponential discounting’, as it is also possible to obtain a constant 
discounting factor 5 by employing other concepts than a constant rate. Concep­
tually, the discount rate reflects the time preferences of a time impatient agent. 
In economics, constant-rate exponential discounting is most commonly known as 
the discounted utility (DU)-model.
To avoid confusion about the different concepts involved in time discounting, 
we will clarify the meaning of the different technical terms introduced so far. The 
discounting factor is the number, assigned to a point in time by a discounting 
function, which is used for weighting goodness evaluations of intertemporal pro­
spects. Such a discounting factor can be determined in a number of ways. One 
frequently employed method of obtaining discounting factors is by introducing the 
concept of a discount rate. Discount rates r € [0,1 ] are also called per-period (or
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time-point) discount rates, as they are taken to reflect the weight that is attached 
to t +  1 in t. That is to say, the concept of the discounting factor is conceptually 
more general than the discount rate, as the former can be determined in a number 
of ways (this point is also prominent in the influential review of time discounting 
theories by Frederick et al. (2002)). Discount rates axe one specific, yet widely 
employed way to determine discounting factors. Indeed, many conceptual and 
normative debates discuss questions about time discounting in terms of ‘choosing 
the correct discount rate’ rather than discounting factors. This is due to the fact 
that many crucial differences between concepts of time discounting can already 
expressed in this slightly easier, yet less general, terminology: for instance, just 
as one can ask what a discounting factor represents conceptually, one can ask the 
same question of discount rates. Even more importantly, by introducing formal 
conditions on the behaviour of the discount rate, crucial differences between dis­
counting theories can be expressed. For example, in exponential discounting, r  
is constant to reflect that such weights axe equal between any two time-points. 
Hence, exponential discounting is often xeferred to as ‘constant-rate discounting’. 
In contrast, many theories of ‘hyperbolic discounting’ can be (paxtly) described as 
endorsing a declining discount rate. The latter theories will be introduced below, 
including those that combine the discount rates with parameters that capture 
delays, deviation from constant-rate discounting, and error terms to obtain dis­
counting factors. We will continue to use the more precise language of a discount 
factor that is given by a discounting function. Apart from greater claxity, thexe 
axe two reasons for this: firstly, the ultimate goal of any time discounting theory 
is to give the correct discounting factor for each point in time under considera­
tion. The discount rate is only one possible ingredient in this exercise. Secondly, 
there are theories that do indeed combine other parameters with discount rates 
to obtain discounting factors -  it would hence be unduly naxrow to only discuss 
discount rates.
The constant-rate exponential discounting model introduced above is due to 
Samuelson (1937). Interestingly, Samuelson (1937), Samuelson (1939) and Koop- 
mans (1960) did not endorse constant-rate exponential discounting. Rather, they 
intended the derivation of exponential discounting to be a mathematically in­
teresting result without great empirical or normative significance. Despite this, 
exponential discounting has become the standard method of time discounting in 
economic theory. The most important formal property of exponential discounting
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is that it preserves the utility function, even when engaging in time discounting. 
Indeed, this very property lies at the heart of the enduring normative appeal 
of exponential discounting, as it rests on a representation of time preference 
as discounted utility (the representation will be discussed in the next section). 
Descriptively, the mathematical tract ability of exponential discounting and the 
formal parallels to the marginal rate of substitution have made exponential dis­
counting attractive (Frederick et al, 2002). Yet, empirical evidence has amassed 
that questions the descriptive accuracy of constant-rate exponential discounting.
In this context, hyperbolic discounting has emerged from empirical study of 
how real-world agents discount for temporal distance (Angeletos et al. (2001), 
Frederick et al (2002)). In such empirical studies, it has been found that real- 
world agents are ‘myopic’, in the sense that time differences in short horizons are 
perceived as more relevant than time differences in longer horizons. So-called ‘hy­
perbolic’ discounting functions capture this phenomenon as they decrease more 
drastically than exponential ones for short horizons, i.e. near the present. This 
results in more time discounting for short horizons than in exponential discount­
ing. For longer horizons, some hyperbolic discounting functions behave similarly 
to exponential discounting functions while many decrease less drastically than 
exponential discounting which results in less time discounting for larger horizons.
Many variants of functions that capture the idea of myopia have been pro­
posed (for an overview of the actual empirical studies that have led to the different 
discounting functions, see the reviews by Frederick et al. (2002), and Loewen- 
stein and Read (2003)). Since hyperbolic discounting is informed by empirical 
research, there are a number of proposals that each captures a variety of data. 
The following functions determine a discounting factor by delays, discount rates, 
constants and/or factors such that discounting factors are generally smaller than 
in exponential discounting for earlier times.
• Discounting for delay: D(t) = | ,  where t equals the length of delay (Ainslie 
(1975), Ainslie (1992), Ainslie (2001)). This function results in no discount­
ing for the next period and a steep decline of the discounting factor for the 
following periods. Note that the delay function assigns the unit weight to 
the present as well as to t — 1, and is only strictly decreasing thereafter. 
On the conceptual level, there are no time preferences introduced; all that 
matters for time discounting is the perception of the delay.
• Discounting for delay and discount rate: D(t) =  , where r  > 0 is the
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discount rate and t the delay (Herrnstein (1981) and Mazur (1987)). This 
function behaves similarly to exponential discounting for the near future 
and discounts the fax future less. In this theory, the consideration of time 
preferences capturing time impatience is combined with the consideration 
of how delays axe perceived.
• Generalised (hyperbolic) discounting: D(t) = 1^+a^ 7/a > where a > 0 meas­
ures how much the function departs from constant rate discounting and 
7  > 0 is a parameter related to time preferences (Loewenstein and Prelec 
(1992), Laibson (1997)). W ith the behaviour of this function depending 
heavily on the specific values of the two parameters, most hyperbolic dis­
counting functions can be written as a special case of this function. Most of 
the empirically relevant specifications of the paxameters result in discount­
ing the near future more than exponential discounting and in discounting 
the far future less than exponential discounting.
• Quasi-hyperbolic discounting:
where 0 < (3 < 1 can be constant or decline as t increases and 5* is the 
exponential discounting function (Phelps and Poliak (1986), Laibson (1986), 
Laibson (1997), Barro (1999)). This discounting function captures the idea 
of hyperbolic discounting in a much simpler way than many other functions 
as the weighting factor (3 can capture how much the discounting deviates 
from exponential discounting.
Figure 4.1 displays the graphs of the aforementioned discounting functions.1
1The graphs in Figure 4.1 are based on the following functions:
- Exponential discounting: D(t) =  6*, where <5 =  .8 (i.e. given by where r =  .25),
- Hyperbolic discounting for delay: D(t) =  y,
- Hyperbolic discounting for delay and discount rate: D(t) =  , where r =  .25
- Generalised (hyperbolic) discounting: D(t) =  (1+a^ 7/a ? where a  =  .7 and 7 =  .9
- Quasi-hyperbolic discounting: D(t) =  |  where /? =  .8 and constant, and S
as for exponential discounting.
90
CHAPTER 4. TIME DISCOUNTING
 Exponential discounting
 Hyperbolic discounting tor delay
Hyperbolic discounting for delay and constant rate
 -G eneralised (hyperbolic) discounting
 Quasi-hyperbolic discounting___________________
t
Figure 4.1: Discounting Functions
Prominently, exponential discounting weighs each subsequent time period with 
the same rate of discount r  which results in a constant discounting factor <5 of 
which the t-th power is taken to obtain the discounting factor for every point in 
time. This results in an exponential shape of the function. Most of the hyperbolic 
discounting functions yield smaller discounting factors for short horizons than 
exponential discounting. The notable exception is delay discounting, for period 
1: note how the hyperbolic discounting for delay adopts a time horizon, such that 
for the delay of one time period, there is no discounting at all (i.e. D( 1) =  1) and 
a steep decline of the function for the following times (indeed, D (5) =  .2). Further 
note that for a longer horizon, some of the hyperbolic discounting functions yield 
less discounting (i.e. larger discounting factors) than  exponential discounting.
The debate about the correct shape of time discounting functions concen­
trates, by and large, on these two proposals, with exponential discounting on the 
one hand and the family of hyperbolic discounting theories on the other hand.
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4.2.3 C onceptual M otivations for Tim e D iscounting
The above review of time discounting theories has concentrated on the specific 
shape of the discounting function that those theories endorse. Here, we briefly 
look at what kind of conceptual motivations have been discussed to underpin 
time discounting. The literature on possible conceptual motivations for time dis­
counting is much more diverse than the literature on time discounting functions, 
and as a consequence, a whole host of motivations has been proposed to value 
future consequences less than present ones.
As mentioned earlier, time discounting is employed to weight goodness eval­
uations of prospects that extend through time. When discussing conceptual mo­
tivations for time discounting, the question arises how discounting factors are 
used. In other words, before answering the question ‘what is the conceptual mo­
tivation for time discounting?’, we first need to answer the question ‘the time 
discounting of whatV. More specifically, to what kind of evaluations can time 
discounting factors be applied? Are those weights used to discount future mon­
etary value, future natural resources, future utility, or future happiness? This 
question, as pointed out by Broome (1991) has led to a lot of confusion in dis­
cussions of discounting. For simplicity, he contrasts the discounting of monetary 
value on the one hand and utility on the other hand. Indeed, Broome (1991, 44) 
goes so far as to say that there is ‘more misunderstanding than disagreement’ 
between philosophers and economists, asserting that typically, economists do not 
employ time discounting for well-being and utility whereas philosophers focus on 
the justifiability of the latter. The widespread use of the standard DU-model 
in economics shows that Broome’s ascription of economists as being mostly con­
cerned with discounting future monetary value is not quite correct. However, the 
distinction between discounting future monetary value versus future utility is a 
useful one. In the remainder, we will concentrate on the discounting of utility 
and consequentialist goodness evaluations more generally.
There are a number of competing conceptual motivations for discounting fu­
ture utility (or goodness evaluations), such as:
• Time impatience (or time preferences) (discussed by, for instance, Samuel­
son (1937), Koopmans (1960), Lancaster (1963), Fishburn and Rubinstein 
(1982)),
• Delay perception (discussed by, for instance, Ainslie (1975), Ainslie (1992),
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Ainslie (2001), Laibson (1997), Ok and Masatlioglu (2007)),
• Risk and fundamental uncertainty about the future (discussed by, for in­
stance, Weitzman (2001), Gollier (2002), Halevy (2008)),
• Preference change (discussed by, for instance, Strotz (1956), Parfit (1984), 
Laibson (1997), Frederick et al. (2002)), and
• Interaction between selves in a decision-maker (discussed by, for instance, 
Thaler and Shefrin (1981), Ainslie (1992), Ainslie (2001), Fudenberg and 
Levine (2006), and Xue (2008)).
Starting off again with constant-rate exponential discounting, the canonical 
interpretation of the constant discount rate r used in these theories rests indeed 
on the idea of time preference. More specifically, r  is interpreted as the constant 
rate of time preference. The concept of time preference, in turn, is supposed to 
capture the idea that agents’ time impatience plays a major role in the subjective 
evaluation of intertemporal prospects. Indeed, the concept of time impatience was 
at the very heart of the beginnings of the time preference theories of discounting: 
Frederick et al. (2002) point out that for many of the precursors of time prefer­
ence theories, like Bohm-Bawerk, Fisher, Jevons and Pigou, the concept of time 
impatience was widely taken to be psychologically plausible and central in devel­
oping their theories of capital and interest. However, these authors have offered 
different and complex interpretations of how time impatience arises, forming an 
‘amalgamation of various intertemporal motives’, according to Frederick et al. 
(2002, 355). For instance, Frederick et al. (2002, 353) cite John Rae’s Sociological 
Theory of Capital (1834) in which he maintains that:
‘[t]he actual presence of the immediate object of desire in the mind 
by exciting the attention, seems to rouse all the faculties, as it were 
to fix their view on it, and leads them to a very lively conception of 
the enjoyments which it offers to their instant possession.’
Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk gives a characterisation of time impatience as consisting 
of underestimating future wants in his book Capital and Interest (1889), cited in 
Frederick et al. (2002, 354):
‘It may be that we possess inadequate power to imagine and to ab­
stract, or that we are not willing to put forth the necessary effort, but
93
CHAPTER 4. TIME DISCOUNTING
in any event we limn2 a more or less incomplete picture of our future 
wants and especially of the remotely distant ones.’
This appear to echo the dictum of ‘weakness of imagination’ which Ramsey (1928) 
credited as producing time discounting. In the same vein, in The Economics of 
Welfare (1920), Arthur Pigou characterised time preference as arising ‘from a 
type of cognitive illusion’ (Frederick et al., 2002, 354):
‘[...] our telescopic faculty is defective, and we, therefore, see future 
pleasures, as it were, on a diminished scale.’
While these authors endorse slightly different explanations of how exactly time 
impatience arises, they all offer these explanations to suggest that time prefer­
ence reflects time impatience which they take to be a deeply rooted psychological 
fact. On the basis of those early conceptual considerations regarding the role of 
time impatience, Samuelson (1937) was the first to formally derive exponential 
discounting from time preferences. Note that, as highlighted by Frederick et al. 
(2002, 353), assuming that time preferences capture time impatience is a consid­
erable conceptual simplification, when compared to the more complex discussion 
of time impatience by Bohm-Bawerk, Fisher, Jevons and Pigou.
As mentioned when introducing the hyperbolic discounting functions, there 
axe a variety of concepts endorsed in hyperbolic discounting theories, includ­
ing time preference, delay perception, risk and uncertainty, as well as preference 
change. Since hyperbolic time discounting theories of have been formulated as a 
result of empirical study, they axe aimed at capturing the data of those studies, 
and indeed aim at predictive accuracy. It his hence not surprising that a variety 
of constants and factors determine those more complex functions. Indeed, the 
constants in the generalised and quasi-hyperbolic discounting functions are diffi­
cult to underpin conceptually. Still, from an explanatory point of view it is also 
plausible that real-world agents’ attitudes towards the future depend on a vaxiety 
of factors. However, the mixture of conceptual motivations behind hyperbolic dis­
counting functions does not provide as straightforward motivations as with time 
preference theories. An exception from such conceptual complexities is the idea 
of delay perception in hyperbolic discounting for delay (given by D(t) = | )  as 
only the idea that agents perceive of time differences in the neax futuxe more 
drastically than in the far future is invoked here. In addition, Ainslie (1992),
2 to limn, to depict, or to picture.
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Ainslie (2001), Ainslie (2005) supplies a theory of bargaining between temporal 
selves to underpin the theory of delay perception behind discounting for delay.
Hyperbolic discounting has also been motivated by the idea that both risk 
and uncertainty, as well as preference change are associated with distance in 
time. For instance, Weitzman (2001), Gollier (2002) and Halevy (2008) consider 
how time-indexed probability functions and risk evaluations can influence mo­
tivations for time discounting. Note, though, that probabilities have also been 
used to motivate exponential discounting (such as a constant probability that a 
decision-maker’s life may end, (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). In the context of hy­
perbolic discounting, Halevy (2008) considers how time impatience can vary, and 
establishes a dependence between time impatience and the perception of risk: 
present bias that is typical for hyperbolic discounting weakens when the imme­
diate becomes risky. Preference change theories of time discounting motivate 
time differences with changes in the propositional attitudes of agents. In those 
theories, the future goodness evaluations of agents are discounted with their di­
minished present credibility due to changes in preferences, as suggested by, for 
instance, Strotz (1956) and (Frederick et al., 2002, 389). Less formally, Parfit 
(1984) also suggests time discounting because of changes in preferences. The lat­
ter proposals have also been dubbed ‘multiple-self’ accounts of time discounting 
(for instance in the Frederick et al. (2002) review), suggesting that the present 
self evaluates prospects from her perspective and discounts the evaluations of 
future consequences to reflect that her future selves might have changed prefer­
ences. Furthermore, in Thaler and Shefrin (1981), Ainslie (1992), Ainslie (2001), 
Fudenberg and Levine (2006), Read (2006), and (Xue, 2008), decision-makers are 
explicitly assumed to be multiple-selves to discuss intertemporal decisions and 
time discounting. As mentioned in the initial review of the multiple-self liter­
ature in Chapter 2 of this thesis, those authors assume that there can be more 
than one self at a time (in most of those contributions, a decision-maker is as­
sumed to consist of a far-sighted ‘planner’ self and short-sighted ‘doer’ selves) 
and attempt to discuss intertemporality in a wide sense, commenting on time 
discounting, problems of dynamic consistency, planning, and the formation of 
second-order beliefs by decision-makers about those problems. These proposals 
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 of this thesis.
With the exception of only some theories (such as the complex motivations 
for time impatience by the precursors of the discounted utility model, and some
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of the multiple-self accounts), the motivations underpinning time discounting do 
not form conceptually rich theories. In particular, it is hard to see how the 
conceptual motivations provide arguments for restricting discounting functions 
to exponential and hyperbolic ones. Moreover, in order to compensate for the 
absence of such accounts, many theories -  especially hyperbolic ones -  appeal for 
a combination of the aforementioned motivations. While the variety of conceptual 
motivations in discounting theories may not be problematic in itself -  indeed, it 
can be argued that such an entanglement is necessarily involved in an adequate 
description of the phenomenon -  it makes it difficult to compare those theories 
to one another.
4.2 .4  Four Problem s o f T im e D iscounting
The question which of these aforementioned theories of time discounting is the 
correct one, has not been resolved (overviews of the debate can be found in Fre­
derick et al. (2002) and Loewenstein and Read (2003)). In general, the theories 
introduced in the previous sections can be compared with regards to two ques­
tions: firstly, does a given theory of time discounting provide the correct time 
discounting function? This is the question of providing the correct discounting 
factor. Secondly, does a given theory of time discounting provide the correct in­
terpretation of time discounting? This is the question of providing the right kind 
of conceptual content that underlies the time discounting.
These two questions can be discussed in two fundamentally different modes; 
namely, descriptively or normatively. In a descriptive mode, the two aforemen­
tioned problems can be analysed with regards to their empirical adequacy. In a 
normative mode, they can be analysed according to their ability to establish a 
justification for discounting a goodness evaluation for temporal distance.
Modes
Questions
Descriptive Normative
Functional Form 
Interpretation
(i) Empirical Accuracy (ii) Prescriptive Adequacy 
(iii) Captures M otivation (iv) Provides Justification
T able 4.1: Two Questions of Time Discounting and Two Modes of their Discussion
The two problems of time discounting and the two modes of their analysis 
yield four persistent problems of time discounting which are depicted in Table 1. 
We consider each of the four problems in turn.
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(i) E m pirica l A ccuracy. Firstly, consider the question of the correct func­
tional form of time discounting in a descriptive sense. Here, we require of a time 
discounting function to be empirically accurate, such as accurately predicting the 
time discounting of agents. In this context, exponential discounting has long been 
defended as a sufficiently general approximation of real-world discounting beha­
viour, with exponential time discounting being widely employed in accounting, 
banking and cost-benefit analysis. However, the different variants of hyperbolic 
discounting functions better fit the data of experiments that have been conducted 
in the context of behavioural economics. As a simple illustration of this point, 
consider the following example: Consider an agent who is presented with two 
choices. Firstly, she is choosing between receiving one apple today and two apples 
tomorrow. Secondly, she is choosing between receiving one apple in 999 days and 
receiving two apples in 1,000 days. For simplicity, suppose that the agent has to 
make a choice, i.e. declaring her indifference is not an option. Consider that in 
such choices, real-world agents often choose one apple today in the first choice and 
two apples in 1,000 days in the second choice. Such choice behaviour is in fact 
predicted by hyperbolic discounting functions, whereas exponential discounting 
functions would imply that the agent either chooses ‘symmetrically’, i.e. either 
the one apple or the two apple in both choices. This question of greater predictive 
accuracy of hyperbolic discounting has enjoyed a lot of attention as of late; in 
particular, many different proposals for hyperbolic discounting have been made 
as reviewed earlier, owing to the rise of experimental and behavioural economics 
(Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), Loewenstein and Read (2003), Frederick et al. 
(2002)).
(ii) P rescrip tiv e  A dequacy. Secondly, consider the problem of the correct 
functional form of time discounting in a normative sense. Here, we require of a 
time discounting function to constitute the right kind of prescription of how to 
value future consequences. In other words, a discounting function tells us how we 
rationally ought to discount the future. This question has received some attention 
in the literature that discusses the relative merits of exponential and hyperbolic 
discounting: the often-rehearsed argument is that hyperbolic discounting implies 
preference reversal, whereas exponential discounting is dynamically consistent 
because it preserves the utility function (for a detailed discussion of this point, 
see Manzini and Mariotti (2007)). Consider again the example of the apples as 
introduced above. From a prescriptive point of view, dynamic consistency de­
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mands that the agent chooses uniformly in the two choices, either opting for the 
one apple-option both times, or for the two apples-option. The choice behaviour 
predicted by hyperbolic discounting is dynamically inconsistent: for if the agent 
first chooses one apple today over two apples tomorrow, then after 999 days she 
will prefer to receive an apple on that day, rather than waiting for two apples 
on day 1,000 -  but this goes against her earlier preference of rather receiving 
two apples in 1,000 days rather than one in 999 days. Giving up her prefer­
ence for receiving one apple on day 999 for the sake of dynamic consistency does 
not solve the problem: on day 999, she will now have changed her preference 
of receiving one apple today rather than two apples tomorrow. This, in fact, 
is often taken as a conclusive normative argument in favour of exponential dis­
counting, with many commentators arguing that hyperbolic discounting is only 
applicable as a descriptive theory (Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), Loewenstein 
and Read (2003), Frederick et al. (2002)). Note, however, that the problem of 
dynamic inconsistency is in fact restricted to whether discounting is in conflict 
with supposedly rational, or more specific, stable preferences. All it shows is that 
hyperbolic discounting can have the effect of undermining specific features of 
goodness evaluations, with that problem not arising in exponential discounting. 
It is not evident that this says much about the normative viability of exponential 
or hyperbolic discounting functions as such. It could simply be the case that we 
ought to value the future hyperbolically -  and that this evaluation is in conflict 
with received theories of goodness evaluation. We will revisit this question later.
(iii) C ap tu res  M otivation . Thirdly, consider the question of interpreting 
time discounting in a descriptive sense. In this context, we require of a theory of 
time discounting to correctly capture the motivation for time discounting. That is 
to say, time discounting theories should give a substantive account of why agents 
engage in time discounting. In constant-rate exponential discounting theories, it 
is often claimed that time impatience is a psychological fact which can be cap­
tured by time preference, as reviewed earlier. In contrast, hyperbolic discounting 
theories maintain that preference change, attitudes towards risk and uncertainty 
and delay perception also play a vital role in determining how real-world agents 
discount for temporal distance. Since the different theories of time discounting axe 
disparate in the conceptual content they associate with temporal distance, and 
in the way they interpret the discounting functions, it is not immediately obvious 
how the accounts can be compared to each other with regards to this question.
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Little explicit attention has been given to this question in the literature which is 
by and large focused on the problem of predictive accuracy of time discounting 
functions. Indeed, somewhat anticipating the discussion in the later sections of 
this chapter based on the representational framework for time discounting, we can 
already flag the relative lack of coherent conceptual motivation for discounting 
the future as a key deficiency of present theories of time discounting.
(iv) P rov ides Ju stifica tion . Fourthly, consider the question of interpreting 
time discounting in a normative context. Here, we require of a theory of time 
discounting to provide sufficient conceptual motivation to justify time discount­
ing. That is to say, there has to be a reason as to why initial, timeless goodness 
evaluations of intertemporal prospects could (let alone should) be weighted by 
time discounting factors. In philosophy, it is mostly denied that time discount­
ing of future goods is justifiable (e.g. Sidgwick (1907), Rawls (1971), Broome 
(1991), Broome (1999)). Prominently, Rawls (1971, 259) follows Sidgwick (1907) 
in saying that discounting future value as such is not permissible:
‘The mere difference of location in time, of something’s being earlier
or later, is not a rational ground for having more or less regard for it.’
This assertion questions that the value-making features of a state of the world 
could depend on its temporal occurrence. Moreover, it also implies that evalu­
ating goodness is separate and should be prioritised. Indeed, it is claimed that 
when evaluating goodness, the standard that is chosen (for instance, pleasure, 
wellbeing, or utility), should not be amended with other considerations. Hence, 
a separate reason is needed in order to justify time discounting. Furthermore, it 
suggests that time discounting will be in conflict with the assumed generality of 
the standard of evaluation that theories of goodness usually invoke. That is to 
say, upon committing to some variant of utilitarianism or expected utility, little 
if any room is left for influencing evaluations beyond those deemed to determine 
goodness in the given theory. This is in stark contrast to fact that the discounted 
utility-model is widely applied in economics. The somewhat unresolved situ­
ation is aptly summarised by Ramsey (1928), as cited in the introduction to this 
chapter. Little is offered by the time discounting interpretations themselves to 
improve on this; i.e. the conceptual motivations for time discounting do not carry 
with them a set of arguments for their normative appeal. However, note that the 
interpretations do come close to expected utility theory in different ways: the time 
preference interpretation simply extends by its very nature the familiar concept
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of preferences, the uncertainty account also draws on the familiar concept of risk 
preferences or indeed probability functions and the preference change interpret­
ation is also close to standard decision-theoretic accounts. While this discussion 
makes explicit what kinds of assumptions axe made by the accounts, it does 
not suggest how to make these normatively plausible. Problem (iv) is hence a 
particularly difficult requirement to fulfil, given that time discounting modifies 
the goodness evaluations provided by sophisticated normative accounts, such as 
expected utility theory.
More generally, debates about the relative merits of time discounting theories 
tend to either focus on one of the four problems raised here, or pairs of problems, 
according to the questions (rows in Table 4.1) and modes (columns in Table 
4.1). For instance, by adopting a descriptive mode, both the correct functional 
form and motivation of time discounting can be debated in an empirical sense. 
Likewise, a normative mode can be adopted, which leads to different concerns with 
regards to the functional form and interpretation of time discounting. Concerning 
the questions of time discounting, theoretical discussions in economics focus on 
establishing the correct functional form of time discounting in both a descriptive 
and normative sense whereas conceptual discussions in ethics and policy discourse 
focus on the question of interpretation. It is probably only the DU-model (i.e. 
constant-rate exponential discounting, with time preferences) that has been taken 
regularly as a prominent referent theory for all four of those questions. However, 
the DU-model can hardly be seen as providing a satisfactory answer to even one 
of those questions (Loewenstein and Read, 2003). Yet, as oldest fully formed 
theory of time discounting, it is a natural point of departure and comparison for 
more recent accounts and debates.
The four problems of time discounting raise deep foundational and methodo­
logical worries (although (i) could be discussed exclusively empirically). From a 
foundational perspective, debates about the merit of discounting theories should 
be resolved by analysing the theories according to their frameworks of represent­
ation and measurement.
4.3 R epresentation  Theorem s for T im e D iscounting
This section reviews the underlying frameworks of representation in existing the­
ories of time discounting. We first highlight the crucial role of representation
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theorems, before reviewing representation theorems for both exponential and hy­
perbolic discounting theories. In a next step, problems with regard to the repres­
entation theorems in the literature are raised. Finally, the strategy of the general 
framework of representation developed in the next section is motivated.
4.3.1 R epresentation Theorem s and M easurem ent Theory
Representation theorems play a crucial role for basic economic concepts, such as 
utility. Indeed, for many contentious concepts in the foundations of economics, 
descriptive and normative debates can be explored systematically by going back to 
underlying theories of measurement and representation (Boumans, 2007). More 
specifically, such discussions axe best framed in terms of representation theorems 
that underlie the different theories.
As a prominent example of such a strategy, consider how expected utility 
theory has been discussed recently in behavioural economics and philosophical 
decision theory. Indeed, its normative and empirical problems have been debated 
with reference to the structure of the representation of expected utility. For in­
stance, in the wake of Allais (1953), the independence assumption in standard 
expected utility theories came under both descriptive and normative scrutiny: 
on the one hand, the new fields of experimental economics and behavioural eco­
nomics conducted numerous studies on whether real-world agents conform to the 
conditions implied in standard expected utility theories. This has led to the de­
velopment of amended expected utility theories (Starmer, 2000). On the other 
hand, there has also been conceptual and normative discussion about the con­
ditions inherent in expected utility theory, with reference to how such theories 
capture the notion of risk and whether specific conditions, such as the independ­
ence assumption are normatively viable.
Indeed, there is a striking parallel between the recent debates about time dis­
counting theories and the way in which standard expected utility theories have 
been challenged with empirical evidence. The four problems of time discounting 
described earlier roughly map onto similar descriptive and normative problems 
in expected utility theory. That is to say, the presence of a representational 
framework (in this case utility as a positive affine representation of rational pref­
erences) has helped to structure the debates and disagreements in various ways: 
concerning (i), the empirical accuracy of expected utility theory, several candid­
ate theories have emerged that are put forward as better fitting data obtained
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in experiments and faring better in predictions (such as Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979)). Concerning (ii), the question of prescriptive accuracy, several alternative 
axiomatisations have been developed that avoid specific conditions; for instance, 
Loomes and Sugden (1982) do not include a transitivity condition and other 
frameworks drop the independence condition, such as Levi (1986). On a concep­
tual level, as in (iii), the descriptive relevance of the presentation of a decision 
problem (‘framing’) has been extensively considered (and integrated in descriptive 
theories, such as by Kahneman and Tversky (1979)). Farther, mirroring (iv), the 
normative relevance of certain conceptual limitations of standard expected utility 
theory have been recognised by providing representations that allow for phenom­
ena such as taste change (Dietrich and List, 2009) and investigating dropping the 
completeness assumption, which has been questioned as conceptually implaus­
ible (on both a descriptive and normative level, e.g. Bradley (2009c)). This 
parallel between foundational problems in time discounting and expected utility 
theory suggests that representational frameworks are very useful for structuring 
the discussion of such questions.
The Representational Theory of Measurement
More formally, representation theorems make explicit the construction principles 
of functions. The concept of representation theorems as used in expected utility 
theory is closely related to the representational theory of measurement. Meas­
urement theory is a natural starting point when considering how to set up a pro­
cedure that captures relevant features in a quantitative way (Boumans, 2007). 
Indeed, in their introduction to measurement theory, Savage and Ehrlich (1992, 
2) maintain that
‘measurement in general is taken to be the assignment of numbers [... ]
to entities and events to represent their properties and relations.’
Savage and Ehrlich (1992, 3) admit that this general characterisation of meas­
urement is already quite close to the representational theory of measurement. 
The latter has been developed as a formal and abstract approach to measure­
ment, generalising the approach to measurement that originated with physical 
measurement. In the latter, the central idea is that (physical) quantities are as­
signed numbers. This concept is captured in the following assertion of Russell 
(1903, 176):
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‘Measurement of magnitudes is, in its most general sense, any method 
by which a unique and reciprocal correspondence is established between 
all or some of the magnitudes of a kind and all or some of the num­
bers, integral, rational, or real, as the case may be . . .  In this general 
sense, measurement demands some one-one relation between the num­
bers and magnitudes in question -  a relation which may be direct or 
indirect, important or trivial, according to circumstances.’
The representational theory of measurement has taken a more abstract stance, 
substituting the idea of physical quantity or magnitude with properties or fea­
tures of objects or with relations between such properties or features (Swistak, 
1990). Swistak (1990, 7) also maintains that the ‘representational paradigm is 
the fundamental notion of measurement which is in use in the contemporary the­
ory of measurement’ and ascribes the coining of the term ‘representational theory 
of measurement’ to Adams (1966). The authoritative statement of the repres­
entational theory of measurement can be found in the three monographs Krantz 
et al. (1971), Suppes et al. (1971) and Luce et al. (1971). In their characterisa- 
tion, a representational measurement procedure allows one to make two formal 
statements,
‘a representation theorem, which asserts the existence of a homo­
morphism 0 into a particular numerical relational structure, and a 
uniqueness theorem, which sets forth the permissible transformations 
0 i—► 0' that also yield homomorphisms into the same numerical struc­
ture. A measurement procedure corresponds in the construction of a 
0 in the representation theorem.’ (Krantz et al. (1971, 12).
Accordingly, representation theorems establish homomorphisms between em­
pirical and numerical structures that allow to characterise properties of numerical 
assignment. For this, we assume an empirical relation R  on a set of objects A  
and a numerical relation S on R. A homomorphism is established by a function 
that assigns real numbers to elements in A in a way that numerically captures 
their empirical relation. More formally,
‘. .. if (A, R \ , . . . ,  Rm) is an empirical relational structure and (R, S i, . . . ,  Sm) 
is a numerical relational structure, a real valued function 0 on A  is 
a homomorphism if it takes each Ri into Sj, i =  1 ,.. .  ,m .’ (Krantz 
et al, 1971, 8ff.)
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Such homomorphisms can be characterised formally to render explicit what 
kinds of transformations are possible which is captured by the concept of scales:
‘A homomorphism into the real numbers is often referred to as a scale 
in the psychological measurement literature. From this standpoint 
measurement may be regarded as the construction of homomorphisms 
(scales) from empirical relational structures of interest into numerical 
relational structures that are useful.’ (Krantz et al., 1971, 9)
The exact characterisation of what kind of scale a given measurement proced­
ure yields is given by uniqueness theorems which specify the permissible trans­
formations of the numbers. More formally, uniqueness theorems assert that
‘. . . a  transformation <j> i—>• 0' is permissible if and only if 0 and 0' 
are both homomorphisms of (A, R \ , . . . ,  Rm) into the same numerical 
structure (R, S i , . . . ,  5m).’ (Krantz et al., 1971, 12)
Following Steven (1946), a distinction is usually made between nominal, or­
dinal, interval and ratio scales. Nominal scales allow only for one-to-one trans­
formations. Ordinal scales allow monotonic increasing transformations of the 
form 0 > /(0 ). Interval scales allow for affine transformations of the form
0 »-> a<j> +  (3, a > 0. Ratio scales allow for multiplicative transformation of the 
form 0 i—> a<f>, a  > 0. The representation developed here will make use of interval 
and ratio scales.
Since the representational framework of measurement is very general, particu­
lar frameworks have emerged, such as extensive, conjoint, bisection and difference 
measurement (reviewed in Suppes (2002, 63ff.)). Representations in extensive 
measurement specify procedures that make use of the addition of magnitudes, 
such as in measuring physical magnitudes of mass and length. Bisection meas­
urement gives representations by using the operation of identifying a midpoint 
in an interval. Conjoint measurement representations allow the combinations of 
magnitudes or properties, such as when measuring the intensity and frequency 
of a phenomenon. In difference measurement, representations capture the in­
tensity of a particular property or relation. Variants of difference measurement 
have been used for some representations of time discounting, such as by Fishburn 
and Rubinstein (1982) and Manzini and Mariotti (2007). (So-called absolute- 
difference structures will be used in the general representation developed in the 
next section.)
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The relevance of the representational theory of measurement for developing 
time discounting functions is also exemplified by the fact that the development 
of specific formal frameworks in the representational theory of measurement is 
intrinsically linked with the goal of formalising measurement of psychological 
quantities such as preferences, emotions, beliefs etc. For an overview of the histor­
ical developments, see the references in Krantz et al. (1971, 9). More specifically, 
consider the characterisation of utility in the context of representational theory of 
measurement, such as in Suppes and Winet (1955) or the measurement-theoretic 
formulation of Ramsey’s representation theorem in Bradley (2004).
This brief review of measurement theory highlights the fact that not only are 
representation theorems useful for greater formal and conceptual clarity in dis­
cussing scientific concepts, but that they also make explicit what kind of assump­
tions need to be endorsed in order to quantify qualitative properties of objects. 
For instance, in the context of utility, representation theorems allow us to define 
choice-theoretic exercises by which preferences of agents can be elicited. If those 
choice-theoretic exercises can be characterised by a specific set of axioms, then 
the preferences of agents can be represented by a utility function (unique up to 
choice of scale).
In the context of time discounting, the representational theory of measure­
ment reminds us that in order to establish a function, the underlying empirical 
structure needs to be well-defined and -described in order to motivate the assign­
ment of numbers. This suggests that the focus on the specific shape of discounting 
functions in the literature, and the relative neglect of the conceptual motivations 
for time discounting is problematic: the latter is much-needed in order to explain 
the objects in both the empirical and numerical structures that underlie repres­
entation theorems. Moreover, note that most time discounting functions reviewed 
earlier are considerably more complicated than utility functions. In particular, 
time discounting functions exhibit regularity properties (such as a constant or 
declining rate) with regards to a set of externally given time points, which is a 
formal requirement of a kind that we do not find in utility functions. This sug­
gests that more assumptions will be required in order to establish representation 
theorems for time discounting than those for standard expected utility frame­
works. In the following, we review representation theorems for time discounting, 
before raising problems concerning their comparability and the types of domains 
they assume.
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4.3.2 R epresentations o f T im e D iscounting
This section gives a brief overview of the underlying frameworks of representa­
tion in existing time discounting theories. Exponential discounting is by far the 
most prominent theory of discounting. As already mentioned, the canonical in­
terpretation of time discounting in economics depicts the discount rate r in the 
exponential discounting function as a representation of time preference. At the 
heart of the time preference interpretation of time discounting lies the idea that 
time impatience plays a major role in intertemporal decisions. That is to say, 
it is assumed that agents have a preference for the present, and a preference for 
earlier rewards over later ones. Such preferences are supposed to be captured by 
the discount rate r which is then used to obtain discount factors.
It is worth noting that assuming time preference is a significant departure 
from and addition to standard expected utility theory. Agents as commonly 
modelled in decision theory and microeconomics have complete and transitive 
preferences over a set of prospects from which an additive utility function is 
derived. However, in addition to those preferences, the concept of pure and 
positive time preference is introduced to derive exponential discounting. That is, 
the concept of time preference introduces a new and additional type of preference. 
It can be further described as a structural preference as it is supposed to hold 
over the temporal dimension of all prospects. In addition, the fact that those 
time preferences axe ‘pure and positive’ implies that an agent has a preference 
for utility at earlier points in time over later points in time, in addition to his 
preferences over prospects. More specifically, pure time preference refers to the 
fact that the betterness which is expressed by time preference is associated with 
distance in time. Positive time preference refers to the fact that time preferences 
capture the idea that ‘earlier’ is better than ‘later’, with the present being the 
earliest point in time considered such that positive outcomes at it are preferred 
to all later points in time.
Pure and positive time preferences are one of the key assumptions in Samuel- 
son (1937), which has served as the standard derivation of time discounting factors 
in economics. Samuelson (1937) made the following assumptions in his discounted 
utility (DU)-model: (1) positive time preference that captures time impatience 
(hence, 5 < 1), (2) constant rate r, reflecting stable time preferences, (3) stable 
preferences, i.e. stationary instantaneous utility, (4) separability of utility, (5) 
independence of consumption, i.e. outcomes experienced at one time do not have
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effects on the experience of outcomes at other times, (6) independence of dis­
counting, i.e. the constant rate r  applies to all possible outcomes. It can be 
shown that given the aforementioned conditions, the discounting function has to 
be exponential. Using a similar set of assumptions, Koopmans (1960) provided 
axiomatic foundations for exponential time discounting, and likewise did Lan­
caster (1963) and Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982). The structure shared by 
these axiomatisations is to postulate that agents have pure and positive time 
preferences and then develop conditions on those preferences that jointly capture 
time impatience and preserve the utility function from standard expected utility 
theory. The conditions used in these derivation suggest that the rate of time 
preference r is constant for all periods.
More formally, in the DU-model and its variants, the new concept of time 
preference is introduced to deal with the subjective evaluation of intertemporal 
prospects. Instead of introducing a valuation on some set of outcomes X  which 
gives a utility function, time preferences compare prospects that are combinations 
of outcomes and times, i.e. the domain of preference becomes X  x T, and time 
preferences Z^t p  over this domain can be numerically represented as discounted 
utility. Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982) provide an axiomatisation of pure and 
positive time preference in difference structures that gives exponential discounting 
in similar spirit to standard representations by Samuelson (1937), Koopmans 
(1960) and Lancaster (1963).
The formal framework in Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982) is based on an 
outcome-time structure (X  x T,>j t p )■> where Z^t p  is a preference relation on 
pairs of time points and outcomes (note that the outcomes are already valued,
i.e. the set of outcomes is a set of utilities). Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982, 680) 
use the standard conditions on rational preferences as a starting point and add 
further conditions to prove that the preference relation $Zt p  can be represented 
by a discounted utility function.
O utcom e-tim e s tru c tu re  (Fishburn and Rubinstein, 1982, 680). X  is a non­
degenerate real interval, T  is either a set of successive non-negative integers 
or an interval of non-negative numbers, and 0,1 e T .  For )z t p  on X  x T, 
for all x, y E X  and all s ,t  E T ,  the following conditions hold:
W eak o rder, j^ t p  is a weak order on X  x T;
M onotonicity. If x > y then (x , t ) > (y,t);
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T im e im patience. If s < t then
(i) if x > 0 then (x , s) y Pp
(ii) if x = 0 then (x , s) ~ tp  and
(iii) if x < 0 then (r ,s )  -<tp
Continuity . {(z,£) : (x,t) >zTp (y,s)} and {(x , t ) : (y , s ) >zTp OM)} are 
closed in the product topology on X  x T;
S ta tionarity . If (z, t) ~ TP (y,t +  y) then (x, s) ~ TP (y, s +  A4).
The key conceptual assumptions in this framework are the conditions of time im­
patience and stationarity. The time impatience condition states that agents prefer 
to receive positive utility earlier and negative utility later (Fishburn and Rubin­
stein, 1982, 680). The stationarity condition asserts that indifference between 
two time-dependent outcomes depends only on the difference (fT) between the 
times and not on the actual time points s, t G T (Fishburn and Rubinstein, 1982, 
681). Together, these constraints on the outcome-time structure X  x T  assure 
that time preferences can be represented by a discounted utility function.
T heorem  (Fishburn and Rubinstein, 1982, 682). Suppose time preferences )Zt p  
on an outcome-time structure X  x T  that satisfy the conditions of weak 
order, monotonicity, continuity, time impatience, and stationarity. Then, 
given any 0 < S < 1, there is a continuous, increasing real-valued function 
u on X  such that:
(i) for all (x,£), (y , s ) E X  x T, (x,t) >Ztp  (y,s) iff ^ u (r )  > 6su{y),
(ii) for all x € X,  u(x) is zero if x = 0, positive if x > 0, and negative if 
x <  0 ,
(iii) if T  is an interval then u is unique (given S) up to multiplication by 
positive constants on {x G X  : x > 0} and on {x £ X  : x < 0}.
Accordingly, upon assuming an outcome-time structure, time preferences are rep­
resentable by a discounted utility function. From representations like the above 
also follows that the discounting function has to be an exponential one. More spe­
cifically, in the above theorem, the constant 0 < <5 < 1 is the discounting factor, 
and it is immediately obvious that 5* is equivalent to exponential discounting. 
The above representation also shows that time discounting is by no means fully 
determined: ‘One may fix the discount factor 5 arbitrarily to represent a given
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preference relation that satisfies the axioms, provided the utility function u is 
calibrated accordingly.’ (Manzini and Mariotti, 2007, 4). More precisely, we can 
take any two discounting factors a  and (3 and find two utility functions such that 
(u, a) preferences are identical to (v, (3) preferences, if they are in the same type 
of representation.3
The property of the non-unique discounting factor in the above representa­
tion is different from derivations of exponential discounting that follow Koopmans 
(1960), where the discounting factor is both constant and unique in the represent­
ation. This is due to the different domains which underlie the two representations, 
in particular the kinds of outcomes under consideration: in Koopmans (1960), 
time preferences are defined over consumption streams, whereas the representa­
tion in Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982) defines time preferences over single, timed 
outcomes. Those differences between the frameworks are not crucial to the goal 
of the analysis pursued here, as we focus on the more general question of how 
to evaluate intertemporality correctly, and how the time preference approaches 
attempt those evaluations. Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982) has been chosen here 
because it allows us to consider non-constant discounting factors by weakening 
the stationarity assumption, which will be discussed below.
However, the non-unique discounting factor in the above representation does 
highlight the fact that both an evaluation of time and an evaluation of goodness 
can have an influence on intertemporality in the time preference framework. The 
often debated problem of the ‘choice of the correct discount rate’ in public policy 
and environmental ethics debates can thus not necessarily be debated without 
making assumptions about goodness preferences in time preference frameworks. 
While the above framework makes this problem more explicit than others, most of 
the time preference frameworks presuppose a method of determining a unique util­
ity function, for instance by defining time preferences over consumption streams. 
This renders axioms that are similar to the ones in the above representation even 
stronger.
On a more general level, the fundamental observation here is that time pref­
erence theories interlink time impatient attitudes with standard preferences. On
3As an illustration of this property, consider the following example: suppose X  =  T  =  [0,1] 
and u is the unique u (by (iii) in the above theorem) that satisfies the representation when 
u (l) =  1. Then, u and v are related as follows: v{x) =  [tt(x)]fc, where k =  and a , /3 are the
respective discount factors for u and v. For a = \  and (3 =  §, we have k =  =  -°^21^g°2s-  =
log 3 - lo g  2
log 2
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the one hand, this makes available some motivations for the constraints on time 
preferences, such as weak order. On the other hand, the additional conditions 
that lead to the representation of discounted utility with an exponential discount­
ing function are introduced without explicit further motivation. For instance, the 
stationarity assumption is difficult to motivate. The latter is acknowledged by 
the proponents in the field; indeed, Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982, 681) admit 
that they ‘know of no persuasive argument for stationarity as a psychologically 
viable assumption. ’ While it is possible to replace stationarity with various types 
of separability assumptions, any time preference framework with exponential dis­
counting as target representation will have to endorse some conditions that affect 
utility that go beyond those in standard representations of utility.
If the goal of a constant discounting factor is given up, weaker assumptions 
that stationarity can be endorsed. For instance, Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982) 
go on to show how replacing stationarity with an assumption of separability can 
yield discounting in which the discounting factor is not constant.
T hom sen  separability . If (x,t) ~  (y , s ) and (y , r ) ~  (z, t) then (z ,r) ~  (z,s), 
for all x , y,z E X  and all r, s, £ G T.
The above separability condition is weaker than stationarity and yields a repres­
entation of discounted utility in which the discounting factor does not have to 
be constant (Fishburn and Rubinstein, 1982, 683). The latter is indeed compat­
ible with many variants of hyperbolic discounting in which the discount rate is 
declining (Manzini and Mariotti, 2007). Such variants of hyperbolic discounting 
theories have been derived by, for instance, Laibson (1997)), Ok and Masatlioglu 
(2007) and Halevy (2008). Most of these derivations, however, have not proposed 
entirely new frameworks of representation. Rather, they have suggested different 
shapes of the utility function, that is, they have proposed to amend standard 
DU-frameworks as the one above, introducing parameters that capture present 
bias, which are then motivated by diminishing impatience, the influence of time 
on attitudes towards risk and uncertainty, and preference change.
Exceptions to this strategy are the recent representational framework by Ok 
and Masatlioglu (2007) and the proposal by Scholten and Read (2006). Ok and 
Masatlioglu (2007) keep the standard time preference framework, but at the same 
time a separate, ‘relative’ discounting function is derived from a time-domain T, 
on which time intervals are compared. The relative discounting function captures
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the characteristic present bias of hyperbolic discounting in the following way: time 
intervals in the near future are evaluated as more significant than those in the 
far future, yielding a relative discounting factor that declines more drastically in 
the near future. Scholten and Read (2006) provide a closely related account, but 
focus on explaining empirical evidence, rather than providing a representation. 
More generally, on those accounts, in addition to an outcome-time structure, a 
further evaluation of time intervals is assumed in order to represent hyperbolic 
discounting. Yet, since those frameworks additionally assume an outcome-time 
domain, the problems of the time preference representations apply to them as well. 
We will now turn to a critical review of those strategies, asking whether they 
provide adequate frameworks to discuss the four problems of time discounting 
posed in Section 4.2.
4.3.3 Problem s o f T im e D iscounting R epresentations
This section discusses problems with the time discounting representations in­
troduced, focusing on the entanglement of time and value in those frameworks. 
Revisiting the four problems of time discounting, it can be shown that for each of 
those, the close interlinks between time and value in the time discounting repres­
entations are worrying. Finally, we suggest that the target of any time discounting 
representation, namely some variant of a decreasing function from time points to 
a real interval, puts severe constraints on the kind of intertemporal phenomena 
that can be captured by time discounting functions.
In what sense axe matters of time and value interlinked in the above rep­
resentations? The obvious starting point is to consider the domains and main 
objects in the representations. Here, both the time-outcome domain and time 
preferences concern time as well as value. However, it is far from obvious that 
this is the best way to evaluate intertemporal prospects. As briefly reviewed in 
Chapter 2, the value dimension of prospects can be covered by utility theories, as 
they provide sophisticated and well-founded tools for evaluating the goodness of 
prospects. The additional challenge of evaluating intertemporal prospects resides 
in the open question of how to accommodate the time dimension in procedures of 
evaluation. Most theories have taken the approach to model evaluations of such 
prospects as ones on outcome-date pairs. This has to do with the fact that there 
are many well-founded and successful theories for goodness evaluations of pro­
spects. A natural consideration is to amend those already well-founded theories in
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order to extend their scope. Indeed, the latter point about the well-foundedness 
and well-entrenchedness of theories of goodness evaluations can be taken to be at 
the heart of this strategy of amending the goodness evaluation with some time- 
related feature (such as the integration of time preferences into preference theories 
of goodness evaluations). The hope behind such strategies is that the normative 
and descriptive force of the goodness evaluation remains intact, providing the 
resources for the four tasks of the interpretation, while the scope of evaluation 
is widened, now also including time features of prospects. Yet, with ever more 
sophisticated attempts to determine descriptively and normatively valid ways to 
perform intertemporal goodness evaluations, the formal and conceptual problems 
in such a strategy have become more and more intractable. This is particularly 
pressing since time discounting lies at the heart of crucial debates about public 
policy, such as how to deal with climate change.4
In contrast, it is also possible to develop a separate evaluation of the time 
dimension by giving an account of how we should understand and evaluate in­
tertemporality, and then combine such an evaluation with a goodness evaluation. 
Before outlining such a strategy in the next section, we will show in greater detail 
how the present strategy of evaluating time-outcome pairs via time preferences 
faces obstacles in answering the four problems of time discounting.
Functional Form
Consider firstly the question of the correct time discounting function. The frame­
work reviewed in the previous section lends itself to comparisons of assumptions 
that lead to different functions, with stationarity giving exponential discounting 
and weaker separability assumptions being compatible with hyperbolic discount­
ing. That is, the representation allows us to discuss the kinds of assumptions 
that produce either one of the standard shapes of the discounting functions, hy­
perbolic and exponential, in the same framework. On the downside, since the 
framework is a based on the idea of a utility representation of preferences over
4 A somewhat separate, but no less pressing question is how uncertainty influences time 
discounting and intertemporal valuation. In the above outline of the formal elements of a 
discounted value representations, problems of risk and uncertainty have been assumed away. In 
standard frameworks, all aspects of risk and uncertainty are integrated in to a representation 
of expected value. Yet, on some accounts, time discounting is motivated by considerations of 
uncertainty about the future (as mentioned in Section 4.2.3). If we consider expected value, then 
delineating the risk and uncertainty that is captured by a probability function from time-related 
risk and uncertainty poses even further foundational challenges.
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outcomes, discussing the different methods of time discounting cannot be separ­
ated from discussions about utility. This becomes relevant when considering the 
correct functional form descriptively as well as normatively.
In a descriptive sense, the correct functional form of time discounting should 
be based on empirically plausible axioms. The empirical plausibility of axioms on 
(goodness) preference is well-researched in the behavioural economics literature, 
and has led to the development of decision theories that drop some conditions 
that have been shown to be violated (such as transitivity, and independence). 
Formulating axioms on the evaluation of intertemporal prospects carries over the 
issues of how empirically plausible those axioms are, and given the intertemporal 
context, their plausibility might change. Furthermore, while the separability 
conditions that allow for hyperbolic discounting are weaker than stationarity, 
they too are not seen as very plausible (Fishburn and Rubinstein, 1982, 687). 
Moreover, note that such weaker conditions are only compatible with hyperbolic 
discounting; that is, they do not directly imply such a functional form. For this, 
further assumptions are made about the behaviour of the utility function which 
are rarely axiomatised (Manzini and Mariotti, 2007). More worryingly, many 
other descriptive problems with expected utility, such as those related to risk atti­
tudes, framing effects, and preference change also need to be accommodated when 
investigating the evaluation of intertemporal prospects in a descriptive sense. The 
problem of preference change, closely related to intertemporal decisions, is espe­
cially difficult in this regard: take a decision-maker who chooses a small and early 
reward over a high and late reward. Does this decision-maker exhibit time pref­
erences that suggest hyperbolic discounting or did the decision-maker undergo 
a momentary preference change? Such questions are hard to characterise on an 
outcome-time domain exactly because goodness evaluations and time evaluations 
are intertwined.
In a normative sense, the correct functional form of time discounting should be 
based on normatively plausible axioms. Philosophical decision theorists have in­
vestigated the normative plausibility of axioms on (goodness) preferences. Yet, it 
is unclear whether those can be transformed to an intertemporal context. Trans­
itivity is a normatively plausible requirement on preference, but when applied 
to time preference, it is a much stronger assumption. There are good reasons 
for intransitivity of preference in an intertemporal context, for instance, when an 
individual experiences changes in her personality and hence her tastes. Yet, con­
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ditions on time preference do not lend themselves to descriptions of what kinds of 
effects of intertemporality one might want to endorse. ‘ More generally, the main 
deficiency of representations in outcome-time structures is that the normativity of 
(goodness) preference get in the way of considering what the normatively correct 
evaluation of time distance is. In particular, it seems that variants of discounted 
utility five on the ‘borrowed normativity’ of the standard axioms on preference, 
which are -  given the additional assumptions such as time preference and sta­
tionarity -  potentially undermined by transforming them to an outcome-time 
domain.
Conceptual Motivation
Consider secondly the question of the conceptual motivation for time discount­
ing. Again, the standard frameworks make it impossible to distinguish between 
statements that are made about time and their influence on the evaluation of 
intertemporal prospects on the one hand, and statements that are made about 
goodness evaluations of such prospects. The problems this entails for the descript­
ive and normative discussion of the conceptual motivation of time discounting are 
similar to the ones discussed concerning the functional form. Descriptively, this 
feature makes it hard to investigate the motivations of decision-makers for dis­
counting. In particular, it is unclear how to integrate the diverse motivations for 
time discounting into a time preference framework. Normatively, it is unclear 
what kind of appeal an evaluation of intertemporality has: what is the normat­
ive standing of time impatience, delay perception, preference change, etc.? This 
question gets swept under the carpet by the concept of time preference, which 
seems to be taken as an innocuous modification of the normatively sound concept 
of (goodness) preference.
More generally, this discussion suggests that concerning all four problems of 
time discounting, the integrated evaluation of intertemporal features and good­
ness features hides contentious issues in the evaluation of intertemporal prospects. 
To be sure, the overall goal is to evaluating intertemporal prospects in terms of 
goodness. Yet, in order to do this, the influence of intertemporality has to be 
captured in a precise way, indeed, as precise as goodness evaluations. The prob­
lem of entanglement of time and value creates the need for a framework that 
evaluates temporal features separately.
114
CHAPTER 4. TIME DISCOUNTING
Towards General Foundations
Considering the review of representation theorems in measurement theory, it be­
comes clear that an unambiguous description of the empirical structure is needed. 
Moreover, given that time discounting functions provide a very specific way to 
evaluate intertemporality, in that they in general assume a regular behaviour of 
the weights and sometimes impose further restrictions, it is important to ask 
what kind of intertemporal phenomena they are capable of capturing. Since time 
discounting functions are decreasing, the phenomena that such functions could 
be representing need to behave in a regular fashion. Not all problems that arise 
in intertemporal decisions lend themselves to motivating an empirical structure 
that can be represented by a time discounting function. What is required in this 
context are phenomena that behave in a regular fashion according to a time- 
index. That is to say, we need to endorse the assumption that the conceptual 
motivations offered for time discounting, such as time impatience, attitudes to 
risk and uncertainty, and preference change indeed behave in a regular way. This 
creates the need for a framework which can facilitate a comparison of the kinds 
of qualitative properties that are represented numerically by a discounting factor 
in the different theories.
4.4  G eneral Foundations o f T im e D iscounting
This section provides general measurement-theoretic foundations of time dis­
counting. We proceed in four steps: firstly, we motivate and explain the strategy 
of representation as one that evaluates time distance features of prospects separ­
ately from goodness evaluations. Secondly, a numerical representation of evalu­
ations of ‘time distance’ is developed. Thirdly, we discuss how standard accounts 
of time discounting interpret time distance, that is, what kind of time distance 
features they take to motivate time discounting. Fourthly, we give time discount­
ing functions in terms of time distance and show how further restrictions yield 
exponential and hyperbolic discounting functions. Finally, we show how such 
discounting functions can be combined with goodness evaluations so as to yield 
discounted value.
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4.4.1 Introduction
As stated above, one of the very aims of the representation developed here is 
to provide a general framework for the clarification of existing theories of time 
discounting. The most important feature of the representation is that we initially 
consider the time dimension and the value dimension separately. This is not to 
argue that they are or should be in some sense separate -  on the contrary, it 
seems natural that there are various interrelations between those two dimensions. 
However, in order to assess how time discounting theories can achieve their goal 
of establishing that goodness evaluations can be weighted with time discounting 
factors, a separate reconstruction is in order that will make transparent what kind 
of assumptions about time, value, and their interrelations have to be endorsed in 
order to establish time discounting.
Recall that theories of time discounting offer different conceptual motivations 
for time discounting. The representation developed here is conceptually neutral 
and can be interpreted with any of the conceptual motivations discussed (and 
other ones). As a placeholder for the precise conceptual motivation for time 
discounting we will henceforth use the term ‘time distance’. That is, we will 
show how time discounting functions can be motivated by an evaluation of salient 
features of time distance. To give an example, time preference theories maintain 
that time discounting functions capture impatient attitudes of agents to time 
distance. Here, we give general conditions of how evaluations of time distance 
can motivate time discounting.
More precisely, we embark from the supposition that a goodness evaluation of 
prospects can be given by a variant of decision theory and that if we are to eval­
uate intertemporal prospects, we also require an evaluation of the time distance 
features of those prospects that is then combined with the goodness evaluation. 
Hence, a separate formal procedure will be developed that enables us to evaluate 
the time distance features of intertemporal prospects. Once such a formal pro­
cedure is in place, it can be supplemented with a substantial interpretation that 
motivates the combination of the goodness evaluation with the time distance 
feature evaluation. The main task of the whole of Section 4.4 is to establish 
a detailed procedure that gives an evaluation of time distance features of pro­
spects based on a measurement-theoretic framework. Matters of interpretation 
and comparison of existing theories will only alluded to briefly, and taken up in 
more detail in Section 4.5 and 4.6.
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As the target of the following representation, consider a general definition of 
a time discounting function that assigns numerical values to points in time. Note 
that henceforth, decreasing means strictly decreasing.
Definition 1 (Time discounting function). A time discounting function D is a 
decreasing mapping D : T  —> (0,1], from a set of time points Tcontaining 0 to 
the real interval (0,1], such that D{0) =  1.
Accordingly, a time discounting function assigns numerical values to time points. 
This definition could be generalised further, but as it stands includes already most 
common time functions proposed in the literature, as reviewed earlier. Definition 
1 fixes the target of the representation, that is, we investigate what kind of 
measurement-theoretic assumptions are required such that D  is well-founded. 
More specifically, we ask: what kind of qualitative phenomena that are associated 
with time points axe expressed by the numerical values given by this function? In 
order to answer this question without pre-commitment to a specific conceptual 
motivation for time discounting at this point, we will make the general assumption 
that the numerical values given by a well-founded discounting function are the 
result of an evaluation of salient time distance features of a set of events.
We now introduce some general notation and primitives of the representation 
framework. Firstly, let T  be a set of externally given time points. Formally, we 
assume that T  C [0, oo) with 0 G T. The point 0 represents the present and 
T  does not contain past time points. T  could be discrete (e.g., T  =  {0 ,1 ,2 } )  
or continuous (e.g. T  =  [0,100]) and might even have infinite horizon (e.g. 
T  =  { 0 ,1 ,2 ,. ..}  or T  =  [0, oo)). We will sometimes refer to T  as representing 
clock-time.
Secondly, let Q be a set of events, and let p G Q denoting the present event. 
We interpret sets of events as prospects, denoted A  C Q. Let there be a function 
r  : Q —► T  mapping each event to the clock-time at which it occurs. We call r  the 
clock-time function. By assumption, r(p) = 0 (i.e., the clock is set such that the 
present event happens at clock-time 0). We also assume that for each clock-time 
tG T  there is at least one event q G Q with r(q) = t. That is, at each clock-time 
at least something happens. Having established clock-time and events, we also 
need an evaluation of the salient features of time distance of those events.
Thirdly, let there be a function <p : Q —> I  mapping each event to a numerical 
evaluation of its time distance features. By assumption, for each i G I  there is at 
least one event q G Q with p(q) =  i. Intuitively, ip gives an evaluation of salient
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features of temporal distance. We call <p the time distance function and give an 
axiomatic derivation of it later.
The goal of the following representation is to show that it is possible to 
construct a well-founded time discounting function by using the time distance 
evaluation I. The representation proceeds in four steps: firstly, we present an 
axiomatic derivation of a time distance function ip, in a framework of ordinal dis­
tance measurement. Secondly, we discuss how this framework can be interpreted 
by existing conceptions of time discounting. Thirdly, we construct a composite 
function which maps clock-time points T  to time distance evaluations I  given 
by ip, and the latter into a real-valued interval (0,1], such that this composite 
function is a time discounting function as stated in Definition 1. Finally, after 
giving conditions for obtaining exponential and hyperbolic discounting in this 
framework, we combine such a time discounting function with an evaluation of 
the goodness of consequences in Q to obtain discounted value.
4.4.2 R epresenting T im e D istance
This section develops a numerical representation of the ordinal concept of ‘time 
distance’; that is, we derive the time distance function (p : Q —> I  in a measurement- 
theoretic framework. As mentioned earlier, the concept of time distance is intro­
duced as a formal notion, and is intended as a placeholder for specific interpret­
ations which will be discussed in the next section.
The representation is closely related to a formal framework of measurement 
and representation developed in Krantz et al. (1971). Indeed, we will employ a 
modified variant of difference measurement, given in Krantz et al. (1971, 170ff.), 
to obtain a formal characterisation of a general evaluation of time distance fear 
tures of intertemporal consequences. In Krantz et al. (1971, 170ff.), so-called 
‘absolute-difference structures’ axe introduced to measure differences along a 
single dimension between pairs of elements in a set. The following structure 
and representation are close corollaries of this result. Firstly, consider ordinal 
distance between pairs of elements in a set.
D efinition 2 (Ordinal distance). An  ordinal distance is a binary relation )? on 
Q x Q .
Henceforth, we write the pair (q,r) G Q x Q as qr G Q x Q. Accordingly, ordinal 
distance compares distances between pairs of elements qr € Q x Q. For example,
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qr >p st means that the distance between q and r is at least as large as the 
distance between s and t. Note that in order to employ such a concept of ordinal 
distance, a single dimension of comparison needs to be specified. For instance, 
the elements could be compared according to their distance in their sweetness, 
or loudness, or how an agent perceives of their temporal distance. Consider the 
following axioms on ordinal distance.
D efinition 3 (Ordinal distance structure). Suppose a set Q with at least two 
elements and ordinal distance )?. The pair (Q x Q , ^ )  is an ordinal distance 
structure iff, for all q, r, s, t , q', r', s', t' G Q, and all sequences q\, q2 , • • •, <7i, • • • € 
Q the following axioms hold:
1. Weak ordering.
(i) Either qr !>= st or st qr.
(ii) I f  qr ^  st, st q'r' then qr !>= q'r'.
2. Weak symmetry.
(i) qr rs/ rq>y qq ~  rr.
(ii) I f  qr ~  qq, then qs ~  rs.
3. Well-Behavedness. I f  rs y  rr, qs qr, rs and rt rs, st, then q t )? qs, rt.
4 . Weak Monotonicity. Suppose that qs !>= qr,rs. I f  qr £= q'r' and rs r's', 
then qs 'y q 'sm oreover if  either qr y  q'r' or rs y  r's', then qs y  gV .
5. Solvability. I f  qr st, then there exists t' G Q, such that qr t'r  and 
qt' ~  st.
6. Archimedean property. I f  q\, <7 2 , • • •, qi, • • • is a strictly bounded standard 
sequence (i.e., there exist t ',t"  G Q, such that for all i = 1 ,2 , . . . ,  t't" y  
qi+iqi qiqi and gi+itfc ~  9 2 ^ 1  Q1 Q1), then the sequence is finite.
To illustrate these conditions, recall that Q is a set of events, and A  C Q can 
be prospects. For example, take the prospect of a dinner A = {q ,r ,s ,t} , where 
q =  starter, r  =  main, s = dessert and t — coffee. According to the above 
definition, pairs of elements in this prospect can be compared according to their 
distance on a single dimension. For instance, the events of the dinner prospect 
can be compared with regards to their sweetness. In order to do so, the pairs of
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elements are ordered according to )p. Take the pairs qr (starter, main) and st 
(dessert, coffee). If the distance in sweetness between main and starter is smaller 
than that between coffee and dessert, then st y  qr. The symmetry condition on 
this ordering states that the distance between pairs of elements is independent of 
their ordering, i.e. when comparing the absolute distance in sweetness between 
starter and main to another pair of events, it does not matter whether we write 
qr or rq. Indeed, the two most important properties of the ordinal distance 
structure from an interpretative point of view are the facts that the relation £= 
orders pairs of elements (and not single elements) according to Condition 1 and 
that the ordering relation is symmetric according to Condition 2.
Conditions 3-6 in the above definition ensure richness of the ordering )p. They 
can be explained more intuitively by introducing the notion of betweenness that 
can hold for single elements. Consider three elements q ,r,s  G Q. Then, r  is 
between q and s iff qs qr, rs. This is denoted <?|r|s. The notion of betweenness 
allows us to understand the relation which orders pairs qr G Q x Q in terms 
of single elements and their position relative to each other. From Conditions 1 
and 2, it follows that for any element q ,r,s  G Q, at least one of the betweenness 
patterns g|r|s, g |s|r or r|g |s must hold and that betweenness is symmetric, i.e. 
g |r|s iff s|r|g. We can now rewrite Conditions 3-6 in Definition 3 in this more 
intuitive terminology:
3. Well-Behavedness. If rs >- rr, q\r\s and r\s\t, then both q\r\t and q\s\t.
4. Weak Monotonicity. If g |r|s, q,\r'\s', and qr ~  gV', then rs r's1 iff 
qs q's'.
5. Solvability. If qr )? st, then there exists t' G Q, such that q\t'\r and qt' ~  st.
6. Archimedean property. If q\, q2 , . . . ,  qi,. . .  is a strictly bounded standard 
sequence (i.e., if qi+i\qi\qi, for all i =  1 ,2, . . . ,  and successive intervals are 
equal and nonnull and qiq\ is strictly bounded), then the sequence is finite.
The above conditions jointly ensure that the ordinal distance structure is 
sufficiently rich and well-behaved in order for to be representable numerically.
Ordinal distance structures as given in Definition 3 are closely related to so- 
called absolute-difference structures in Krantz et al. (1971, 170). In the latter, the 
following symmetry condition is used: if q ^  r, then qr ~  rq y  qq ~  rr. However, 
this rules out that Q can contain distinct events which are similar under the
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domain of comparison. In Definition 3, the weaker symmetry condition 2 avoids 
this problem. (We show how the two types of structures just mentioned relate to 
each other by introducing equivalence classes when proving Theorem 5. Proofs 
of formal statements are given in an appendix to this chapter.)
The ordinal distance structure given here can be interpreted in a variety of 
ways. In order to do so, one has to define the single dimension of comparison 
between elements in Q and then interpret the above conditions on the ordinal 
distance y  between pairs. In the example of the dinner, one could for instance 
change the single domain of comparison to that of time distance as perceived by 
agents. Then, y  reflects the ordinal distance in time between all pairs of elements 
of the dinner. For instance, the time distance between starter and main qr could 
be perceived as greater than that between dessert and coffee st, due to livelier 
conversation later in the evening, such that qr y  st. The next section will discuss 
in detail how to interpret ordinal distance by the conceptions of time distance 
that can underly different theories of time discounting.
Note that ordinal distances do not need to correspond to any supposedly 
objective standard that is externally given, such as sweetness defined in terms 
of sugar content in food items or time as it is given by a clock. What is crucial 
is the fact that if one can identify one dimension on which ordinal distances 
between pairs of elements can be compared, and upon the comparison satisfying 
the conditions in Definition 3, the ordering y  can be represented numerically.
D efinition 4 (Representation). A real-valued function p  on Q is said to repres­
ent ordinal distance y  i f  for all p, q ,r ,s  G Q,
qr y  st iff |p{q) -  y?(r)| > \<p(s) -  p(t)\.
Accordingly, y  has a numerical representation if the absolute difference between 
the assigned numbers of pairs of elements adequately reflects their ordinal dis­
tance.
T heorem  5 (Interval Representation of Ordinal Distance). Suppose ordinal dis­
tance y  satisfies the conditions of an ordinal distance structure. Then there exists 
a function p  : Q —> R that represents y . I f  p' is another function with the same 
property, then p ' = a p  +  /3, where a , / i E E , a / 0 .
Accordingly, it is possible to numerically represent the ordinal distance between 
pairs of elements in a set Q. That is, in the context of measuring ordinal distance
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between consequences on a single dimension, a number p  E R can be assigned to 
any event q G Q such that for any two events qr G Q x Q, the absolute difference 
of p(q) and p(r) adequately reflects their ordinal distance when compared to any 
other pair of elements st G Q x Q and the numbers assigned to them, such that
qr ^  st iff |p(q) -  <p(r)\ > |p(s) -  p (t) |.
In the context of the dinner example and the sweetness dimension of compar­
ison, this means that all consequences in the dinner are assigned a real number 
p  € R that reflects the ordering in ordinal distance of sweetness between all pos­
sible pairings. For example, take the following ordinal distance in sweetness of 
the dinner consequences: st y  sr y  qt ~  qs y  rt y  rq. According to Theorem 
5, this can be represented numerically, for instance by the following assignment 
of numbers: ip(q) = 55, p(r) = 50, p(s) =  105, p(t) = 5. This clearly satisfies 
Theorem 5, as |y?(s) -  <p(t)\ > |p(s) -  p(r)\ > \p{q) -  p(t)\ = \<p{q) -  p(s)\ >
|ip(r) — p(t) | > |p(r) — ip(q) |, i.e. 100 > 55 > 50 =  50 > 45. Moreover, the
assigned numbers are unique up to an affine transformation.
For some dimensions of comparison, it is possible to identify a specific element 
p G Q to which the above representation can be normalised. Generally, such a 
normalisation is permissible if p is a true zero point.
C orollary  6 (Normalisation). Let 'y satisfy the conditions of an ordinal distance 
structure and be represented by a. Then, p  is a normalisation of a to p iff 
p  = o + (3 and p{p) =  0. I f  p f is another function with the same property, then 
p' = ap, where a  G R, a > 0.
The above statement asserts that the interval scale given in Theorem 5 can be 
normalised to an absolute zero which gives a ratio scale on which only multi­
plicative transformations are allowed. That is, to continue the example of the 
dinner items, if there is an element that has maximal or minimal sweetness, then 
the numerical representation can be normalised. Suppose an agent has a double 
espresso with no sugar for coffee and that this is minimally sweet. Normalising 
according to Corollary 6 to t £ Q, by the transformation p  — a — 5, gives p{t) — 0 
(and, accordingly, p{q) = 50, p(r) = 45, and p(s) = 100).
Interpreting the above framework with other dimensions of ordinal distance, 
similar orderings and representations can be given. In the context of time dis­
tance, it is indeed also plausible to normalise the representation to a ratio scale, 
when taking the present p as an absolute zero, as it is the natural viewpoint 
from which prospects and courses of actions are assessed. It is also possible to
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normalise to any other time point in the past or future, which is plausible when 
there is a specific point in time from which temporally extended prospects axe 
analysed. For most applications and indeed for representing time discounting, 
normalising to the present is the most plausible option. This normalisation also 
makes it possible to specifically analyse time distance between p and other ele­
ments in the set Q. Notably, from the normalisation, the following statement 
follows immediately:
r p ^ q p  iff |<£>*(r)| > \tp*(q)\.
Accordingly, consequences q G Q can be analysed directly with regards to their 
time distance to the present p. This more intuitive comparison of time distance 
will be used to consider the interpretations of time distance that is inherent in 
the different theories of time discounting.
The above representation rests on Definition 3 which contains richness as­
sumptions which may not be satisfied in modelling applications. For instance, 
the assumptions imply that Q is infinite and the image of ip is an interval (or ra­
tio). Such richness assumptions are standardly included in measurement-theoretic 
representations and make explicit the requirements needed to construct functions 
with scale-properties. In the following, we use p  also in ‘non-rich’ cases where, 
for instance, Q is finite and there are only finitely many time distances. That is, 
<p : Q —* I  is an (onto) function from events to their time distance. From now on, 
we assume that I  C [0, oo) with cr(p) = 0. That is, past events are not included.5
Before employing the function ip : Q > I  to derive time discounting func­
tions, we consider how the formal notion of ‘time distance’ that has been given 
measurement-theoretic foundations in this section can be interpreted with the 
concepts inherent in existing theories of time discounting.
4.4.3 Interpreting T im e D istance
Time distance can be interpreted in a variety of ways. Firstly, it could be inter­
preted as equivalent to clock-time. Indeed, the six axioms on the binary relation 
)p would follow immediately from the idea that time distance is given by clock­
time. It is possible to understand the framework introduced here in such a naive
5If <p is indeed thought of as being derived from an ordinal distance structure (Q x Q, y )  with 
<p(p) =  0, then the assumption that /  C [0, oo) implies that the present event p  is not strictly 
between any two other events (i.e., there are no events r,s  G Q such that rs y  rp and rs y  sp). 
All other events q e  Q are such that qp y qq for future events, and Q contains no past events.
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sense, yet it is unclear what this would add: the real purpose of the framework 
is of course not to capture measurement of time as clock-time, but to develop a 
framework that can compare what properties different theories of time discount­
ing take to be relevant about time distance. That is, the term ‘time distance’ -  as 
employed so far -  can be understood as a formal notion for which certain prop­
erties have been defined that are required to obtain a numerical representation 
of temporal features of prospects.
We now turn to the question of supplementing the ordinal distance structure 
and its representation with substantive interpretations. Intuitively, such an inter­
pretation will specify what one takes the relevance of distance in time to be, i.e. 
what kind of regular phenomena one associates with the passage of time. For all 
interpretations, Q depicts a set of events and > orders pairs of those according 
to their time distance. However, the approaches can differ widely in how exactly 
that distance is interpreted and how rich the description of the events needs to 
be.
T im e im patience. Time preference theories of discounting evaluate time 
distance according to the degree of impatience it induces in the agent. Indeed, 
at the heart of these theories lies the idea that time impatience of agents is both 
psychologically plausible and plays a major role in intertemporal evaluations (Fre­
derick et al., 2002). In those theories, rp ^  qp iff a higher degree of impatience is 
associated with r than with q, as no time impatience is associated with p. With 
the additional assumption that events q € Q take a positive value under a de­
sirability evaluation, this captures time preferences as used in the representations 
of Samuelson (1937), Koopmans (1960), and Fishburn and Rubinstein (1982).
Delay. Delay theories of time discounting evaluate time distance according to 
how agents perceive the delay inherent in it. In those theories, initiated by Ainslie 
(1975), Ainslie (1992), Ainslie (2001) amongst others, empirical results on how 
agents perceive of delays are generalised and used to motivate time discounting, 
and Ok and Masatlioglu (2007) provide a representation theorem that includes 
delay perception. Hence, in this interpretation, rp qp iff an agent perceives a 
longer delay between rp than with qp, and no delay is associated with p.
R isk an d  uncerta in ty . Risk and uncertainty theories of time discounting 
evaluate time distance according to the degree of fundamental risk or uncertainty 
it induces. Such accounts, in which time-indexed probability functions and risk 
evaluations motivate time discounting are discussed by Weitzman (2001), Gollier
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(2002), Mas-Colell et al. (1995) and Halevy (2008). Hence, rp qp iff more 
fundamental uncertainty is associated with r than with q, as no fundamental 
uncertainty is associated with p. Additional assumptions on how the risk and 
uncertainty evaluation of time distance is delineated from risk and uncertainty 
in goodness evaluations are needed to employ time discounting functions thus 
motivated.
P reference change. Preference change theories of time discounting evaluate 
time distance according to the degree of change in the propositional attitudes of 
agents. In those theories, the future goodness evaluations of agents are discounted 
with their diminished present credibility due to changes in preferences, as sug­
gested by Strotz (1956), Paxfit (1984) and Frederick et al. (2002, 389). On such 
accounts, rp qp iff there is more preference change associated with r  than with 
q, when compared to preferences at p. In order for this interpretation to hold, 
richer descriptions of consequences have to be assumed (e.g. events q € Q are 
interpreted as an agent-relative proposition ‘Agent a  eats a dessert’), such that 
the description specifically includes a reference to the agent whose preferences 
change.
In addition to those interpretations, there is a large class of time discounting 
theories that combine several interpretations of time distance (overviews are in 
Frederick et al. (2002), Loewenstein and Read (2003)). As presented in the over­
view of hyperbolic discounting, there are theories that combine considerations of 
time preferences, delay, risk and uncertainty and preference change.6 This will 
require us to model more than one understanding of time distance in order to 
be able to formulate representations of time discounting functions. For this, we 
either have to repeat the representation according to the different interpretations 
or interpret as capturing all of those interpretations in one ordering.
Interpreting ordinal time distance and its representation with the conceptual 
content from the different theories of time discounting makes transparent how 
those theories establish the numerical representation of a qualitative concept. 
Furthermore, it also makes transparent that the specific interpretation of time 
distance has to motivate the ordinal distance structure given in the previous 
section. More generally, the framework given in this paper allows us to recast the
6Note that there is also a rich literature on intertemporal allocation that employs a plethora 
of concepts to motivate time discounting, including those already mentioned, as well as market 
rates of return on investment and other factors related to investment. Such specifications of 
‘time discounting’ will be even more complex to represent than the above.
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conceptions of time discounting the different theories endorse in terms of their 
inherent interpretation of time distance. This facilitates a clarification of their 
assumptions. These questions will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.5 and 
4.6.
4.4.4 Tim e D istance D iscounting
This section constructs a composite function which maps clock-time points T  to 
time distance evaluations I  given by p, and the latter into a real-valued interval 
(0,1], such that this composite function satisfies Definition 1. This composite 
function is written as Disc o c, where c is an increasing function c : T  —> I  and 
Disc : I  —> (0,1] is a decreasing function with Disc(0) =  1. Firstly, we consider 
D isc , followed by c , to finally show that Disc o c is a time discounting function.
Recall that p : Q —> I  is an (onto) function from events to their time dis­
tance, with I  C [0, oo) and p(p) = 0. Here, we use the function p  to construct 
discounting weights. From now on let Disc : I  —> (0,1] be a decreasing function 
with Disc{0) =  1. Since this function uses the representation of ordinal distance 
between events to formulate weights (0,1], it is called the distance discounting 
function.
P ro p o sitio n  7 (Distance discounting). Suppose p  represents ordinal distance )p 
on Q x Q. Then, Disc(p(q)) > Disc(p(r)) iffrp  qp, for all q,r G Q.
Accordingly, the distance discounting function assigns the unit weight to p(p), 
resulting in no discounting at all for this event, and assigns a number in the real 
interval (0,1) to all other distances such that the larger the distance, the lower the 
weight. On the conceptual level, any of the specific time distance interpretations 
introduced earlier can be used to interpret such a distance discounting function. 
This completes the first step of constructing the composite function Disc o c.
As alluded to before, time distance does not necessarily correspond to time 
as commonly understood as clock-time. This is due to the fact that not all con­
ceptions of how we understand and measure time distance need to correspond to 
clock-time. For example, imagine that what is relevant about temporal features 
of events is how an agent subjectively perceives of their time distance to the 
present. It is immediately obvious that such a subjective perception of time dis­
tance does not need to correspond in any regular way to clock-time: events quite 
far in the future could be perceived as close, and events in the near future could
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be perceived as far away. Crucially, this could even be the case if the subjective 
time perception of that agent is measurable by the time distance measurement 
procedure introduced earlier, as it has been given as independent of clock-time. 
For example, let p ,q ,r ,s  G Q denote events on different days. Assume that the 
way the agent perceives of the time distance between those events yields the as­
signment ip(p) =  0, ip{q) = 1, p{r) =  2, <£>(s) =  3. However, it could be the 
case that the clock-time function r  assigns the following values: r(p) =  today, 
T(o) = yesterday, r(r)  =  in two months, r(s) =  next week. While it is still 
possible to construct a distance discounting function Disc that is meaningful -  
indeed, it can be used to weight consequences according to an agent’s subjective 
time perception -  it surely does not satisfy Definition 1 in this case, recalling that 
in the general time discounting definition it is defined as a mapping from a set of 
clock-time points T  to a real interval.
Hence, a set of requirements is needed that ensures a correspondence between 
the representation of time distance and clock-time. Indeed, it is a virtue of the 
general framework developed here that it makes explicit this crucial regularity 
assumption that is implicit in any time discounting theory that gives time dis­
counting functions satisfying Definition 1. Indeed, as will be discussed in more 
detail in Section 4.5 and 4.6, this implicit regularity assumption severely con­
strains the kinds of evaluations of time distance that time discounting theories 
are capable of expressing. In the following, we will state assumptions about the 
correspondence between clock-time and time distance that are needed to con­
struct well-founded time discounting functions that satisfy Definition 1.
D efinition  8 (Correspondence between clock-time and time distance). A corres­
pondence between clock time and perceived time is a function c : T  —+ I  such that
i f i  =  C O T .
Informally, such a correspondence maps every clock-time to the time distance 
of the events happening at that clock-time. Recall that clock-time is defined as 
T  C [0, oo) with 0 G T, and that there is a clock-time function r  : Q —> T, with 
r{p) =  0, mapping each event to the clock-time at which it occurs. Note that a 
correspondence satisfies c(0) =  0, i.e., the clock-wise present is also the present 
under a time distance evaluation, due to r(p) =  0 and ip(p) = 0 .
P ro p o sitio n  9 (Uniqueness of correspondence). There is at most one corres­
pondence between clock-time and time distance.
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By this uniqueness result, we can henceforth talk unambiguously of the corres­
pondence between clock time and perceived time, if it exists.
P ro p o sitio n  10 (Existence of correspondence). There exists a correspondence 
between clock-time and time distance iff for all events q ,r E Q, r{q) = r (r )  
ip(q) = ip(r).
This condition for existence of a correspondence states that events which are sim­
ultaneous under clock-time also have the same time distance. We will from now 
on assume that this condition is satisfied. Therefore, a (unique) correspondence 
exists, henceforth denoted by c.
P ro p o sitio n  11 (Increasing correspondence). The correspondence c is increasing 
iff for all events q,r € Q> r(q) > r(r) <=> (p(q) > <p{r).
Informally, increasing correspondence asserts that events which are later by clock­
time axe also characterised as later by time distance. Note that, by applying this 
condition in both directions, it follows that for all events q,r  G Q, r{q) = r ( r )  «=> 
ip(q) = <p(r), i.e. that events which are simultaneous under clock-time axe also 
simultaneous under time distance.
Increasing correspondence between clock-time and time distance is a sub­
stantial assumption in a conceptual sense: as discussed earlier, the degree of 
impatience, fundamental uncertainty, preference change or delay perception that 
motivates time distance could be influenced by a number of other factors and, 
for instance, fluctuate when compared to an externally given time index. The 
latter could indeed rule out that time distance understood by such conceptions 
is a suitable motivation for time discounting. However, given an increasing cor­
respondence between clock-time and time distance, time discounting as stated in 
Definition 1 can be obtained.
T heorem  12 (Time discounting and time distance). The following are equival­
ent:
(i) D is a time discounting function.
(ii) c is increasing.
(Hi) For all events q,r € Q, r(q) > r (r )  <*=> (p(q) > <p(r).
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Accordingly, a time discounting function is a composite function which maps 
clock-time points T  to time distance evaluations I  given by <p, and the latter into 
a real-valued interval (0,1], such that this composite function is a time discounting 
function as stated in Definition 1. Indeed, the distance discounting function Disc 
generates a decreasing function D := Discoc from T  to (0,1], such that D(0) =  1. 
In other words, taking any pair of events qr E Q x Q and comparing their time 
distance with other pairs, each consequence can be assigned a number p  that 
indicates their time distance. Given increasing correspondence between clock­
time and time distance, the image of ip (denoted I)  can then used to obtain the 
function Disc o c which is a time discounting function according to Definition 1.
More generally, the general representation theorem makes transparent the re­
quirements any theory of time discounting has to fulfil in a measurement-theoretic 
framework: namely, a conceptual interpretation of time distance has to be given 
that renders plausible the representation procedure in an ordinal distance struc­
ture. Furthermore, increasing correspondence between clock-time and time dis­
tance has to hold under this interpretation. This suggests that the conceptual 
interpretation of time distance is subject to two rather strong regularity assump­
tions. Furthermore, note that fulfilling the above requirements does not directly 
imply descriptive or normative plausibility with regards to discounting utility 
in intertemporal decisions. Indeed, time distance discounting as obtained above 
only gives a procedure for the evaluation of the temporal features of intertem­
poral prospects by well-founded time-indexed weights. We will discuss this set 
of general requirements for time discounting theories in greater detail in Sections
4.5 and 4.6.
4.4.5 E xponential and H yperbolic Tim e D iscounting Functions
The construction of a well-founded discounting function in the general framework 
is both in fine with existing representations of time discounting and permissive 
enough to obtain specific functional forms of time discounting. This section shows 
how the time discounting function given in the general framework can be further 
restricted so as to obtain more specific time discounting functions that have been 
proposed in the literature.
Formally, exponential time discounting functions and (many) hyperbolic time 
discounting functions are special cases of time discounting functions as defined in 
Definition 1. Firstly, consider exponential discounting.
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D efinition 13 (Exponential time discounting). A time discounting function D 
is exponential iff there exists a 5 € (0,1) such that D(t) = 51 for all t € T.
It is immediately obvious that Definition 13 is a special case of Definition 1. Ac­
cordingly, exponential time discounting introduces a constant discounting factor 
<5 which is used to calculate the discounting factor for each point in time.
In order to derive such a more restrictive time discounting function in the 
general framework given above, additional requirements are imposed on the cor­
respondence between clock-time and time distance. Indeed, to obtain exponential 
time discounting, we assume linearity of the correspondence c. Examples of such 
linear correspondence c are, for instance, ip = r , or ip = 2r .  Consider the lat­
ter for T  = {0,1,2} and I  = {0,2,4}. Here, c : T  —> I  is given by c(0) =  0, 
c(l) =  2 and c(2) =  4, i.e. k = 2. A more complex example is T  — I  = [0, oo) 
and c(t) = 3t, for all £ € [0,oo). In other words, time distance is proportional 
to clock-time iff correspondence c is linear. If linear correspondence holds, expo­
nential time discounting functions can be given in the general representational 
framework.
T heorem  14 (Exponential time distance discounting). Suppose c is increasing, 
so that D is a time discounting function by Theorem 12. I f  time distance is pro­
portional to clock-time and Disc preserves proportionality, then D is exponential.
Accordingly, if linear correspondence ensures the proportionality between clock­
time and time distance and Disc preserves the proportionality, D  is an exponen­
tial time discounting function.
On a conceptual level, note that the assumption of linear correspondence 
translates into an assumption about the regularity of time distance. More spe­
cifically, in order for time distance to be proportional to clock-time, the time 
distance between any two events that are subsequent under (discrete) clock-time 
must be the same.
Naturally, time distance does not need to behave in such a regular manner 
so that proportionality holds. Another possibility is that time distance might 
be concave in clock-time, i.e. <p = c o r  for some concave function c : T  —► I .7 
Examples of concave correspondence c include <p(q) = y/r(q) for all t  G T or 
T  = I  = [0, oo) and c(t) =  \ f t  for all t € T, or c(t) = log(l 4- t ) for all t £ T.
7That is, c(at +  (1 — a)t') > ac(t) +  (1 — a)c(t') for all distinct t,t' £ T  and all a £ (0,1) such 
that at +  (1 — a)t' £ T.
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That is to say, time distance is concave in clock-time iff c is concave. Such an 
assumption can be used to characterise hyperbolic discounting.
T heorem  15 (Non-exponential time distance discounting). Suppose c is increas­
ing, so that D is a time discounting function by Theorem 12. I f  time distance is 
concave in clock-time, Disc preserves concavity, and T  contains more than two 
time points (for non-triviality), then D is non-exponential.
Accordingly, if time distance is concave in clock-time, we obtain non-exponential 
time discounting. This is significant as many hyperbolic discounting functions 
exhibit properties that can be described as concave correspondence. Due to the 
plethora of hyperbolic discounting functions proposed in the literature, we only 
give this general characterisation that makes explicit the property that the near 
future in clock-time is associated with relatively larger time distance evaluation 
than the far future.
For both exponential and hyperbolic discounting, note that there is a degree 
of freedom involved in the choice of the function Disc that gives the discounting 
factors. In the above results, it has been assumed that Disc behaves so as to 
preserve the correspondence between clock-time and time distance. Yet, for an 
infinite horizon, it is possible that this is not the case: it is easy to see that 
converse cases could hold in which there is no proportionality (or concavity) in 
the correspondence, yet Disc is chosen in a way that gives an exponential (or 
hyperbolic) time discounting function.
4.4.6 D iscounted Value
We will now discuss how the evaluation of temporal features established by the 
above framework can be combined with a goodness evaluation to obtain a repres­
entation of discounted value. This will make transparent that additional assump­
tions axe needed to endorse the time discounting of value. That is to say, while 
the representation of discounting developed so far allows for a completely sep­
arate and general evaluation of time distance in temporally extended prospects, 
additional assumptions are needed in order to establish time discounted value.
In a first step, we have to assume that it is possible to obtain a goodness 
evaluation of the events in Q , such as by a variant of standard expected utility 
theory. Note that in order to apply the discounting weights, a (weak) separability 
assumption is required: it has to be the case that a value can be assigned to any
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q G Q, and that values of prospects can be obtained by combining the evaluations 
of several events. With these assumptions in place, discounted value can be 
established by joint consideration of the two evaluations, i.e. the time distance 
evaluation and the goodness evaluation.
Secondly, recall that the time discounting function as introduced above gives 
weights that axe completely independent of the goodness evaluation. Crucially, 
the descriptive and normative status of discounted goodness will depend on the 
time distance interpretation given. Indeed, a set of assumptions is needed to es­
tablish that discounted value is descriptively and normatively meaningful. That 
is, the degree to which one accepts the normative and descriptive attractiveness 
of a particular interpretation of time distance determines the degree of the de­
scriptive and normative appeal of discounted utility. More generally, the initial 
separation of time and value makes transparent the requirements for establishing 
discounted value in both a descriptive and normative value.
4.4.7 Summary
This section has provided a general foundational framework for time discounting. 
We asked what assumptions are needed to establish well-founded time discount­
ing functions, and showed that they need to satisfy both a representation and 
a correspondence requirement. More specifically, in the measurement-theoretic 
framework for time discounting provided in this section, a discounting factor can 
be determined by a representation of time distance between events. It has been 
shown that if such a representation corresponds to an externally given time-index, 
a general discounting function according to Definition 1 can be recovered.
In a general sense, the framework renders transparent the formal and concep­
tual assumptions required by theories of time discounting. That is, the general 
framework developed here has a number of applications in foundational work re­
garding time discounting. Formally, the framework can be employed to assess 
and render transparent formal assumptions that specific accounts of time dis­
counting make. Conceptually, it can be related to a number of interpretations of 
time distance, including time preference, preference change, delay as well as risk 
and uncertainty. From an empirical point of view, it can be asked whether exist­
ing accounts of descriptive time discounting approaches satisfy the measurement 
conditions needed to specify their functional form. Concerning a possible justi­
fication of time discounting, the framework lends itself to a neutral comparison
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of the normative appeal of different substantial interpretations of time distance.
Naturally, not all of those possible applications can be discussed in the context 
of this thesis. We will proceed by revisiting the four problems of time discounting 
as well as time preference theories in Section 4.5, before discussing how the general 
framework for time discounting given here can be motivated by the concept of 
connectedness in the multiple-self in Section 4.6.
4.5 T im e D iscounting T heories R econsidered
This section applies the general foundations of time discounting to (i) the four 
problems of time discounting introduced earlier, and (ii) time preference theories 
of time discounting. Before discussing these two problems, we reconsider the main 
insights from the general foundations of time discounting developed in Section 
4.4.
Firstly, the general framework (initially) separated the time and the value di­
mensions. That is, we have discussed foundations of time discounting by asking 
what kind of evaluation of temporal features of prospects they can capture. The 
separate analysis has a twofold motivation: firstly, if time discounting factors are 
to be used to weight goodness evaluations, the former should live up to require­
ments of measurement and representation that are comparable to those on which 
goodness evaluations are founded. Secondly, it was argued that time discounting 
representations that entangle time and value make it more difficult to discuss the 
four problems of time discounting. We will argue below that separating time and 
value in the general framework enables us to ask well-posed questions about time 
discounting concerning the four problems.
Secondly, the account distinguished between an evaluation of temporal fea­
tures of events (the time distance) and an externally given time-index (the clock­
time). This exposed a curious dichotomy inherent in time discounting functions. 
On the one hand, in order for time discounting factors to be well-founded, the 
numerical values have to be derived or justified axiomatically. In the general 
framework, this was achieved by the representation of time distance. On the 
other hand, time discounting functions have to give weights that are associated 
with an external-time index in a quite regular way. In the general framework, 
this has been considered by studying different kinds of correspondence between 
clock-time and time distance. That is to say, in the terminology of the general
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framework, the twofold concern of time discounting is addressed by the char­
acterisation of ‘representation’ and ‘correspondence’, respectively. We will argue 
below that the joint requirement of correspondence and representation puts severe 
constraints on time discounting theories.
In a general sense, the discussion suggests that the framework developed here 
makes explicit the formal and conceptual requirements for time discounting the­
ories, casting doubts on whether current proposals of time discounting theories 
can meet those requirements.
4.5.1 Four Problem s o f T im e D iscounting
Here we reconsider the four problems of time discounting raised earlier from the 
perspective of the general foundations of time discounting. Recall that the four 
problems of time discounting concern the descriptive and normative discussion of 
two questions: firstly, what is the correct time discounting function, and secondly, 
what is the correct conceptual motivation for time discounting?
Functional Form
Here we discuss the question of the correct functional form of discounting, in 
both a descriptive and in a normative sense. The general framework allows us to 
discuss specific function forms of time discounting by formulating conditions on 
the correspondence between clock-time and time distance. This was exemplified 
by Theorems 14 and 15 which state exponential and hyperbolic time discounting 
in the general framework, respectively. Note that conditions formulated on the 
correspondence between clock-time and time distance imply a specific behaviour 
of the representation of time distance. That is, the deserved functional form of 
time discounting can be conveniently expressed in terms of correspondence, which 
fixes requirements for the representation.
In Theorem 14, it is shown that exponential time discounting requires that 
time distance is proportional to clock-time (i.e. a linear transformation of clock­
time yields time distance). That is, assuming a discrete set Q for ease of exposi­
tion, the time distance between any two events that are subsequent in clock-time 
must be of equal difference: for example, the time distance between events in 2 
and 3 years will be the same as the time distance between events in 22 and 23 
years, and so on. This very strong condition on the representation of time dis­
tance is required for proportionality of correspondence between clock-time and
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time distance. Descriptively, this condition is probably best understood as an 
approximation, while it is hard to see a direct normative appeal for it. Yet, argu­
ments about those questions will depend on what kind of interpretation of time 
distance is considered.
In Theorem 15, non-exponential time discounting is characterised by time 
distance that is concave in clock-time (such that a concave transformation of 
clock-time yields time distance). The condition is relevant for hyperbolic dis­
counting as it can be used to describe the phenomenon that time distance of 
events that are close to the present in clock-time is perceived as relatively larger 
than the time distance of events that are in the far future in clock-time. Again 
assuming a discrete set Q for ease of exposition, this means that the time distance 
between, say, events in 2 and 3 years will be the larger than the time distance 
between events in 22 and 23 years. That is, the concavity condition allows one to 
evaluate the time distance of events that have intervals of equal length in clock­
time differently. This condition is more permissive than linearity, which implies a 
uniformity in time distance evaluation. As such, it can be seen as a more plaus­
ible condition in a descriptive sense, while its normative appeal will again depend 
on the interpretation of time distance that is adopted.
Now recall the two features of the general framework mentioned above. Firstly, 
consider the joint requirement of correspondence and representation. The above 
discussion shows that the functional form of discounting can be expressed in 
terms of correspondence, yet that these in turn imply conditions on the rep­
resentation. This makes explicit the requirement that specific functional forms 
of time discounting can only be justified when the representation of time dis­
tance is well-behaved enough to satisfy the correspondence conditions. As will 
be discussed later in more detail, the joint requirement of correspondence and 
representation severely constrains the kinds of interpretations that can be used 
to conceptually motivate time discounting.
A comparison of the above joint requirement to the kinds of requirements im­
plied by representations common in expected utility theory further illustrates the 
latter fact: in expected utility theory, all what is required is a representation of 
preference by a function with interval-scale properties. In addition to such a re­
quirement, time discounting representations also require ratio-scale properties of 
time distance (for normalisation to the present) as well as correspondence between 
the time distance representation and clock-time (i.e. increasing correspondence
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for a general time discounting function, as well as more specific conditions, such 
as linearity or concavity for exponential or hyperbolic discounting). As a loose 
analogy, consider how expected utility is sometimes linked to expected monetary 
value, such as in the law of diminishing marginal utility. Here, monetary value 
serves as an externally given index to which utility is linked in a regular way. Yet, 
such considerations are certainly outside the confines of (contemporary) decision 
theories and the concept of utility as preference satisfaction. That is to say, the 
general framework developed here exposes the fact that the requirements for time 
discounting are much more complex than those for related concepts, such as those 
for expected utility.
Secondly, the separation between time and value in the general framework 
shows how the normative appeal of exponential discounting is weaker than usually 
presumed. As briefly mentioned when initially considering the four problems of 
time discounting, there is an argument for exponential discounting due to its 
preservation of the utility function over time. That is, exponentially discounted 
utility will stay stable over time. By contrast, hyperbolically discounted utility 
can yield inconsistency over time: weighting equal clock-time intervals in the 
near future different than those in the far future implies that such weightings can 
change over time. That is, as time passes, the weightings assigned to time points 
can also change, as the far future will become the near future and can hence 
be evaluated hyperbolically again. This is usually taken to be an argument for 
exponential time discounting, where such problems do not arise. Yet, the general 
framework shows that this argument is based almost exclusively on considerations 
of value. It does not show that there is something inherently wrong with, for 
instance, a concave correspondence between clock-time and time distance. All 
it suggests is that such an evaluation can undermine goodness evaluations. The 
latter can still be taken as an argument for the normative appeal of exponential 
discounting. Yet, the argument is an additional consideration motivated by the 
preservation of goodness, and not automatically motivated by the representation 
of time distance. This weakens the argument considerably, as it does not show 
that there is anything inherently problematic about non-linear correspondence 
between clock-time and time distance.
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Conceptual Motivation
Here we discuss the underlying conceptual motivation for time discounting. In 
the general framework, the representation of time distance was introduced for 
which a conceptual motivation is required in order to motivate discounting.
Consider the question of motivating time discounting in a descriptive sense. 
In this context, the general framework makes precise the regularity assumptions 
that are needed for time discounting: possible time discounting motivations such 
as time impatience, delay perception, or preference change can only be used to 
interpret the framework if they behave in such a regular fashion that they are 
representable. Indeed, for a well-founded time discounting function, the axioms 
contained in an ordinal distance structure have to be motivated. Moreover, as dis­
cussed in the previous section, specific conditions on the correspondence between 
clock-time and time distance imply further regularity constraints on the repres­
entation of time distance.
The general framework also permits us to formulate well-posed questions 
about the elicitation of agents’ attitudes to time distance. Indeed, after fix­
ing a particular interpretation of time distance (for instance, one associated to 
time impatience, or changes in propositional attitudes), axioms on ordinal dis­
tance could also be tested in elicitation exercises where agents compare time 
distances according to such an interpretation between pairs of events. Given that 
the ordinal distance measurement procedure can be understood as separate from 
goodness evaluations, this will allow us to determine whether there are interpret­
ations of time distance that allow us to delineate agent’s attitudes towards time 
distance from those to goodness in such a practical sense. It is beyond the scope 
of this work to discuss such more practical problems of eliciting agents’ attitudes 
to time distance in sufficient detail. Still, the virtue of the general measurement 
procedure developed here with regards to the elicitation of agents’ attitudes to 
time distance lies in posing the elicitation task in a sparse and well-defined way: 
if it is possible to elicit an agent’s attitudes to time distance according to ordinal 
distance measurement, then a time discounting can be based on ‘revealed ordinal 
time distance’. This is an improvement over representations that entangle time 
and value, as it exposes the requirement of time discounting to delineate attitudes 
to time distance from other attitudes of agents.
Normative discussion about time discounting usually rests on the idea that 
it should not undermine goodness evaluation, as discussed in the previous sec­
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tion. Here, the separation of time and value in the general framework exposes 
the requirement of a separate normative justification of time discounting. That 
is to say, a conceptual motivation that underpins discounting that fulfils this re­
quirement would answer the question why agents should engage in discounting 
the future.
4.5.2 Tim e Preferences
Here we show how the general framework is capable of reformulating the time 
preference approach. As reviewed earlier, time preference theories of discounting 
obtain discounted value by considering a preference relation >Ztp  on an outcome­
time structure, which can be represented by a discounted utility function.
In order to reformulate this idea, recall that the general framework conceives 
of discounted value of prospects as the combination of two separate evaluations, 
a goodness evaluation and a time distance evaluation D  of events that form 
prospects. The goodness evaluation can be given in a standard decision-theoretic 
framework, where the goodness evaluation maximises a preference relation on 
events, and a time distance evaluation can be given by a variant of the general 
framework of time discounting which combines a representation of time distance 
)p with a correspondence requirement.
Time preferences, to be reformulated in this account, have therefore to be 
‘separated’ into two components, one concerning value and one concerning time. 
The value (or goodness) dimension is reasonably straightforward, as it can be 
given by a standard expected utility account. The time dimension requires us to 
reformulate two conditions in outcome-time structures, namely time impatience 
and stationarity. (The latter is only needed when endorsing exponential time 
discounting, which we will assume here.)
Concerning time impatience, the relation in ordinal distance structures can 
be interpreted as ordering pairs of events according to the impatience they invoke, 
where rp qp iff a higher degree of impatience is associated with r  than with q, as 
no time impatience is associated with p. Isolating time impatience in this fashion 
highlights the fact that the conceptual assumptions in time preference theories 
have been, by and large, implicit in the frameworks. As discussed in the initial 
review of conceptual motivations for time discounting, there are a number of 
different ideas of what time impatience consists in and how it is ‘produced’, such 
as by a desire for immediate gratification, or by cognitive deficiencies (‘weakness
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of imagination’). These conceptual nuances will matter a great deal in deciding 
whether time impatience can motivate a representation of time distance in an 
ordinal distance structure.
Concerning stationarity, this condition can be mirrored by the linearity re­
quirement that underlies the formulation of exponential time discounting in The­
orem 14. Recall that stationarity requires time preferences to be invariant under 
equal distances of clock-time (that is, the ordering of two outcomes at clock-time 
t and t +  fi remains the same when considering the two outcomes at t' and t' +  fi, 
respectively). This assertion is captured in linearity of correspondence between 
clock-time and time distance. Note how this reformulation, analogous to time 
impatience, is now completely separate from the goodness evaluation.
Such a reformulation of time preference accounts exposes the fact that the 
exponential shape of time discounting functions often endorsed by those theories 
is ambiguous in its conceptual underpinning (as it primarily stems from the idea 
to preserve the goodness evaluation). Indeed, it is unclear how time impatience 
implies a regularity of time distance so as to motivate linearity of correspond­
ence between clock-time and time distance. In a general sense, the framework 
developed here allows us to reconsider the assumptions made about time and 
goodness evaluations in a separate way to expose what kinds of formal and con­
ceptual requirements are encapsulated in time discounting theories.
4.6 T im e D iscounting in the M ultip le-Self
This section presents multiple-self interpretations of the general discounting frame­
work introduced in the previous sections. Firstly, Parfit’s proposal that time dis­
counting can be motivated by diminishing intrapersonal connectedness between 
temporal selves is used to interpret the time distance. On his account, events 
q € Q are interpreted as richer propositions that are relative to temporal selves. 
The greater the similarity of preferences between temporal selves, the closer the 
discounting factor is to the unit weight. We show that ‘Parfit’s representation 
theorem’ for time discounting is helpful in addressing objections against his view 
put forward by Williams (1970) and Elster (1986). Secondly, we suggest that Par­
fit’s discounting can motivate a novel account of (exponential) time discounting 
for preference change.
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4.6.1 Parfit’s D iscounting for Intrapersonal C onnectedness
As reviewed in Chapter 3, Parfit (1984) proposes to view personal identity over 
time reductively, and as a matter of psychological connectedness. Furthermore, 
psychological connectedness is viewed as a matter of degree, such that different 
temporal instances of a person can be connected to each other to a varying degree 
of strength. This very idea of imperfect intrapersonal connectedness can, accord­
ing to Parfit, also motivate time discounting. More specifically, Parfit (1984, 313) 
maintains:
‘My concern for my future may correspond to the degree of con­
nectedness between me now and myself in the future ... since con­
nectedness is nearly always weaker over long periods, I can rationally 
care less about my further future.’
The quote suggests that we can view persons as consisting of collections of 
temporal selves that axe connected to each other in varying degree. This, in 
turn, motivates time discounting. The above claim I will call Parfit discounting, 
using it to interpret the ordinal distance structure of the general time discounting 
framework developed in the previous sections.
Recall an ordinal distance structure (Q x Q, )>=). For Parfit discounting, the set 
Q can be interpreted as a collection of events which have a richer description such 
that they include a reference to a temporal self. For example, the description of 
the event of having desert includes a reference to a specific self, such as ‘self Si is 
eating desert’. As before, the relation orders pairs in this set. The dimension of 
the distance comparison is the psychological distance between the temporal selves 
associated with the events. That is to say, the relation orders pairs of events 
according to the similarity of the psychological traits of the temporal selves that 
are associated with those events. That is, for all events q ,r ,s ,t  E Q, if qr >- st 
then the psychological differences between the selves that axe associated with q 
and r  are greater than those between the selves that axe associated with s and t. 
This suggests that it is possible to obtain a numerical representation of psycho­
logical connectedness between selves. Furthermore, we can interpret the general 
representation framework for time discounting given in Section 4.4 with Parfit’s 
intrapersonal connectedness. Accordingly, if each self in the multiple-self corres­
ponds to a clock time-point, we can motivate time discounting factors according to 
intrapersonal connectedness. Hence, Parfit discounting can be used to motivate a
140
CHAPTER 4. TIME DISCOUNTING
time discounting function that satisfies Definition 1. W hat is needed in order for 
the time discounting representation to hold conceptually, is that ordinal distances 
between selves can be compared according to their psychological connectedness. 
It is hard to see why comparisons of psychological similarity between pairs of 
temporal selves are a stronger requirement than distance comparisons according 
to, for instance, time impatience. Indeed, recalling the review of time impatience 
theories, it can be argued that Parfit’s account of psychological connectedness is 
a more comprehensive source of conceptual motivation that the notion of time 
impatience in time preference theories. This suggests that Parfit discounting is 
at least as viable a candidate theory for time discounting as the ones discussed 
so far.
Parfit discounting for psychological connectedness is meant to be a normative 
concept. However, Frederick (1999) present an empirical study in which subjects’ 
intrapersonal connectedness has been tried to establish via questionnaires, ask­
ing participants to make connectedness comparisons between their future selves. 
While he is by and large pessimistic about the possibilities that this method 
provides robust empirical evidence for time discounting factors, his approach 
suggests that the measurement-theoretic framework can indeed be interpreted by 
intrapersonal connectedness, as it even lends itself to elicitation exercises.
Problems with Parfit Discounting
Parfit discounting has been criticised for a variety of reasons. Here, we consider 
four arguments against his proposal.
The first line of criticism focuses almost exclusively on the fact that Parfit’s 
psychological connectedness is not the correct characterisation of personal identity 
over time, as briefly reviewed in Chapter 3. The worry is that Parfit connectedness 
is a non-starter concerning personal identity, and therefore of no use in answering 
other questions. Without claiming to fully rebuke such a highly sceptic stance, 
consider the discussion of multiple-self models in Chapter 2, and their possible 
interpretation with conceptions of intrapersonal connectedness, as reviewed in 
Chapter 3. In this discussion, we suggested that connectedness in the multiple- 
self is introduced as a modelling device to investigate the relation between time 
and decision-making, rather than as a complete account of personal identity. In 
that sense, it is still possible to maintain that Parfit connectedness can yield 
an interpretation of a specific aspect of personal identity, without covering all
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aspects of it. This, in turn, makes it possible to use his account to motivate time 
discounting.
The second line of criticism suggests that Parfit connectedness cannot influ­
ence a concern for future selves. In other words, Parfit connectedness does not 
imply Parfit discounting, as many other kinds of connectedness will play a role 
in determining concern for future selves. The most prominent proponent of such 
a view is Williams (1970) who maintains that imperfect intrapersonal connected­
ness does not disburden us from concern for our future selves. Indeed, Williams 
(1970) asks us to imagine a situation in which there is low psychological con­
nectedness, yet there is still connectedness in terms of the body, memories and 
sympathy. He argues that in such a situation, we should still be concerned with 
a future self thus connected to our present self. It seems that Williams does not 
want to reject Parfit discounting, but rather suggest that his account of connec­
tedness is unduly narrow, and that, for instance, bodily connectedness, or some 
other type of non-reductive connectedness maintains perfect overall intrapersonal 
connectedness, and with it maintains concern for future selves. That is to say, 
it is not only a matter of (dis-)similarity of preference between temporal selves 
that can motivate time discounting: for instance, consider someone who knows 
he will have, by and large, different preferences when approaching retirement age. 
That is, there is low psychological connectedness between his self now and the 
self at retirement age. Were we to discount goods for that future self according 
to psychological connectedness, then a very low discounting factor would apply. 
Yet, the present self might still feel empathy for his future self, and might still 
care about whether the future self will receive goods. This, in turn, suggests 
that richer accounts, modifying connectedness to interpret the ordering relation 
with a non-reductive account as well, would be needed to fully answer this 
criticism.
The third fine of criticism appeals to the notion of rational agency and main­
tains that Parfit discounting is in conflict with it. Rational agency, this argument 
goes, overrides any imperfections in concern for the future that may arise out of 
diminishing psychological connectedness. Prominently, the rejection of time dis­
counting by Sidgwick (1907) and Rawls (1971) that was mentioned in Section
4.2.4 is already associated with a statement of this position, namely by Rawls 
(1971, 259), who said that ‘rationality requires an impartial concern for all parts 
of our fife.’ Closely related to this assertion, Elster (1986) claims that agency uni­
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fies temporal selves despite imperfect connectedness. Other proponents of this 
view are, for instance, Korsgaard (1989), as already briefly discussed in Chapter 
3. On this view, even if Parfit’s connectedness account is accepted, the discount­
ing that is motivated by it is in conflict with a theory of goodness that suggests 
that there has to be equal concern for selves.
Yet, this critique is misplaced if we consider Parfit discounting in the general 
representational framework. In the latter, due to the separation of time and 
value, psychological connectedness functions solely as an enrichment, and does 
not replace any of the features of a rational agent. Rather, it offers a modelling 
device to consider the influence of time distance on goodness evaluations, and it 
is unclear why it is problematic that time distance can have an effect on goodness 
evaluations. Consider the discussion of temporal distance in standard decision 
theories in Chapter 2. We have shown that standard decision-theoretic accounts 
stay, by and large, silent on the issue of temporal distance and do indeed allow 
for future events to be valued less than current ones. W hat they do not offer, are 
tools in which temporal distance can be evaluated separately which is what the 
representational framework for time discounting, combined with a psychological 
connectedness interpretation offers here.
Furthermore, such an enrichment is minimal when considering psychological 
connectedness. Assume that a theory of goodness is consequentialist. In a first 
step, the goodness of a prospect can be evaluated with, for instance, expected 
utility theory. Now, Parfit discounting does provide a theory of time discount­
ing which uses variations in the very basis of evaluating goodness as its starting 
point: it proposes time discounting on the basis that psychological features will 
be different in the future. In other words, Parfit discounting measures the present 
credibility of the goodness evaluation (if the latter is based on preferences). That 
means that Parfit discounting does not diminish the concern for future selves, 
it just expresses the degree to which future selves share the present evaluations. 
This is arguably an important concern for the present evaluations: Parfit dis­
counting simply expresses to what degree one can expect present evaluations to 
be diachronically stable.
A fourth line of criticism, raised by Parfit (1984) himself and by Elster (1986), 
is that discounting for diminishing psychological connectedness has unfortunate 
implications: it takes future wants as datum, rather than something that can 
be shaped, and it does not respect the fact that there are some things about
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the future that we value deeply, such as the fulfilment of plans. The following 
statement, hence, would be ruled out by and be vulnerable to this objection. 
Parfit (1971, 9):
‘We care less about our further future because we know that less 
of what we are now -  less, say, of our present hopes or plans, loves 
or ideals -  will survive into the further future. . . .  [if] what matters 
holds to a lesser degree, it cannot be irrational to care less.
In this quote, Parfit takes psychological connectedness to be a very rich 
concept, which includes plans and ideals. However, note that such a rich inter­
pretation of psychological connectedness cannot be used to motivate an empirical 
structure in a time distance representation, as it would not be compatible to 
the regularity properties in ordinal distance structures, as given in Definition 3. 
More specifically, it is not clear how it would be possible that individual’s hopes, 
plans, or ideals that are associated with events can be ordered according to the 
relation )?. The kind of psychological connectedness that can motivate a time 
distance representation is one of psychological similarity between temporal selves, 
as determined by sameness of taste, or preference. Such interpretations can also 
fulfil the correspondence requirement in a representational framework. That is to 
say, if we wish to motivate a well-founded time discounting function, it cannot be 
as richly motivated as implied by the above quote. Hence, this line of criticism 
seems to rest on a misunderstanding of the formal confines of time discounting.
It seems, then, that the viability of Parfit’s representation theorem rests on a 
narrow reading of his idea of psychological connectedness as taste or preference 
similarity between temporal selves. Yet, this does not imply that plans, hopes, 
or ideals have to be disregarded. It only suggests that they cannot be adequately 
captured by time discounting functions and should be considered separately. In­
deed, plans, hopes, and ideals can still inform a separate goodness evaluation. 
Consider an individual who chooses her career path and could either become a 
banker or pursue graduate studies in physics. Now, this person might have the 
ambition to become a scientist. Clearly, such an ambition will be reflected in 
the goodness evaluation of the two available prospects. Since the prospects are 
extended through time, the decision-maker might also consider her psychological 
connectedness and discount the expected goodness of both prospects accordingly.
What is required for the latter, however, is that independence between connec­
tedness and the action in question holds. That is, if there is an action available
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to the decision-maker that is designed to change her psychological connected­
ness, then discounting comes in conflict with the evaluation of such an action. 
Such an independence requirements mirrors conditions for probabilistic independ­
ence of acts and states in Bayesian decision theories. While it somewhat limits 
the applicability of psychological connectedness to motivate time discounting, it 
presents a far smaller limitation than the initial objection against discounting for 
psychological connectedness suggested.
4.6.2 Exponential D iscounting for Taste Change
To emphasise the capabilities of the general framework, this section briefly con­
siders a novel motivation for exponential time discounting that is closely related to 
Parfit discounting. Indeed, upon Parfit discounting satisfying linear correspond­
ence we can motivate exponential discounting for psychological connectedness. 
Such a regular taste change might be plausible if we take it as an approximation 
of the psychological changes an individual undergoes. Indeed, if an individual 
deliberates about a time horizon in which little of her circumstances change, a 
quite regular taste change might be defended. This is not to say that it does not 
present a heavy assumption -  yet, it is hard to see why it is a stronger assump­
tion than, say, a regular behaviour of time impatience. Furthermore, making the 
assumption of linear correspondence yields a conceptually interesting derivation 
of exponential discounting.
Note that exponential discounting is usually derived from time preference 
accounts which assume stable tastes and preferences. The reason for the latter 
assumptions is that time preferences are defined on outcome-time structures, and 
a constant discounting factor only holds if tastes are stable over time. Such 
requirements are not needed in the general framework, where time and value 
are separated. Formally, it is possible to derive time discounting by using any 
concept that can motivate the time distance representation and correspondence 
requirements.
Hence, we may assume Parfit connectedness as the motivation for time dis­
counting, and if it satisfies linear correspondence, we have an account of expo­
nential time discounting that is motivated by the changing psychological char­
acteristics of temporal selves within the decision-maker. Moreover, as discussed 
when introducing the concept of psychological connectedness in Chapters 2 and 
3, psychological connectedness can be understood as a coarse-grained character­
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isation of changes in taste.8 After deriving exponential time discounting in such 
a fashion, we can combine it with a standard goodness evaluation which yields 
exponentially discounted utility, while allowing for changing tastes.
Nevertheless, we may ask whether combining the two accounts in this way 
gives rise to conflicts. Firstly, we might say that goodness evaluation and time 
evaluation really are separate procedures and it is possible to make opposing 
assumptions. Secondly, the interpretation of preference change in the two evalu­
ations is rather different. When evaluating goodness, a single preference change 
can cause a preference reversal which undermines an agent’s utility function. 
However, when evaluating time according to psychological connectedness, only 
coarse-grained changes in tastes are considered. That is, an agent can have an 
unconditional belief about how likely his tastes are going to change in the future, 
for instance, by introspection about the past development of his personality. In­
deed, if there would be more structure, the regularity assumptions in the ordinal 
distance structure and linear correspondence could not be satisfied. This suggests 
that there is no conflict between evaluating goodness of prospects according to 
present (and stable) preferences on the one hand and then weight those evalu­
ations with an evaluation of how likely such preferences axe to change over time.
More generally, consider that other connectedness interpretations according 
to Chapter 3 are possible. This yields a rich set of possibilities to motivate time 
discounting according to psychological and empathy connectedness (as well as 
other ones due to reductive and non-reductive memory connectedness).
Note that motivating an ordinal distance representation in the above fash­
ion can also be interpreted as providing measurement-theoretic foundations for 
connectedness functions in multiple-self models. That is to say, instead of assum­
ing that connectedness is a matter of degree, the ordinal distance representation 
yields a connectedness function that can be transformed into giving well-founded 
connectedness weights. In the remainder of the thesis, when employing discount­
ing weights that axe motivated by connectedness, we shall assume that such a 
foundation can be given in principle, such that the connectedness weights axe 
well-founded. This will be especially useful in Chapter 6.
8Note that the latter does not refer to changes in preference about specific, identifiable pro­
positions as in preference reversals or dynamic inconsistency (those kinds of preference changes 
will be analysed separately in Chapter 6).
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4.7  C onclusions
This chapter has provided a representational framework for time discounting. In 
this framework, a discounting factor can be based on a representation of time dis­
tance that corresponds to an externally given time-index. Formally, this provides 
a structure to assess the temporal element of prospects in intertemporal decisions. 
Conceptually, it can be related to a number of interpretations of time differences, 
including time impatience, risk and uncertainty, intrapersonal connectedness, and 
preference change.
The analysis in this chapter has shown that the concept of time discounting 
has a specific role in intertemporal decisions: it can provide weights that quantify 
qualitative properties associated with the passage of time, to provide an account 
of how temporal distance can be evaluated. For this to hold, such qualitative 
properties have to be measurable by some procedure (ideally, some variant of the 
general framework outlined in Section 4.4.2). Note how measurability by such 
a procedure severely constraints the conceptual motivations for time discounting 
functions. Many complex issues, such as how decision-makers form plans for 
the future, and ambiguities about their execution, cannot possibly be fully (if 
at all) captured by time discounting. The kind of evaluation of intertemporality 
which can be performed by time discounting is one of a coarse-grained evaluation 
of features of temporal distance. That is, time discounting functions can be 
motivated by the idea that the passage of time is in general associated with 
such concepts as impatience, with additional risk or uncertainty, or a general 
change in an individual’s personal identity. However, time discounting functions 
do not lend themselves to characterize many complexities that are related to 
the evaluation of intertemporal prospects. The chapter thus clarifies the concept 
of time discounting by rendering explicit the fact that a construction of time 
discounting factors requires us to endorse strong regularity conditions.
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4.8 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 5
To prove Theorem 5, we first consider that ordinal distance structures as given 
in Definition 3 axe closely related to so-called ‘absolute-difference structures’ in 
Krantz et al. (1971, 170ff.), henceforth called KLST-type structures. For the 
latter, Krantz et al. (1971, 173) prove a representation similar to Theorem 5. In 
KLST-type structures, the following conditions are different from the ones fisted 
in Definition 3:
2. Symmetry. If q ^ r ,  then qr ~  rq y  qq ~  rr.
3. Well-Behavedness.
(i) If r  ^  s, qs £= qr, rs and rt rs, s t , then qt )p qs, rt.
(ii) If qs !>= qr, rs and q t )? qs, st, then qt ^  rt.
In order to include elements that axe distinct yet identical under the dimension 
of comparison, the above conditions have been replaced by a weak symmetry and 
a reformulated well-behavedness condition, respectively, in the ordinal distance 
structure given in Definition 3. To show how ordinal distance structures relate 
to KLST-structures, we define a binary relation =  on Q by q = r iff qr ~  qq, 
for all q, r € Q. Interpretationally, such q = r means that q and r are identical 
with regards to the dimension of comparison (such as sweetness, or time distance, 
etc.).
Lemma 16. I f  (Q x Q, ^ ) is an ordinal distance structure, then = is an equi­
valence relation on Q. Moreover, this equivalence relation is congruent with )?,
i.e. for all q, r, s, t, q', r', s', t' € Q, if q = q', r = r’, s = s ', t = t ', then qr st 
iffq 'r ' ^  s' f .
Proof. Reflexivity: q = q because qq ~  qq (since ~  is reflexive). Symmetry: 
If q = r then qr ~  qq, and so (by weak symmetry) rq ~  rr; so that r = q. 
Transitivity: Suppose q = r and r = s. Then qr ~  qq and rs ~  rr. By qr ~  qq, 
we have qs ~  rs (using weak symmetry), which by rs  ~  r r  and r r  ~  ss implies 
qs ~  ss, i.e. q = s. Congruence: Suppose q = q>, r  = r ' , s  = s ' , t  = t ' . 
We prove qr )? st iff q'r' £= s 't'. Applying weak symmetry four times, we have 
qr ~  q'r ~  q'r' and st ~  s't ~  s't' So qr st iff q'r' s't'. □
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By Lemma 16, for every ordinal distance structure (Q x Q, y)  we can define 
a new structure (Q* x Q*, y*) called “(Q x Q, y) modulo equivalence
• Q* is the set Q / = of all equivalence classes of Q with regards to =,
• y* is the binary relation on Q* x Q* defined as follows: for all q*,r*,s*,t* E 
Q*, q*r* y  s*t* iff qr y  st for some (hence, by congruence, any) elements 
q,r, s ,t  from the equivalence classes q*,r*,s*,t*, respectively.
Lemma 17. I f  (Q x Q,y)  is an ordinal distance structure, then (Q* x Q*,£=*) 
is a KLST-type structure (Krantzet al., 1971, 170).
Proof. The properties of (Q x Q, )p) imply the KLST-type properties, by drawing 
on congruence (which allows us to replace any relation q*r* £= s*t* by qr st for 
any representants q, r, s, t oi q*,r*, s*,t*, respectively) and by noting that:
• in the KLST Condition 2, we can replace q* ^  r* by qr y  qq (which, by 
adding the weak symmetry condition 2.{ii) in Definition 3, implies qr ~  
rq y  qq ~  rr),
•  in the KLST Condition 3.(i) we can replace r* ^  s* by rs y  rr  (which 
reduces the condition to the Condition 3 in Definition 3),
• KLST Condition 3.(ii) can be omitted as it is implied by the new Weak 
Symmetry condition. To show this, let (a) qs y  qr, rs and (b) qt y  qs, st. 
It has to be shown that qt y  rt. By completeness of y,  rs y  rr or rr y  rs.
Firstly, suppose rs y  rr. If rt y  rs, st, the result follows directly from 
(b) and WBi. Assume (c) rs y  r t or (d) st y  rt. If (c), then qs y  rt 
by (a) and transitivity of y.  By (b) and transitivity therefore qt y  rt. 
Assume (d). Then, by transitivity and (b), qt y  rt.
Secondly, suppose rr y  rs. Since also rs £ 3  r r  (by Weak Symmetry 
(i)), it follows that rs ~  rr. Hence, by Weak Symmetry (ii), st ~  rt. 
This, together with (b) and transitivity implies that qt y  rt.
□
We can now prove Theorem 5.
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Proof. Suppose (Q x Q, =^) is an ordinal distance structure. Then, by Lemma 
17 above, (Q* x Q*,£=*) is a KLST-type structure. By Krantz e£ af. (1971, 
173), there is a function ip* : Q* —> R such that p* represents :>=*. Define 
p(q) := p*(q*), where g* is the equivalence class of q. For all q ,r ,s , t ,£  Q , we 
have qr !>= st iff g*r* !>= s*t* iff \p*(q*) — y>*{r*) \ > l<£*(s*)— ^ * ( 0 1  ^  I <£(<?) ~  ^ (r )l 
> |<p(s)-y>(i)|. □
Proof of Corollary 6
Proof. Immediate from the properties of the interval representation in Theorem 
5. □
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Consider any g, r  G Q. We have
rp qp |y>(r) — <p(p)| > |<£>(g) — < (^p)| (as p  represents )
\<p(r )\ > \p{q)\ (by p{p) = 0 )
** <p(r) > <p(q)
Disc o p(r) <  Disc o p{q) (as Disc is decreasing).
Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. Suppose c and d  axe two correspondences. To show that they coincide, 
consider any clock-time t G T. By assumption, there is an event q G Q such 
that r(g) =  t. Since c and d  are correspondences, c o r(g) =  d  o r(q), i.e., 
c(t) =  d(t). □
□
Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. 1. First suppose that (*) for all g ,r G Q, r(g) =  r( r)  <*=> </?(g) =  <^(r).
Define a function c : T  —* R as follows. For all t G T  let c(t) =  <£>(g), where q 
is a (by assumption existing) event in Q with clock time r(g) =  t. By (*), this 
definition does not depend on the choice of q. By definition, p  = c o t .  So, c  is a 
correspondence.
2 . Conversely, suppose there exists a correspondence c. We have to show (*). 
Consider any events g ,r G Q such that r(g) =  r (r) . Applying c on both sides
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it follows that c o r(q) = c o r(r), and hence by ip = c o r  that ip(q) = (p(r), as 
desired. □
P ro o f of P ro p o sitio n  1 1
Proof. 1. First suppose that
(*) for all events q,r e Q, r(q) > r (r)  <p(q) > <p(r).
To show that c is increasing, consider any clock-times t ,s  E T  such that 
t > s. Write them as t  = r(q) and s = r(r) for some events q,r E Q. We have 
c(t) = cor(q) = ip(q) and c(s) =  co r(r) =  <£>(r). By r(g) > r(r)  and (*), we have 
<p(q) > </?(r). Hence, by <p = c o r ,  we have cor(q ) > c o r ( r ) ,  i.e., c(t) > c(s). 
This proves that c is increasing.
2 . Conversely, suppose that c is increasing. We have to show (*). Consider 
any events q,r 6  Q such that r(q) > r(r). Since c is increasing, it follows that 
c o r(q) > co  r (r) , in other words, that ip{q) > <p(r), as desired. □
P ro o f  of T heorem  12
Proof. Conditions (ii) and (iii) are equivalent by Proposition 1 1  above. So it 
suffices to show that (i) and (ii) are equivalent.
1 . First, suppose (ii). We have to show that D  has range (0 , 1 ], is decreasing 
and satisfies D (0) =  1. Since Disc has range (0,1], so does D. Since Disc is 
decreasing and c increasing, the composition D is decreasing. Finally,
D(0) =  Disc o c(0) =  Disc(0 ) =  1 .
So, D  is a time discounting function.
2. Now suppose (i). Applying the Disc~l on both sides of D — Disc o c, we 
obtain D isc-1 o D = c. So c is the composition of two decreasing functions, and 
hence is increasing, proving (ii). □
P ro o f of T heo rem  14
Proof. Let Disc preserve linearity by Disc(i) = Sl for all i  G / ,  and let c be 
linear, say c(t) = k for some k E R. If T =  {0} the result holds trivially. So let 
T / {  0}. It follows that k > 0, since otherwise c would not be increasing. For 
all t E T, D(t) = Disc(c{t)) =  8kt = (<$*)*. Note that 8k < 0 by k > 0. So D  is 
exponential with discount factor Sk. □
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Proof of Theorem 15
Proof. Let Disc preserve concavity by Disc(i) = Sl for all i 6  I, let c be concave 
in clock time, and # T  > 2. For a contradiction, suppose D  is exponential, say 
D(t) = 7 * for some 0 < 7  < 1. For all t € T, we have D(t) = Disc(c(t)) and 
hence St = 7 ^ ) .  Taking logarithms on both sides, we get flog 6 = c(t) log 7 , and 
hence c(t) =  kt for k := So c is linear. This implies that c is not concave. 
To see why, note that by > 2 we can find distinct t, t' G T and an a € (0,1) 
such that at +  (1 — a)t' £ T. We have
c(at +  ( 1  — a)t') = k(at +  ( 1  — a)t')
= akt +  ( 1  — a)ktr 
= ac(t) +  ( 1  — a)c(t'),
whereas concavity would require that c(at +  (1 — a)t') > ac(a) +  (1 — a)c(t'). This 
contradiction completes the proof. □
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Backward Induction
Sum m ary. This chapter analyses the problem of interaction over time; in par­
ticular, the sequential structure of dynamic games with perfect information. A 
three-stage account is proposed, that specifies set-up, reasoning and play stages 
of dynamic games. Accordingly, we define a player as a set of agents corres­
ponding to these three stages. Moreover, the notion of agent connectedness is 
introduced which measures the extent to which agents’ choices are sequentially 
stable. A type-based epistemic model is augmented with agent connectedness and 
used to provide sufficient conditions for backward induction. Moreover, an exist­
ence result is obtained ensuring that these conditions are indeed possible. Our 
epistemic foundation for backward induction makes explicit that the epistemic 
independence assumption involved in backward induction reasoning is stronger 
than usually presumed. Furthermore, in the three stage-account, players can ex­
plicitly be understood as multiple-selves, which permits to interpret low agent 
connectedness as stemming from imperfect connectedness between selves. 1
5.1 Introduction
Strategic interaction over time is modelled by dynamic games. The standard ex­
tensive form models dynamic games as trees, but does not further explicate the 
sequential dimension. The structure of the game, the players, their reasoning and 
strategies are implicitly assumed to remain stable throughout the whole game. 
In particular, the reasoning is supposed to occur before the game and to apply
1This chapter is based on a joint paper (Bach and Heilmann, 2009) with Christian W. Bach 
(University of Maastricht, Netherlands) to which both authors contributed equally.
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to the entire duration of the game. However, local deviations from strategies 
are relevant for the dynamics of sequential interaction. More specifically, agents 
may depart from the strategy of their respective player, thus contradicting the 
idea that agents act according to instructions. Here, we perceive of a player as 
a set of agents and introduce the notion of agent connectedness to capture the 
extent of sequential stability of players. In our account, high agent connectedness 
characterises an agent’s compliance with a player and low agent connectedness an 
agent’s deviation. Precisely such properties of agents are central to backward in­
duction, since players need to be able to entertain deviating moves by opponents’ 
agents in hypothetical reasoning. Indeed, here we provide sufficient conditions 
for backward induction in terms of agent connectedness, as well as an existence 
result ensuring that our conditions are indeed possible.
In a general sense, we amend the representation of a dynamic game by three 
sequential stages. In the set-up stage, the game structure and the players’ util­
ities are determined. Then, in the reasoning stage, the players deliberate about 
the game, their opponents and choose their strategies. Finally, in the play stage, 
the players’ agents act at their respective decision nodes. Relative to these three 
sequential stages, a player is defined as a set of agents, namely the set-up agent, 
the reasoning agent and the game agents. We also amend the notion of strategy 
such that its use in the stages can be discussed separately, introducing the notion 
of initial strategy in the reasoning stage and actual strategy in the play stage. 
This three-stage account enables us to make explicit the sequential stability as­
sumptions inherent in dynamic games. Also, the framework can be used to locally 
weaken such assumptions.
The reasoning of players in games is usually described by epistemic models. 
Here, we extend a type-based epistemic model of dynamic games with an ini­
tial strategy function by means of which the connectedness of each agent to his 
respective player can be expressed. In particular, the notion of connectedness 
between a player’s reasoning agent and his game agents is formally introduced to 
capture the assumption of sequential strategic stability, i.e. compliance with the 
initial strategy. According to this definition, an agent is either high-connected 
if he acts in fine with the initial strategy or low-connected otherwise. Hence, 
beliefs about the connectedness of opponents’ agents enters the belief space as 
an additional epistemic feature. Applying this framework, sufficient conditions 
for backward induction axe obtained by explaining surprise information with low­
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connectedness of the deviating agent. Rather than revising the belief in an oppon­
ent’s rationality, a supposedly irrational move of one of his agents at a preceding 
decision node is accommodated by belief revision on the high-connectedness of 
that agent. This, in turn, separates that supposedly irrational agent from the 
remaining agents of the respective opponent.
Various substantial interpretations of this framework become available. Inter­
preting sequence temporally, the three stages in a dynamic game reflect a player 
as existing over time: initially, a player assigns utilities to possible outcomes, 
subsequently chooses a strategy and at later points in time, he actually plays. 
Indeed, players existing over time can be interpreted as multiple-selves and their 
agents as selves whose personal identity changes over the course of the game. 
This, in turn, makes available theories that describe how personal identity over 
time can change. In particular, the behavioural notion of agent connectedness in 
a player can then be explained by intrapersonal connectedness. We would like 
to stress that agent connectedness as introduced here is not directly integrated 
into a multiple-self model as introduced in Part I of this thesis. Rather, agent 
connectedness is a behavioural notion that refers to a game agent’s compliance 
(high agent connectedness) or deviation (low agent connectedness) from the initial 
strategy. We will discuss in Section 5.5 how this behaviour can be explained by 
characterisations of underlying connectedness in a multiple-self model of personal 
identity over time . 2
Furthermore, the interpretation of our framework unveils strong assumptions 
implicit in the principle of epistemic independence which underlies any foundar 
tional argument for backward induction. Indeed, an observed surprise must never 
induce a belief revision on any intrapersonal connectedness of game agents at any 
later points in the game. To illustrate our framework, consider the dynamic game 
with perfect information given by the extensive form given in Figure 5.1.
Such games are commonly solved by backward induction as follows. At Alice’s 
second decision node, her unique optimal choice is / .  Given this choice of Alice, 
Bob’s unique optimal action at his decision node is d. Given the unique optimal 
choices of Alice at her second decision node and Bob at his decision node, Alice 
picks a at her first decision node. The backward induction strategy profile (a /, d) 
thus obtains. Note that Bob has to entertain the possibility of Alice having
2In the remainder of this chapter, the term connectedness will be used to refer to the beha­
vioural notion of agent connectedness. Any reference to (underlying) connectedness as used in 
the multiple-self model will be made explicit.
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Alice b Bob d Alice f 2,2
3,3 1,1 0,0
Figure 5.1: A Dynamic Game with Perfect Information
deviated from her backward inductive strategy when determining the choice for 
his decision node. Even though Alice could not have complied with her backward 
inductive strategy, Bob is assumed to think that Alice will nevertheless act in 
accordance with backward induction later on and hence to play the backward 
inductive move himself at his decision node. Accounting for the surprise that Alice 
has played b while still maintaining that she will play d is vital in making backward 
induction reasoning work. Usually, an assumption of epistemic independence 
is used to exclude any influence of such deviating behaviour on expectations 
about Alice’s future behaviour. In our account, surprise information is explained 
with low agent connectedness of the agent governing Alice’s first decision node. 
Low agent connectedness can be interpreted by understanding player Alice as a 
multiple-self. Accordingly, the deviating behaviour of Alice’s first agent can be 
explained as exhibiting low underlying connectedness between Alice's selves. For 
instance, such low intrapersonal connectedness can occur due to a breakdown 
of psychological features, memory or empathy between the self at Alice’s first 
decision node and her other selves. Such a more detailed description of dynamics 
allows us to more fully understand strategic interaction over time.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 introduces a three-stage ac­
count of dynamic games, and defines a player as a set of agents. Section 5.3 
describes the players’ reasoning by extending a type-based epistemic model of 
dynamic games with agent connectedness. Section 5.4 gives sufficient conditions 
for backward induction in terms of agent connectedness and provides an existence 
result ensuring the possibility of these conditions. Section 5.5 discusses some in­
terpretative issues of our framework, with particular emphasis on a multiple-self 
interpretation of a player. Finally, Section 5.6 offers some concluding remarks.
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5.2 M odelling D ynam ic Gam es
Since Kuhn (1953) dynamic strategic interaction has commonly been modelled 
by the so-called extensive form which represents a game as a tree.
D efin ition 1  (Extensive form structure with perfect information). An  extensive 
form structure with perfect information is a tuple T = [X, Z, E, x q , I, m, (uj)j€/), 
where
• X  is a finite set of non-terminal nodes, specifying decision nodes,
• Z  is a finite set of terminal nodes, specifying the different situations in 
which the game may end,
• E  is a finite set of directed edges (x ,y ) € X  x (X u Z ) , specifying the choices 
for the players, where (x , y) moves the game from x  to y,
• xq is the unique root of the tree and called initial node,
• I  is a finite set of players, where | 1 1> 1,
• m  : X \ Z  —► I  is the move function assigning to every non-terminal node the 
choosing player, where X i denotes the set of all x  G X  such that m (x) = i,
• Ui : Z  —> R is player i ’s utility function assigning to every terminal node 
z  G Z  a utility U i ( z ) .
The extensive form can be interpreted as a set-up procedure for modelling a 
dynamic game. Note that we restrict attention to dynamic games with perfect 
information, i.e. games in which all players, whenever they have to choose, know 
exactly the choices made by their opponents until then. First, the structure of 
the game has to be specified, i.e. all of its possible situations, outcomes at final 
situations, and rules are formalised by the sets X , Z  and E, respectively. Then, 
a particular set of players determines the decision-makers in the game and the 
corresponding contingent situations where they act is given by the move function 
m. In a final step, each player has to consider all possible outcomes of the game 
and assign cardinal utilities to them in line with his preferences. To make explicit 
this procedural character inherent in the extensive form, we call the course of 
fixing the model the set-up stage of a dynamic game. Once the game is fixed, 
the players can reason about it for decision-making purposes and thereafter the 
game is actually played.
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A further basic ingredient when modelling dynamic games is the notion of 
strategy, which is considered the object of choice for the players. A strategy 
specifies an action for each contingency that might possibly arise for the respective 
player.
D efinition 2  (Strategy). Let T be an extensive form structure with perfect in­
formation, i G I  some player and Ai(xi) C E  the set of edges departing from 
Xi G X{. A strategy for i is a function Si : X{ —> (JXieXi such that
Si(xi) e  Ai(xi) for all X{ € X i.
According to the standard view, a strategy specifies an action for each contingency 
that might possibly arise for the respective player and hence can be interpreted 
as his disposition to act at each of his decision nodes. We call such a choice plan 
actual strategy since it refers to the contingent actions of the players when actually 
playing the game. However, also before the game is played, players determine 
strategies based on their hypothetical reasoning. Such objects resulting from the 
players’ reasoning and being fixed before play are called initial strategies and axe 
formally defined in the next section. Note that actual strategies can differ from 
initial strategies.
Indeed, after the set-up stage, a player reasons about his opponents as well as 
the fixed game, and decides on a complete contingent choice plan for the game as 
a result of this reasoning. We call this process the reasoning stage of a dynamic 
game and the player’s ensuing hypothetical choice plan is his initial strategy. Note 
that although coming after the set-up stage, the reasoning stage is prior to the 
actual play of the game. The introduction of the reasoning stage thus explicitly 
separates hypothetical plans from actual choices.
After the set-up and reasoning stages the game is actually played and all 
contingent situations that may possibly arise in the game axe represented in the 
extensive form by a player’s set of decision nodes. We assume that each such 
node is governed by an agent of the player and call the actual playing phase of 
the dynamic game the play stage. With the game structure and initial strategy 
being fixed by the prior two stages, the play stage determines the strategy profile 
that is actually played as well as the corresponding outcome and utilities for 
the players. Hence, our account distinguishes between three stages of a dynamic 
game: the set-up, the reasoning and the play stages.
Further, note how our three-stage view on dynamic games makes use of the 
notion of player. Accordingly, two distinguishable tasks are performed by a player
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before the play stage: utilities have to be assigned to outcomes in the set-up stage, 
followed by the choice of an initial strategy in the reasoning stage. During the 
play stage each of the decision nodes specifies a distinguishable task to be handled 
by one agent, respectively. In order to be able to discern the acting entities of 
the different stages, we understand the player as consisting of a set-up agent, a 
reasoning agent and game agents. Formally, a player is defined as the set of his 
agents.
D efinition 3 (Player as set of agents). Let T be an extensive form structure 
with perfect information. A player i £ I  in V is defined as a set of agents 
i = { a ^ a ^ a ^ a ^ ,  ...,a lm}, where | Xi \= m  £ N, and a* is called set-up agent, 
a lr is called reasoning agent, and all other agents ctj are called game agents, each 
corresponding to a unique decision node Xi £ Xi.
Accordingly, a player as a set of agents makes formally explicit the different tasks 
to be performed by a player in a dynamic game, related to the three different 
stages. The conception of a player as set of agents can naturally be linked to 
the notion of selves in a multiple-self. Indeed, the idea of understanding agents 
of players as distinct selves of multiple-selves has been used in the context of 
dynamic games with imperfect information by, for instance, Piccione and Ru­
binstein (1997). Also, the idea that a player consists of different acting selves 
appears in the agent normal form in Selten (1975). In Definition 3, the agents 
of a player axe modelled according to their specific tasks in the game. However, 
from an interpretative point of view, a more detailed description of agents in a 
player can be considered.
Note that our account of dynamic games makes transparent their sequential 
structure. Yet, a stability assumption lurks in the standard extensive form model. 
Despite the sequential character of dynamic games, no changes in the game’s 
ingredients, utility assignments or choice prescriptions by the initial strategy is 
admitted during the dynamic interaction. Indeed, any object fixed in the two 
pre-play stages, once determined, remains rigid until the end of the game. In 
particular, the deliberation of the reasoning agent of a player is supposed to 
apply to all game agents, who axe all required to adhere to the initial strategy. 
Hence, any dynamics concerning the game structure as well as concerning the 
players axe excluded by the standard extensive form model of dynamic games. 
While it may seem plausible to keep the game structure fixed given an underlying 
dynamic game to be modelled, the suspension of any dynamics concerning the
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players represents a rather strong assumption within the standard model. The 
introduction of three stages relevant to a dynamic game allows us to explicitly 
endorse or weaken the stability assumption with respect to deviation from pre­
play reasoning.
The idea of understanding a player as a set of agents is now illustrated with 
the extensive form depicted in Figure 5.1. In addition to the game agents at their 
respective decision nodes, both players Alice and Bob have two further agents 
that determine their utilities and strategies before play, corresponding to the set­
up and reasoning stage, respectively. The two players can thus be formalised 
as sets Alice = {Alices, Alicer, Alice\, Alices) and Bob =  {Bobs, Bobr , Bob2 }. 
Actual choice of a player is then described by a strategy, each component of 
which is determined by the respective game agent in charge. For example, the 
actual strategy profile (be, d) signifies that Alicei chooses b at her first decision 
node, then Bob^ picks d at his decision node and Alices selects e at her second 
decision node. However, the initial strategies of the reasoning agents could be 
different. For instance, Alicer might have chosen bf prior to play. Note that in 
this example, a common index is used for both players to identify the position 
of their agents in the game tree and to reflect its sequential structure. More 
complicated game trees such as ones with parallel nodes governed by different 
agents of one player can then still be given some sequential order, relative to 
the structure of the game tree. Further, game agents assigned to decision nodes 
that are excluded by actual play can be interpreted as inactive game agents. 
Also, it is possible to conceive of a player as having inactive agents at opponent 
decision nodes, and to hence interpret the player as a decision-maker over time 
with inactive agents at points in the game where no game agent acts for him. 
For instance, the set representing Alice would then be amended with the inactive 
agent Alice2 , and the set representing Bob would be amended with the inactive 
agents Bob\ and Bobs, where the inactive agents correspond to decision nodes 
which are assigned to opponent game agents, respectively.
Our three-stage account of dynamic games proposed in this section makes 
explicit the sequential character of dynamic games and the stability assumptions 
already implicit in the standard extensive form model. A player is conceived of 
as a set of agents relative to the three sequential stages, making explicit that 
different agents of a player act in distinct sequential situations before and during 
play. The next section proposes an epistemic model for the reasoning stage of
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dynamic games and formalises the notion of initial strategy.
5.3 E xtending T ype-based  Interactive E pistem ology
Interactive epistemology, also called epistemic game theory when applied to games, 
constitutes a quite recent field of inquiry into the foundations of game theory. 
Interactive epistemology provides an abstract framework to formalise epistemic 
notions such as belief and knowledge in settings involving several decision-makers. 
This field of research was initiated by Aumann (1976) and first adopted in the 
context of games by Aumann (1987) as well as Tan and Werlang (1988). Devel­
opments of the discipline axe reviewed by, for instance, Brandenburger (1992), 
Battigalli and Bonnano (1999), Board (2002), Brandenburger (2007), and Perea 
(2011, forthcoming). The fundamental problem addressed is the description of the 
players’ choices in a given game relative to epistemic assumptions. For instance, 
a typical starting point for epistemic game-theoretic analysis is the notion of com­
mon knowledge of rationality . 3 Implications for play in given classes of games are 
then deduced. More generally, existing game-theoretic solution concepts are char­
acterised in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as novel solution concepts are 
proposed by studying the consequences of refined or new epistemic hypotheses.
Epistemic game theory can be regarded as complementing classical game the­
ory. While classical game theory is based on two basic primitives -  game form 
and choice -  epistemic game theory adds an epistemic framework as a third bar 
sic component, on the basis of which knowledge and beliefs can be modelled in 
games. Moreover, the epistemic program in game theory is somewhat opposed 
to the classical refinement program. The latter approach takes the Nash (1951) 
notion of equilibrium as the starting point and attempts to propose various refine­
ments, that cut down the multiplicity of equilibria with the ultimate objective of 
obtaining a unique prediction for play in an arbitrary game. In contrast to seeking 
a general characterisation of rationality in terms of equilibrium refinement, the 
epistemic programme takes beliefs, knowledge and rationality as starting points 
for its analysis and aims to unveil the implications of epistemic assumptions for 
play in games. A wide variety of epistemic hypotheses involving different refine­
ments of rationality as well as different epistemic operators can be considered 
and their subsequent game-theoretic consequences be analysed. As Brandenbur-
3An event E  is common knowledge among a set of agents G if E  holds, every i E G knows 
E, every i 6 G knows that every i 6 G knows E, . . .  (ad infinitum).
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ger remarks, a key property of the epistemic programme is that there does not 
exist one right set of assumptions to make about a game (Brandenburger, 2007, 
490). In particular, the concept of Nash equilibrium loses its predominant role, 
since it merely qualifies as one particular outcome of a  game -  obtainable only 
under specific epistemic conditions -  among a set of possibilities. For a more 
detailed comparison of classical game theory and the epistemic programme, see 
de Bruin (2009).
More generally, epistemic game theory builds on the basic intuition that a 
player has to reason about the other players. Before choosing his strategy, he 
must form a belief about what his opponents will do. However, in order to so, 
he also needs to form a belief about what the others believe that their opponents 
will do. Similarly, any higher-order beliefs about his opponents are relevant to 
the player’s choice. In order to formally represent players’ reasoning about each 
other, an epistemic model is added to the classical analysis of a game.
Here, we follow the type-based approach to epistemic game theory, according 
to which different epistemic states are encapsulated in the notion of type. Note 
that the notion of type was originally introduced by Harsanyi (1967) in the spe­
cific context of incomplete information but can actually be generalised to any 
interactive uncertainty. A recent survey of type-based interactive epistemology is 
provided by Siniscalchi (2008). In a type-based epistemic framework for games 
-  as illustrated in Example 4 -  a set of types is assigned to every player, where 
each player’s type induces a belief on the opponents’ choices and types. Thus, 
any higher-order belief can be derived from a given type.
E xam ple 4. Let T =  ((Si)i^/, (ui)iE/) be a game in normal form, where I  = 
{Alice, Bob] is a set of players, SAlice = {^ , y , z} ,  SBob = {0 , 1 } are their 
strategy sets, and U{ are utility functions for i E {Alice, Bob}. The tuple M T =  
((Ti)iei> (^i)ie/) an epistemic model ofT,  where T{ is a finite set of types for 
i E {Alice,Bob} and every type U E T{ induces a probability function bi(ti) E 
A (Si x T{) on the opponents’ choice-type combinations. Suppose the following 
types and believes:
• Sets of types:
TAlice Alice’^Alice’^Alice}
T B o b  =  { ^ B o b ’ ^ B o b ’ ^ o b ’ ^ B o b }
• Beliefs for Alice:
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bAlice(t Alice) =  O-’ ^Bob) 
b A l ic e i^ A U c e )  =  ( ^ ^ B o b )
bAlice{tAlice) =   ^ ' (^ B o b ) +  *7 ’ ( M Bob)
• Beliefs for Bob: 
bBob{tBob) =  (y^Alice)
bB6b{t2B0b) =  (®, tAlice) 
bB6b{t%ob) =  Alice)
bBob(t%ob) = .5 ■ ( M a b J  +  .5 • {z ,t2Alice)
Note that any higher-order belief can now be derived for the different types 
of a player from the epistemic model. For instance, A lice’s type t \ lice believes 
with probability 1  that Bob chooses 1. Also, t \ lice believes with probability 1  that 
Bob believes with probability 1 that Alice picks x. Moreover, t \ lice believes with 
probability 1 that Bob believes with probability 1 that Alice believes with probability 
1 that Bob selects 1. Analogously, any higher-order belief can be derived for t \ lice.
To give another example, Bob’s type tg ob believes with probability 1 that Alice 
chooses x. Also, t \ ob believes with probability 1  that Alice believes with prob­
ability 1 that Bob picks 1. Moreover, t2Bc^  believes with probability 1 that Alice 
believes with probability 1 that Bob believes with probability 1 that Alice selects x. 
Analogously, any higher-order belief can be derived for t2Bob.
To give an example with partial beliefs, A lice’s type t \ lice believes with prob­
ability .3 that Bob chooses 0; and with probability .7 that Bob chooses 1. Also,
tAlice believes with probability .3 that Bob believes with probability 1 that Alice
picks x; and t \ lice believes with probability .7 that Bob believes with probability 1 
that Alice picks z. Moreover, t \ lice believes with probability .3 that Bob believes 
with probability 1 that Alice believes with probability 1 that Bob selects 1; and
t \ lice believes with probability .7 that Bob believes with probability 1 that Alice
believes with probability .3 that Bob selects 0 and that Alice believes with probab­
ility .7 that Bob selects 1 . Analogously, any higher-order belief can be derived for 
t3Alice'
In a similar fashion, for every type of every player, any higher-order belief 
can be obtained from the epistemic model.
Here, we extend the standard type-based epistemic model with the new notion 
of initial strategy. Before our epistemic model can be defined, one further notion
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is needed. Letting Sj denote the set of all strategies of player j ,  a strategy sj £ Sj 
is said to avoid a given decision node x  £ X ,  if there exists some decision node 
x* £ X  on the unique path from the initial node xq to x, for which Sj assigns an 
off-path action. The set Sj (x) C Sj then denotes all strategies of player j  that 
do not avoid node x. An extended epistemic model for dynamic games can now 
be defined as follows.
Definition 5 (Extended epistemic model). Let T be a finite extensive form struc­
ture with perfect information. An extended epistemic model of T is a tuple 
M r = {Ti,Pi,t,i)ieI, where
• Ti is a finite set of types for player i,
• Pi : Tj x (Xi U x 0) —> A ( X j ej\{i j(Sj  x Tj)) assigns to every type U £ Ti and 
decision node Xi £ X i a probability distribution on the set of opponents’ 
strategy-type pairs, where Pi(U,Xi) £ A ( X j Ei\^iy(Sj(x) x  Tj)) for all x  £ 
X i U { x 0} ,
• Li \Ti —> Si assigns to every type U £ Ti an initial strategy.
In the context of our three-stage account of dynamic games, the extended epi­
stemic model concerns the reasoning stage. Thus, the deliberation of a player’s 
reasoning agent is formalised by the extended epistemic model. In particular, the 
reasoning agent is disposed with conditional beliefs of any order at each of his de­
cision nodes as well as the initial node, via the probability function Pi. Crucially, 
it is a distinguished feature of our epistemic model that a type does not only 
hold conditional beliefs about the opponents’ actual strategies, but also about 
the opponents’ initial strategies. Note that the conditional beliefs of the reas­
oning agent refer to hypothetical epistemic states of the respective game agents. 
Hence, while types and their induced conditional belief hierarchies model the de­
liberation process of the reasoning agent, the novel ingredient of initial strategy 
is interpreted as the outcome of the player’s reasoning. Further, note that the 
conditional beliefs of a player i at a given node x £ X  U {xo} only assign posit­
ive probability to opponents’ strategy choices that do not avoid x. This seems 
reasonable since otherwise a player would exhibit contradictory beliefs: although 
knowing to be at decision node x, he believes that at least one opponent has 
chosen a strategy avoiding x  and thus excluding it to be reached.
The initial strategy is fixed in the reasoning stage before the play stage, in 
which the game is actually played. Choices by the game agents might differ from
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the ones prescribed by the reasoning agent’s initial strategy. Since a player is 
conceived of as a set of agents by Definition 3, such a behavioural deviation from 
the initial strategy raises the problem of connectedness between a player’s game 
agents and his reasoning agent. On the basis of the initial strategy function, 
we now formally introduce connectedness into our extended epistemic model for 
dynamic games.
D efinition 6  (Agent connectedness). Let A4r  be an extended epistemic model of 
an extensive form structure T with perfect information. Further, let Xi) denote
the action that the initial strategy of type U E Tj designates for game agent a lx . at 
Xi E Xi, let s f  denote the strategy of i that is actually played and let sf(xi)  denote 
the actual choice of game agent a lx . at Xi. The agent connectedness Ci(alx ., s f  | ti) 
of game agent ax . is defined as
I t \ _ /  kigk $  =L't\ULxii i>i I li) l , ,,I low otherwise.
In Definition 6 , the actual strategy played refers to the actual choices of the 
respective player’s game agents at the decision nodes they govern. Initial and 
actual strategy are then compared. A game agent is said to be high-connected 
if he acts in compliance with the initial strategy and low-connected otherwise. 
Connectedness hence both separates and relates sequential parts of the player at 
contingent points of the game. Note that the connectedness function expresses a 
behavioural notion as its values are determined by the actual choices of the game 
agents, relative to the initial strategy of the reasoning agent. In this context, 
the reasoning agent can be seen as the central representative of the player. This 
is plausible as the reasoning agent initially chooses a complete strategy that is 
intended to apply throughout the game, whereas the game agents only act locally. 
Also, note that stability of the initial strategy and hence equivalence to the actual 
strategy is implicitly assumed in the standard extensive form model. In the sequel, 
we therefore refer to reasoning agent and player interchangeably.
Moreover, the notion of agent connectedness in Definition 6  can be explained 
by underlying connectedness of psychological features, memory and empathy as 
captures by multiple-self models of personal identity over time. Also, rather than 
focusing on the relation between the reasoning agent and the game agents of a 
given player, connectedness between any pair of agents can be considered. Such 
interpretations are addressed in Section 5.5.
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In type-based epistemic models, the objects of beliefs axe events. Intuitively, 
an event states a property concerning the model’s uncertainty space. Within 
the context of games, examples of events are “Alice plays strategy 6 / ”, “Bob 
is rational” and “Bob believes at the initial node that Alice’s agents are high- 
connected”. Formally, events axe simply sets of types. More precisely, a set 
E  C Ti  of types is called event. The belief of some player i at some node 
x  G XjU{:ro} in some event E  can then be modelled by projecting Pi(U, X{) on T_j, 
denoted as fli(ti,Xi | T_{). Similarly, player z’s belief at some node x E X i U {xo} 
on the type of player j  G I  \  {z} can be obtained by projecting f3i(U,Xi) on Tj, 
denoted as /%(£*, Xi \ Tj). Moreover, player z’s belief at some node x  G XjU{xo} on 
player j ’s strategy-type pair can be extracted by projecting Pi(U,Xi) on Sj x Tj, 
denoted as j3i(U,Xi \ Sj x Tj). Note that beliefs axe events, too and that indeed 
any higher-order belief can be represented in a type-based epistemic model. Given 
some event, a player’s type specifies conditional belief hierarchies at each of his 
decision nodes. Epistemic states axe thus local and concern the respective node- 
governing agent of the player. Yet they axe hypothetical in the sense of belonging 
to the reasoning agent when deliberating before play about what his game agents 
would know were their respective nodes be reached.
For the purpose of formalising rationality in our framework, let Ui(ii(ti), /3i(ti) \ 
Xi) denote player z’s expected utility starting at node x» of playing the relevant 
part of strategy Li(ti) given his belief at X* about the opponents’ strategies.
D efinition 7 (Rationality). Let M T be an epistemic model of an extensive form  
structure T with perfect information and i G I  some player. A type U G Ti is 
rational i f t i E R i  = € Ti : Ui(i»(it),/3*(ti) | x{) > Ui(si,(3i(ti) | x {) for all Si G
Si and for all Xi G Xi}.
Accordingly, a type of a player is rational if his initial strategy maximises his 
expected utility at every decision node in the game. Rationality is hence under­
stood as a notion relative to the result of a player’s reasoning, since it is precisely 
the outcome of his reasoning that reflects his attitude towards the interactive 
situation he is involved in. Note that our notion of rationality is weaker than the 
standard one, since the latter requires actual choice to be optimal throughout the 
tree while the former only concerns initial choice. A player can thus be rational 
in our sense while still actually acting irrationally in the standard sense. As an 
illustration of this observation, consider the game given in Figure 5.1. Suppose 
Alice believes that Bob chooses d and her reasoning agent Alicer hence picks the
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rational initial strategy a f. Nevertheless, Alice\ can still choose b at her decision 
node, hence acting irrationally in the standard sense.
As has already been pointed out above, within our extended epistemic frame­
work a player can be perceived as the reasoning agent and his object of choice, 
the initial strategy, can be perceived as the result of the reasoning process, for 
instance, as his intention or plan of action for the game. A player’s game agents 
then actually choose actions at the respective decision nodes, either in line with 
the initial strategy of the reasoning agent, or differently. Specific patterns of re­
lationship between a player or his reasoning agent and his game agents can be 
formalised. We call a player i G I  high-connected if all of his game agents are 
highly connected, i.e. Ci(alx . ,s f  | U) = high for all ax . G i. In other words, 
the game agents of a high-connected player actually choose in complete accord­
ance with his proposed initial strategy. However, it is possible that only some 
game agents are highly connected, while others are not. For instance, only game 
agents succeeding some particular node might be high-connected. Crucially, be­
lief in different patterns of high-connected game agents can be defined in our 
model. For instance, the following condition requires a player to believe in the 
high-connectedness of an opponent at all future nodes. 4
D efinition 8  (Future-high-connectedness). Let M F be an epistemic model of an 
extensive form structure T with perfect information, i G /  be some player, and 
x  G A iU { r o }  some node. A type U G Ti believes in j ’s future-high-connectedness 
at node x if ti G BHij (x)  = {U  G Ti : supp(0i(ti,x | Sj x  Tj)) C {(sj , t j )  G 
Sj x  Tj : Sj(xj) = tj {xj) for all xj  G X j  succeeding r } } .
Accordingly, a player’s belief on what an opponent is actually playing is related 
to the belief about his initial strategy. More generally, our model is also capable 
of distinguishing between actual and initial strategy in the reasoning of players 
about their respective opponents.
The preceding definitions introduce connectedness of game agents to their 
'  player, conceived of as the reasoning agent, into our extended epistemic frame­
work, which in turn can be used to understand reasoning in strategic interaction 
over time. In a first such step, these notions are used in the next section to shed 
fight on backward induction reasoning in dynamic games with perfect informa­
4The following definition uses the mathematical notion of support abbrevieated as supp. The 
support of a probability measure on some space X  is the set containing all elements x €  X  that 
receive positive probability.
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tion.
5.4 Sufficient C onditions for Backward Induction
Backward induction constitutes the standard reasoning method in dynamic games 
with perfect information: at each decision node, optimal behaviour is determined 
by assuming the optimality of choices at all succeeding nodes. Before formally 
defining backward induction we restrict attention to generic games with perfect 
information.
D efinition  9 (Genericity). An extensive form structure T with perfect informa­
tion is called generic if for every player i € I, for every decision node X{ G X i, 
for every two actions ai,a- € Ai(xi), every two terminal nodes z £ Z  such that z 
follows a{ and z' follows a[, it holds that ui{z) ^  Ui(zf).
Accordingly, any two different choices at a given decision node will always lead to 
two distinct utilities for the respective player. It is common to assume genericity 
when searching for epistemic characterisations of backward induction. Since gen­
ericity implies uniqueness of the backward inductive strategy profile, no ambiguity 
arises in determining the actions in fine with backward induction at each node in 
the tree. This restriction is not severe, since the aim is to unveil the epistemic 
states portraying the way of thinking characteristic of backward inductive reas­
oning. Genericity avoids the introduction of somewhat arbitrary criteria for ties 
that would divert from the essential properties of the players’ reasoning required 
for backward induction to obtain.
Further note that backward induction can only be defined for finite games, as 
possible end points of the game are required for the backward inductive process 
to begin. Finiteness is already implicit in our definition of the extensive form.
In order to facilitate the formal expression of backward induction, the decision 
nodes are classified according to their maximal distance from an end point i.e. a 
terminal node of the game, independent from any closer terminal nodes.
D efinition 10 (Decision nodes). Let T be an extensive form structure with perfect 
information and x  G U«u X{ some decision node. Decision node x  is called 
ultimate if x is only immediately succeeded by terminal nodes; decision node x is 
culled pre-ultimate if x  is only immediately succeeded by ultimate decision nodes 
or by ultimate decision nodes and terminal nodes; decision node x is called pre- 
pre-ultimate if x is only immediately succeeded by pre-ultimate decision nodes
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or by pre-ultimate decision nodes and ultimate decision nodes or by pre-ultimate 
decision nodes and terminal nodes or by pre-ultimate decision nodes and ultimate 
decision nodes and terminal nodes; etc. Decision node x is called initial node if 
x = Xq.
It is now possible to define backward induction for generic finite dynamic 
games of perfect information as follows.
D efinition 1 1  (Backward induction strategy). Let T be a generic extensive form  
structure with perfect information, i G I  some player and Xi G X{ some decision 
node of i. The unique backward inductive choice bi(xi) G Ai{x{) at X{ is determ­
ined as follows: if Xi is an ultimate node, then bi(xi) is the unique action that 
maximises i ’s utility at Xi, and if Xi is pre-ultimate node, then bi(x{) is the unique 
action at Xi that maximises i ’s utility at X{ given backward inductive actions at all 
decision nodes succeeding Xi, etc. Player i ’s unique backward inductive strategy 
bi G Si assigns to each of i ’s decision node X{ G X i the respective unique backward 
inductive action bi(xi) G Ai(xi).
Naturally, epistemic game theory searches for epistemic requirements that in­
duce the players to choose their backward inductive strategies. Indeed, various 
different sufficient conditions for backward induction have been proposed in the 
literature, which are reviewed, unified and compared by Perea (2007). Further­
more, note that the emphasis lies on what requirements are needed for a player to 
actually choose his backward inductive strategy and hence to make transparent 
the complete reasoning underlying backward induction. The genuinely different 
question of what epistemic conditions are needed to get the backward induct­
ive outcome is addressed in, for instance, Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) and 
Brandenburger et al. (2008). Here, we give an epistemic characterisation of the 
backward inductive strategy profile in terms of connectedness.
Some more epistemic concepts need to be introduced before formal conditions 
for backward induction can be stated.
D efin ition  12 (Structural belief in rationality). Let M F be an epistemic model 
of an extensive form structure T with perfect information, and i G I  some player. 
A type ti G Ti structurally believes in his opponents’ rationality i f  ti G SBRi = 
{U G Ti : supp{(3i{ti,x \ Tj)) C R j , for all x e  Xi U {xo}, for all j  G I \  {i}}.
Accordingly, at the beginning of the game as well as at any of his decision nodes,
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a player believes that all of his opponents are rational i.e. choose a rational initial 
strategy.
Iterating structural belief in rationality gives the nested epistemic notion of 
common structural belief in rationality.
D efin ition 13 (Common structural belief in rationality). Let A4r be an epi­
stemic model of an extensive form structure T with perfect information and i G I  
some player. A type U G Ti expresses common structural belief in rational­
ity if  U G C SB R i = {ti E Ti : ti e SBR% for all k > 1 }, where S B R j  = 
SB R i, and SBR±+1 = {ti G Ti : supp{fti{ti,x \ Tj)) C S B R j , for all x  G 
X i U {x o } , for all j  G I \  {*}}> for all k > 1.
Intuitively, the event of player i satisfying common structural belief in rationality 
describes the situation in which i initially as well as at each of his decision nodes, 
believes that his opponents initially choose rationally, i.e. optimal everywhere 
in the game tree, initially as well as at each of his decision nodes, believes that 
his opponents initially as well as at each of their decision nodes believe that 
their opponents initially choose rationally i.e. optimal everywhere in the game 
tree, etc. In other words, player i always believes that his opponents choose 
optimal initial strategies, always believes that every opponent always believes 
that every other player always chooses an optimal initial strategy, etc. Observe 
that due to our weaker notion of rationality in Definition 7, it is always possible to 
define common structural belief in rationality in our epistemic model, contrary 
to impossibility results, such as by Reny (1992) and Reny (1993), concerning 
epistemic models with standard rationality. While it is usually not distinguished 
between initial and actual choice, common structural belief in rationality cannot 
be generally defined in standard epistemic structures. However, our model is 
capable of admitting that a player believes that an opponent initially chooses 
rationally, while at the same time entertaining the belief that the same opponent 
will actually choose irrationally at some points in the game and thus not carry out 
the rational strategy of his respective reasoning agent. In our model, a player can 
reason about both the reasoning as well as the actual play of his opponents. In 
this context note that Perea (2008) provides an epistemic model in which common 
structural belief in standard rationality is generally made possible by allowing a 
player to revise his beliefs about his opponents’ utilities during the game, while 
assuming the respective player’s utilities to be constant. As an illustration of the 
permanent feasibility of common structural belief in rationality in our framework,
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consider the dynamic game given in Figure 5.1. Suppose satisfying common 
structural belief in rationality, Bob believes at the beginning of the game as well 
as at his decision node that Alice initially rationally chooses strategy a f. It is 
then possible that Bob believes at his decision node that Alice actually chooses 
a strategy different from a / ,  i.e. that game agent Alice\ has picked b and game 
agent Alices, for instance, will pick e, while still maintaining his belief in Aliceas 
rational choice of the initial strategy a f.
Further, note that games are epistemically investigated from a perspective 
which is completely that of a single player. Even nested belief notions are defined 
from the viewpoint of a specific player. Understanding interactive epistemology 
as a theory of reasoning prior to choice, this stance seems natural, since any 
reasoning process takes place entirely within the reasoning individual, represented 
here by the reasoning agent.
Connectedness is now used to define the nested epistemic notion of forward 
belief in future-high-connectedness.
Definition 14 (Forward belief in future-high-connectedness). Let MF be an epi­
stemic model of an extensive form structure T with perfect information and i G /  
some player. A type ti G Ti expresses forward belief in future-high-connectedness 
if  U G FBH i =  {U € Ti : U G BH^(x) ,  for all k > 1, for all x  £ X i U {zo}}, 
where BH}{x) =  { U  G Ti : U G BH^j  for all j  G /  \  {«}}> and BH*+l{x) = 
{ U  G Ti : supp((3i(ti,x | Tj)) C BH^(xj) ,  for all j  G I  \  {z} , for all Xj  G 
Xj  such that Xj follows x}, for all x  £ X i U {aro}, and for all k > 1.
According to forward belief in future-high-connectedness, a player always believes 
that his opponents’ agents are highly connected at all succeeding nodes, that his 
opponents believe at all succeeding nodes that their opponents-agents are highly 
connected at all respectively succeeding nodes, etc. Observe that this epistemic 
condition implies that at any possible situation in the game, the player believes 
that any opponent agent at a succeeding decision node is highly connected and 
hence acts in accordance with the respective initial strategy of his player.
Further, note generally that requiring forward belief in some event E  is a 
considerably weaker epistemic condition than common structural belief in E. 
Accordingly, a theorem only requiring forward belief in some particular event and 
not common structural belief is strengthened. To see that common structural 
belief in E  is stronger than forward belief in E, consider a decision node Xi 
succeeding some node Xj. According to the former epistemic condition i believes
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at Xi that opponent j  believes E  at Xj, while the latter concept of forward belief 
in E  does not put any restrictions on what i believes at X{ what j  believes at any 
preceding decision node, in particular not whether j  believes E  at X j .  Intuitively, 
the strength of common structural belief derives from the fact that it concerns any 
decision node, including respectively preceding ones, relative to a given decision 
node. In contrast, forward belief concerns only succeeding decision nodes, given 
a particular decision node.
It is now possible to formulate epistemic conditions for backward induction 
in terms of connectedness. Proofs are given in an appendix to this chapter.
T heorem  15 (Sufficient conditions for backward induction). Let A tr  be an epi­
stemic model of a generic extensive form structure T with perfect information and 
i £ I  some player. IfU  £ Ti such that ti £ RiC\ C SB R i n  FBHi ,  then t (U) =  bi.
In our enriched epistemic framework, the preceding theorem provides a found­
ation for backward induction in terms of connectedness. Intuitively, common 
structural belief in rationality ensures that the respective player always believes 
that his opponents initially play rationally i.e. their unique backward inductive 
strategies, while at the same time he also always believes that his opponents’ 
future game agents actually choose accordingly, by forward belief in future-high- 
connectedness. Then, i initially chooses his unique backward inductive strategy. 
In fact, any surprise information that might arise during play is explained by 
low-connectedness of the deviating game agent, maintaining the belief in future- 
high-connectedness of all succeeding game agents.
When reasoning about his opponents in the reasoning stage, a player’s reas­
oning agent contemplates both about his opponents’ reasoning as well as their 
actual choices. In fact, it is his conclusion on his opponents’ actual choices that fi­
nally matters for the decision problem of the player’s reasoning agent on the basis 
of which he then chooses an initial strategy. Conceptually, a type furnished by an 
epistemic model captures the complete reasoning of the respective player. Indeed, 
the epistemic states and the reasoning of a player coincide. During the play stage, 
agents then pick actual choices according to which the dynamic game unfolds. 
Importantly, actual decisions need not to be in accordance with the underlying 
reasoning. For instance, a player might change with regards to his underlying 
connectedness. These interpretative issues will be addressed in Section 5.5.
An epistemic model only prescribes a player’s beliefs and intentions, i.e en­
compasses his reasoning, but it does not prescribe actual choices. Here, our frame­
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work precisely captures this basic idea of an epistemic model by distinguishing 
between initial and actual strategy choice by a reasoning agent and a set of game 
agents, respectively, and explicitly endorses the possibility of change in a player’s 
decisions. A player’s decision furnished by our epistemic model is accurately his 
initial strategy. Hence, the epistemic foundation for backward induction provided 
by the above theorem does concern a player’s initial and not his actual strategy. 
However, our framework also permits the formulation of sufficient conditions for 
backward induction in terms of actual choice as follows.
C orollary  16 (Backward induction play). Let be an epistemic model of 
a generic extensive form structure T with perfect information. I f  Ci {ax., s f  \ 
t{) = high, for all xi G X i, and for all i G I, as well as U G Ti such that 
U £ Ri fl CSBRi  fl FBHi for all i G I , then sa = b.
Accordingly, the backward inductive strategy profile will be played if each player’s 
reasoning agent is rational, expresses common structural belief in rationality as 
well as forward belief in future-high-connectedness, and each player’s game agents 
axe highly connected i.e. actually do carry out their reasoning agent’s initial 
strategy. Again note that actual choice is a property of game agents not of the 
reasoning agent i.e. the type.
It is now shown that the restrictions imposed on a player’s belief revision 
in fine with our epistemic conditions for backward induction do not lead to any 
contradictions and axe indeed always possible.
T heorem  17 (Existence). Let T be a generic extensive form structure with perfect 
information. Then, there exists an extended epistemic model of T such that 
U e  R i f  \ CSBRi n FBHi for all U G Ti and for all i G I.
As an illustration of this epistemic foundation of backward induction, consider 
Bob’s reasoning in the dynamic game given in Figure 5.1. In order to choose his 
initial strategy in the reasoning stage, Bobr hypothetically considers his game 
agent Bob2 - By forward belief in future-high-connectedness, Bobr believes at 
Bo&2 that Alice3  will be high-connected and thus play in fine with the initial 
strategy of her reasoning agent Alicer. Since, by common structural belief in 
rationality, he believes Alicer to choose rationally, Bobr believes at B 0& 2 that 
Alicer initially chooses /  at her final decision node. Therefore, Bobr believes at 
B 0& 2 that the high-connected Alices complies with the initial rational strategy
173
CHAPTER 5. BACKWARD INDUCTION
and thus picks / .  Hence, Bobr initially chooses his rational strategy d, as well as 
actually in case of H0& 2 being high-connected.
Further observe that our theorem makes explicit a strong principle of epi- 
stemic independence needed for backward induction: the observation of a de­
viating opponent game agent has no influence whatsoever on a player’s beliefs 
concerning any game agents at succeeding decision nodes, who axe still believed 
to be highly connected each. Also note that only requiring forward belief in 
future-high-connectedness instead of the stronger condition of common structural 
belief in future-high-connectedness strengthens our epistemic characterisation of 
backward induction. The epistemic foundation for backward induction in terms 
of connectedness provided here is interpreted and discussed in Section 5.5.
5.5 D iscussion
5.5.1 D ynam ics
Our extended epistemic framework, which understands players as sets of agents 
and models their connectedness, is capable of shedding light on the dynamic 
character of dynamic games.
In a general sense, our framework displays the complete sequential structure 
underlying the standard extensive form model of dynamic games. According to 
our framework, a dynamic game has at least three distinguishable stages: the 
set-up stage, the reasoning stage and the play stage. It is thus made explicit that 
different agents of a player find themselves in distinct, sequential situations, such 
as utility assignments before play, reasoning before play and then play at dif­
ferent decision nodes. Moreover, explicating the sequential structure of dynamic 
games within our framework reveals stability assumptions implicit in the stand­
ard extensive form model. The ingredients of the game, including the fact that 
utilities are determined prior to reasoning and actual play as well as that pre-play 
strategy choice resulting from reasoning, are supposed to remain invariant during 
the whole dynamic strategic interaction. Concerning utilities, the assumption of 
stable preferences of all agents throughout reasoning and play is made explicit by 
the fact that they respond to the same utility function. Concerning reasoning, 
our model clarifies that a game agent is presumed at his decision node to comply 
with his player’s instructions i.e. to act in line with the respective initial strategy.
The assumed stability of dynamic games implicit in the standard extensive
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form model can be argued to be in tension with its inherent sequential nature. 
While the latter suggests the possibility of change in dynamic games, the former 
does not offer enough structure to account for any such changes. This prob­
lematic aspect of sequential stability is made explicit and can be relaxed in our 
framework. In particular, the notion of high-connectedness can be formally in­
troduced which captures the sequential stability of game agents. Intuitively, 
high-connectedness captures the idea that game agents make choices according 
to the pre-play instructions of their reasoning agents. Also, the above theor­
ems relate high-connectedness to backward induction reasoning. Note that high- 
connectedness is a purely behavioural assumption that can be dropped locally, 
in order, for instance, to account for surprise information in backward induction 
reasoning. More generally, connectedness can be used to formulate hypothetical 
reasoning patterns related to the sequential stability of a player and his game 
agents, which in turn can be applied to epistemic characterisations of game- 
theoretic solution concepts.
Moreover, by clarifying the sequential character of dynamic games, unveiling 
stability assumptions and modelling reasoning about connectedness of agents, our 
framework provides foundations for a realistic interpretation of dynamic games 
as formal representations of strategic interaction over time. More specifically, two 
interpretative directions can be taken. Firstly, the very sequential structure of 
dynamic games as rendered transparent in our framework can be interpreted as 
temporal. Secondly, the player which is defined as a set of agents with specific 
tasks in our framework can be interpreted as a person. In particular, interpret­
ations of players in dynamic games can be linked to multiple-self models of per­
sonal identity over time by understanding players as multiple-selves and agents 
as selves. The idea of decision-makers as multiple-selves can thus be addressed in 
our account of dynamic games. Indeed, the subsequent section interprets dynamic 
games from a multiple-selves point of view.
5.5.2 M ultiple-Self
The conception of player as a set of connected agents can naturally be linked to the 
notion of connected selves in a multiple-self. Indeed, this idea of understanding 
agents of players as the different selves of multiple-selves has been employed in 
the context of extensive form models with imperfect information, such as that of 
Piccione and Rubinstein (1997). Also, the idea that a player consists of different
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acting selves appears in Selten (1975) and Halpern (2001) within the context of 
the agent normal form. Yet such appearances of the multiple-self concept in game 
theory lack philosophical foundations. Here, we propose to interpret the notion 
of player as a multiple-self using theories of personal identity over time, in order 
to give specific meaning to change of players over time and to the reasoning of 
players about possible or observed changes of their opponents.
Multiple-self models of personal identity over time can be related to the ex­
tended epistemic framework by interpreting the agents as selves and the player 
as a multiple-self. The purely behavioural notion of connectedness as measur­
ing compliance or deviation of a game agent with or from the initial strategy of 
the reasoning agent can then be explained by underlying connectedness which 
describes the degree of connectedness in the multiple-self. Substantive inter­
pretations of intrapersonal connectedness, such as with psychological, empathy 
and memory connectedness render the description of decision-makers in dynamic 
games more realistic. Adopting such a multiple-self model of personal identity 
over time, three substantive interpretations of underlying connectedness axe now 
considered and linked to our extended epistemic model and sufficient conditions 
for backward induction.
Psychological connectedness permits the interpretation of players as consist­
ing of agent-selves with possibly different preferences. That is to say, a supposedly 
irrational move at some decision node can be interpreted as resulting from dif­
ferent preferences of the respective agent. As an illustration consider the game 
given in Figure 5.1 and suppose that Bob believes Alicei to rationally play a. 
Upon observing a surprising move b by Alicei ,  he can make sense of the low 
behavioural connectedness of Alicei as follows: Bob adopts the belief that Alicei 
has exhibited deviating preferences from her player. In particular, it is natural to 
depict a breakdown in psychological connectedness between Alicei and Alices. 
However, it could also be the case that Alice\ has re-evaluated outcomes at later 
terminal nodes rendering her preferences different from Alice3 . Note that a par­
ticular contemplation about what precisely has prompted the preference change 
or about what precisely it consists in, is not formally needed to obtain our suffi­
cient conditions for backward induction in terms of connectedness. Yet, in order 
to further describe backward induction reasoning, it is possible to provide such 
more realistic interpretations when viewing a player as a multiple-self. In order to 
obtain backward induction, an agent who observes a supposedly irrational move
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can hence maintain belief in the rationality of the respective opponent, as well as 
belief in future-high-connectedness by revising his belief in the high psychological 
connectedness of the deviating game agent. Such belief revision only co m m its  
the reasoner to believing there to have been a relevant preference change such as 
to prompt a local re-evaluation of the payoffs which, in turn, has led to a local 
deviation from the initial strategy. Note that similarly, Perea (2008) provides 
an epistemic model for dynamic games in which the possibility of belief change 
about opponents’ utilities during the game is explicitly endorsed, modelled and 
sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived.
Along similar lines, empathetic connectedness permits us to interpret a sup­
posedly irrational move at an earlier decision node as a local breakdown in the 
opponent’s empathetic connectedness. By ascribing a low empathetic connected­
ness to some self of another person, it is reasonable to still grant full rationality 
and reasoning capacity to the remaining game agents and the reasoning agent of 
that person. Similar interpretations for the dynamic game given in Figure 5.1 as 
proposed for psychological connectedness are hence available.
With (reductive or non-reductive) memory connectedness, a supposedly ir­
rational move at an earlier decision node can be interpreted as a breakdown of 
memory between the deviating agent and his player, in particular, that the devi­
ating agent has forgotten the initial strategy. Note that memory connectedness 
could also be used to interpret issues raised in Piccione and Rubinstein (1997) 
related to imperfect recall. By assigning a low access to earlier experiences of the 
deviating agent, a reasoner can revise his belief in the stability of memory of an 
opponent, excluding the agent from the opponent’s agents that share memories 
while still maintaining belief in rationality. Similar interpretations for the game 
given in Figure 5.1 as proposed for psychological and empathy connectedness axe 
thus available.
The different interpretations of intrapersonal connectedness in the multiple- 
self allow both a more fine-grained discussion of reasoning about opponents as 
well as a more specific interpretation of how observed surprise moves at pre­
ceding decision nodes can be explained. When discussing backward induction 
paradoxes later in this section, we will use a more formalised model of underlying 
connectedness.
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5.5.3 Epistem ic Independence
The extended epistemic framework proposed here allows us to give epistemic 
foundations of backward induction in terms of agent connectedness. This no­
tion of connectedness measures the extent to which game agents are sequentially 
stable relative to the reasoning agent of the player. In the above theorem, back­
ward induction is assured by explaining surprise information in terms of low­
connectedness of the deviating game agent.
Connectedness reflects the fundamental principle underlying any foundation 
of backward induction. This so-called principle of epistemic independence, which 
is conceptually discussed by Stalnaker (1998), requires that a player treats any 
information obtained during the game, such as observed opponents’ moves, as 
irrelevant to his beliefs about opponents’ behaviour at later points in the game. 
This property is at work in our theorem: the observation of a surprising move of 
an opponent’s game agent does not affect a player’s beliefs on the behaviour of the 
respective opponent’s future game agents, but rather the concerned game agent 
is concluded to be low-connected. In other words, his comportment is regarded 
as isolated and irrelevant to future behaviour of the represented player.
More specifically, forward belief in future-high-connectedness yields the condi­
tion of epistemic independence that is implicit in any characterisation of backward 
induction. At any decision node, forward belief in future-high-connectedness en­
sures the stability of all game agents at all succeeding decision nodes even if game 
agents at preceding decision nodes have been deviating from the initial strategy 
of their reasoning agent. Note that in our framework surprise information pre­
cisely consists in deviation from the initial strategy. Epistemic independence is 
assured by forward belief in future-high-connectedness which, in turn, leads to a 
behavioural isolation of any surprise information.
In a general sense, note that there is a tension between the sequential stabil­
ity implicitly assumed to underlie standard accounts of dynamic games and some 
local breakdown which is needed for epistemic independence. This tension needs 
to be accounted for in any epistemic characterisation of backward induction. In 
our framework, the notion of connectedness is used to describe this tension: low­
connectedness makes explicit the idea that the sequential stability of the initial 
strategy can break down locally, while forward belief in future-high-connectedness 
ensures that the effects of such a breakdown indeed remain local. Connectedness 
thus makes explicit the crucial rigidity with which epistemic independence re­
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quires local breakdowns of sequential stability to be treated.
The multiple-self interpretation introduced above yields further insights into 
the fundamental principle of epistemic independence. In dynamic games, it is 
natural to depict a player as a multiple-self whose selves are highly connected ac­
cording to several interpretations of underlying connectedness, i.e. selves highly 
connected in terms of psychological features, memory and empathy. Upon receiv­
ing surprise information, belief revision according to forward belief in future-high- 
connectedness sets the behavioural connectedness of the deviating opponent game 
agent to low. It is then plausible to claim that this low behavioural connected­
ness stems from some breakdown in underlying connectedness. However, forward 
belief in future-high-connectedness also ensures that any succeeding game agents 
of the respective opponent are assumed to be entirely unaffected by the deviat­
ing behaviour of the particular preceding supposedly low-connected agent under 
any interpretation of underlying connectedness, such as psychological, empathy 
and memory connectedness. Hence, forward belief in future-high-connectedness 
reveals that foundations for backward induction have commonly been tacitly as­
suming a much stronger epistemic independence assumption. Indeed, it is plaus­
ible to require forward belief in future-high-connectedness for any underlying 
connectedness as well. Note that assuming such epistemic independence with 
regards to any underlying connectedness is considerably strong, which suggests 
that the assumption of epistemic independence is much stronger than commonly 
assumed.
Furthermore, our framework is capable of clarifying the epistemic conditions 
for backward induction in Aumann (1995). In his framework, Aumann uses an 
entirely static epistemic operator that refers to the beginning of the game. Once 
fixed, the epistemic state of a player concerns a single point in time and does not 
change. It is hence difficult to account for belief revision in this framework. How­
ever, Aumann’s key nested epistemic notion of common knowledge of rationality 
can be interpreted as being equivalent to our concept of common structural belief 
in rationality. Indeed, rationality refers to a player’s initial strategy fixed before 
the game and rigidity of a belief in a rational initial strategy is thus possible to 
entertain in our model. However, the belief in the actual choice of the opponents 
may change at different points in the game. It can hence be claimed that Aumann 
implicitly endorses some kind of high-connectedness assumption, requiring it to 
be common knowledge that a player never actually changes his intended initial
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strategy. This implicit assumption is explicated by our forward belief in future- 
high-connectedness condition. By understanding strategies as intentions or, more 
precisely, initial strategies, Aumann is able to obtain backward induction with 
an entirely static epistemic operator.
5.5.4 Backward Induction Paradoxes
The so-called backward induction paradoxes have been addressed by, for instance, 
Selten (1978), Rosenthal (1981) as well as Binmore (1987), and identify games 
in which backward inductive reasoning leads to rather implausible and counter 
intuitive strategy choices. In this context, a crucial argument against the plaus­
ibility of backward induction criticises that the reasoning method does not take 
into account any observed past behaviour at all, even when the backward induct­
ive strategy profile is contradicted during actual play. In fact, our framework 
can be used to juxtapose belief revision patterns in line with such a plausib­
ility requirement, and to contrast them to belief revision policies sufficient for 
backward induction reasoning according to the above theorem. Recall that the 
latter belief revision policies require a player to set the connectedness of a devi­
ating agent to low and to maintain belief in the high-connectedness of each of 
the opponent’s future agents. In contrast, belief revision policies in line with the 
plausibility requirement set the connectedness of all future game agents of the 
relevant opponent to low upon observing an opponent game agent deviate. Thus, 
the intuition is captured that the respective game agents actually play a strategy 
different from the initial strategy believed to be chosen by their reasoning agent.
As an illustration of this comparison between these two kinds of belief revision 
policies for dynamic games with perfect information, consider the dynamic game 
given in Figure 5.1. Suppose Bob reasons in fine with the conditions of Theorem 
15 and hence in fine with backward induction. In case of him surprisingly ob­
serving Alicei to choose 6 , he sets her connectedness to Alice's reasoning agent 
to low, while keeping his belief in the high-connectedness of Alice's future game 
agent Alice3 . Alternatively, suppose now that Bob when observing Alicei ’s de­
viating move still believes that Alice's reasoning agent has chosen the backward 
inductive strategy as initial strategy, but that the game agents play a strategy 
different from the initial strategy. He thus also sets the connectedness between 
Alice3  and Alice's reasoning agent to low. Note that he is free to believe what 
Alice3  will choose. For instance, if he believes that she will pick e, then he can
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only optimally select c at his decision node.
We now focus on the Rosenthal (1981) approach to the backward induction 
paradoxes. On his account, small probabilities of future deviating moves are 
introduced into dynamic games and interpreted as the players’ intersubjective 
beliefs about future moves of opponents. In our framework, such probabilities 
can be elucidated by introducing a more fine-grained belief revision on deviat­
ing moves. More precisely, we introduce probabilistic beliefs on how likely it is 
that opponent game agents deviate from their respective initial strategy. These 
probabilistic beliefs are updated by a player’s belief about the underlying connec­
tedness of an opponent, which in turn depends on his beliefs on the opponent’s 
behavioural connectedness. Recall that underlying connectedness describes the 
degree of connectedness of psychological features, memory and empathy in a 
multiple-self.
A player could form probabilistic beliefs on future deviating moves of an op­
ponent as follows. Firstly, suppose a player observes a move by an opponent agent 
that deviated from his respective initial strategy and explains it with the latter’s 
low behavioural connectedness. Note that this low behavioural connectedness can 
be treated as information about the opponent. Secondly, suppose further that a 
player has a belief about the underlying connectedness of the opponent’s person. 
It is then natural to update these beliefs with the behavioural observation. In 
other words, players can learn about their opponent’s character during the game. 
Thirdly, also suppose that a player entertains beliefs about his opponents’ future 
behaviour. Then, it seems reasonable to update the latter beliefs with his beliefs 
about the respective opponent’s underlying connectedness.
Let a specific underlying connectedness be assigned to any pair of agents in a 
player: c : i x i —► {high, low}, where a player i is conceived of as a set of agents 
according to Definition 3. Such an underlying connectedness function can be suit­
ably interpreted as an opponent’s belief about the connectedness between any pair 
of agents in a player. For instance, within the context of the game given in Figure 
5.1, starting with a natural belief in high-connectedness from sequential stability 
as well as a belief that Alice’s initial strategy is the backward inductive one, upon 
observing that Alicei chooses b, backward induction can only be behaviourally 
maintained for Bob by updating his belief about Alice’s underlying connected­
ness function as follows: set the connectedness of any pair of Alice’s agents 
involving Alicei to low, i.e. c(Alices, Alicei) =  low, c{Alicer,Alice\) =  low,
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c(Alicei, Alices) = low, c{Alice\, Alice s) = low, c(Alice\, Alicer) = low, and 
c(Alices, Alicei) = low, while maintaining the belief in the high connectedness 
between any two other agents, i.e. c(Alices, Alicer) = high, c( Alice s, Alices) = 
high, c{Alicer, Alices) — high, c(Alicer, Alices) — high, c(Alices, Alicea) — high, 
and c(Alices, Alicer) = high. Clearly, such a belief revision policy is implausible: 
believing that Alicei is low-connected to all other agents while still preserving 
belief in the high-connectedness between all other pairs of agents seems to com­
pletely deny any relevance of Alice\ with regards to Alice as a multiple-self.
Now consider a more fine-grained underlying connectedness function, as in­
troduced Chapter 2 , which expresses degrees of connectedness of pairs of agents, 
namely c : i x i —► [0,1]. Then, according to psychological connectedness, the de­
gree of connectedness then measures the similarity of preferences between agent- 
selves. Similarly, memory and empathy connectedness can be seen as a matter of 
degrees rather than binary. Using such a more fine-grained underlying connec­
tedness function, the following belief revision upon receiving surprise information 
seems plausible. The supposedly low behavioural connectedness of the deviat­
ing game agent Alicei induces Bob to believe that there is some agent of Alice 
to which Alice\ s connectedness is strictly less than 1. In other words, some 
failure of the underlying connectedness has to be assumed in order to explain 
the low behavioural connectedness. Then, such revised beliefs in an underlying 
connectedness function can be used to update beliefs about future moves of an 
opponent. More specifically, underlying connectedness can determine a player’s 
probabilistic beliefs about how likely an opponent game agent will deviate from 
the initial strategy at future nodes. Conditionalising on the fact there is some 
agent of Alice to which Aliceas connectedness is strictly less than 1 , plausible 
updating rules render Bob's probabilistic beliefs in future deviation of any of 
Alice's game agents strictly positive, since each agent has some relevance to his 
respective player as a multiple-self. Intuitively, upon believing that there is at 
least some agent-pair in an opponent which is not perfectly connected, the re­
spective player’s belief about the future deviation of his opponent’s game agents 
will be strictly positive, as future game agents may also be disposed to deviate 
from the reasoning agent’s initial strategy as exhibited by the particular game 
agent that has already deviated.
Further plausible constraints on such updating patterns can be introduced. 
For instance, it is possible that under the interpretation of psychological connec­
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tedness, the underlying connectedness changes more drastically than under the 
interpretation of memory connectedness. Consider a preference change of one 
game agent. If all other agents’ preferences remain stable, then there will be a 
low-connectedness between the respective game agent and all other agents. How­
ever, in the context of memory connectedness, it could be the case that one game 
agent has forgotten the initial strategy, while all other agents still remember the 
initial strategy well. Therefore, it is at least plausible to require monotonicity 
to be respected in updating beliefs about future deviation for psychological con­
nectedness. With different interpretations, the breakdown of connectedness can 
be more or less wide in scope in terms of how many agents are affected. Which 
or whether all of these interpretations are endorsed depends on how realistic a 
model of the decision-maker is intended. Naturally, it is beyond the scope of the 
present work to explore plausible updating rules and interpretations in greater 
detail.
More generally, our framework permits us to argue that backward induction 
reasoning is implausible when underlying connectedness is interpreted as a belief 
about the opponent’s character and probabilistic beliefs about future deviation 
of opponents are updated on the basis of beliefs about underlying connectedness.
5.5.5 Trembling Hand
It is possible to interpret the idea of a perturbed game in Selten (1975) with 
connectedness as understood in our framework. The claim that a deviating move 
is due to the respective player exhibiting a ‘trembling hand’, and thus making 
a slight mistake by picking an irrational action with small probability, can be 
expressed and explained in our model. The agents of a player are assumed to be 
highly connected and play in line with the initial strategy with almost certainty, 
yet with small probability their underlying connectedness is low and subsequent 
behaviour deviates. In other words, a given game agent might -  despite it be­
ing assumed to be very unlikely -  tremble in implementing the intended initial 
strategy of his player’s reasoning agent. Such trembles can be used as explan­
ations for observed deviations from an opponent’s supposed initial strategy in 
belief revision policies. More precisely, whenever a player who believes in the 
high-connectedness of the game agents of each of his opponents is surprised by 
a move of a game agent which contradicts the initial strategy he believes the 
respective opponent’s reasoning agent to have chosen, he can then separate that
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game agent. Indeed he can only assign low-connectedness to that particular game 
agent, while keeping fixed the high-connectedness of the respective opponent’s 
other game agents. Such isolated behaviour of this given deviating game agent is 
explained as a mistake on the agent’s part.
Note that such a specific trembling hand vindication of deviating behaviour 
corresponds to a particular belief concerning the underlying connectedness of the 
relevant game agent. Intuitively, the trembling hand is a physical metaphor for 
the failure to complete a given task, despite having had appropriate dispositions 
to perform it. In terms of underlying connectedness, it is possible to interpret 
a trembling hand with low empathy connectedness, while at the same time psy­
chological as well as memory connectedness are high. Hence, the deviating game 
agent is now supposed to be lowly connected to the player as a multiple-self: 
even though he has the same preferences and perfect memory, he somehow slips 
and makes a mistake. Note that such belief revision policies are close to the 
ones sufficient for backward induction and far from the supposedly more plaus­
ible ones with regards to the backward induction paradoxes in terms of their 
general intuition. Lexicographically speaking, whenever a surprise move of some 
game agent contradicting the supposed initial strategy of his respective reasoning 
agent is observed, the state in which the deviating agent is lowly connected and 
others are highly connected is deemed infinitely more likely than the state where 
the player’s future agents are also lowly connected to the respective player. The 
key to the construction and comparisons of such belief patterns is our notion of 
initial strategy, which can be contrasted with the same player’s actual strategy, 
and hence belief about initial choice can be juxtaposed with belief about actual 
choice.
As an illustration of the idea of a trembling hand in the context of our frame­
work, consider the dynamic game given in Figure 5.1. Suppose Bob initially 
believes all game agents of Alice to be high-connected and at B 0& 2 that Alice'1 s 
initial strategy is backward inductive one a f. However, at H 0& 2 he then has has 
to accommodate the surprise information that Alice 1 has actually chosen b. Ex­
plaining this deviating behaviour with an exceptional mistake incurred by Alice\ 
in implementing Aliceas plan, Bob sets the connectedness of game agent Alice 1 
to low, yet preserves his belief in the high-connectedness of Alice’s future game 
agent Alice3 . His unique optimal choice is hence given by d.
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5.6 C onclusion
By rendering transparent relevant yet usually neglected processes linked to dy­
namic games we clarify their inherent dynamics. We analyse the sequential 
structure of dynamic games with a three-stage account, which defines player and 
strategy relative to these dynamic stages. A sequential stability assumption un­
derlying the standard extensive form model of dynamic games is made explicit in 
our account. To describe reasoning in dynamic games, a more general epistemic 
model is proposed that is capable of formalising the notion of agent connected­
ness. Such an enriched framework sheds fight on backward induction reasoning. 
Formally, we provide sufficient conditions for backward induction in terms of con­
nectedness, as well as an existence result ensuring that our conditions are indeed 
possible. Conceptually, the essence of backward induction can be explicated, 
since surprise information is explained with low-connectedness of the deviating 
agent. Also, the epistemic independence assumption underlying any foundation 
of backward induction can be shown to be considerably stronger than usually 
assumed. Our framework makes explicit that any underlying connectedness of 
players as multiple-selves has tacitly been assumed to be high.
In a general sense, our frameworks provides adequate foundations for inter­
preting the sequential structure of dynamic games in temporal terms. In partic­
ular, defining a player as a set of agents enables a more realistic interpretation 
of decision-makers in dynamic games. Using the multiple-self model of personal 
identity over time also provides richer descriptions of players, for instance, with 
regards to psychological, empathy and memory connectedness. Hence, our frame­
work is especially relevant for economics and the social sciences, where players 
should be interpreted as persons existing over time.
Finally, the framework proposed here could also be employed to shed light 
on the sequential structure and dynamics of games of imperfect information as 
well as to to clarify corresponding reasoning and solution concepts. It would be 
of particular interest to search for sequential stability requirements for forward 
induction reasoning in terms of agent connectedness. Intuitively, actual choice of 
a game agent should then be believed to be highly relevant to actual choice of 
the respective player’s future game agents.
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5.7 A ppendix: Proofs 
P roof of Theorem  15
Proof. Suppose that U G T* such that U G Ri  n CSBRi  n FBHi.  We show that 
U initially assigns the backward inductive action to each decision node ^  G Xj, 
i.e. i(ti) =  b{. Consider a decision node Xi G X{ of player i. Suppose that X{ is 
an ultimate decision node. Then, by rationality of U, ^ ( x i )  = bi{xi). Suppose 
that X{ is a pre-ultimate decision node. Since U G F B H i, type U believes at Xi 
that every opponent game agent oPXj is high-connected to his respective player 
j  and hence chooses according to j ’s initial strategy at every ultimate decision 
node Xj succeeding X{. As U G C S B R i , he also believes at Xi in j ’s rationality i.e. 
that j ’s initial strategy is rational. Hence, U believes that every high-connected 
opponent game agent oPXj does indeed choose rationally at every Xj succeeding Xj, 
and thus picks the unique backward inductive action bj(xj) there. Therefore, the 
unique optimal action for i at Xi is the backward inductive one and rationality of 
U ensures that (xi) = bi(xi). Now suppose that x* is a pre-pre-ultimate decision 
node. Since ti G F B H i , type tj believes at Xi that every opponent game agent 
oPXj is high-connected to his respective player j  and hence chooses according to j ’s 
initial strategy at every decision node Xj succeeding Xi. Note that every opponent 
decision node Xj succeeding Xi is either pre-ultimate or ultimate. Suppose that 
Xj is ultimate. As ti G CSBR iD FBH i,  type U believes at Xi in j ’s rationality i.e. 
that j  initially chooses rationally, as well as that every high-connected opponent 
game agent oPXj does indeed choose rationally at every ultimate decision node x j , 
and thus picks the unique backward inductive action bj(xj) there. Suppose that 
Xj is pre-ultimate. Since U G FBHi,  type U believes at Xi that at any immediately 
succeeding opponent decision node X j ,  the respective opponent j  believes that his 
opponents’ game agents are high-connected, and thus act in accordance with their 
respective player’s initial strategy, at all succeeding ultimate decision nodes. Also, 
by U G C SB R i, type U believes at Xi that his opponents believe at all succeeding 
nodes in their opponents’ rationality i.e. that their opponents have initially chosen 
rationally. Hence, U believes at Xi that at any immediately succeeding opponent 
decision node X j ,  the respective opponent j  believes that his opponents’ high- 
connected game agents play rationally at every ultimate decision node succeeding 
X j .  Moreover, by t i  G C SB R i, type U also believes at X i  in j ’s rationality, i.e. 
in a rational initial strategy choice of j .  Since U G FBH i, it then follows that
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he believes at Xi that every high-connected game agent o?Xj does indeed choose 
rationally at the respective pre-ultimate decision node Xj. But as U believes at X{ 
that j  believes at Xj that j ’s opponents choose the backward inductive actions at 
all ultimate decision nodes succeeding Xj, in fact ti believes at X{ that aJXj picks 
his unique backward inductive action bj(xj) at xj. Therefore, since U believes 
at X{ that at any succeeding decision node the respective opponent game agent 
chooses the backward inductive action, the unique optimal action for i himself at 
Xi is the backward inductive one and ^ '(x i) = bi(xi) obtains by rationality of tj. 
By induction, it follows that at any Xi £ Xi, type ti believes that his opponent 
game agents choose the unique backward inductive action at any Xj succeeding 
Xi, and hence, being rational, ti initially assigns the unique backward inductive 
choice to each of his decision nodes, i.e. ii(ti) = bi. □
P roof o f Corollary 16
Proof. Consider i £ I  and suppose that ti £ Ti such that ti £ RiC\CSBRiDFBHi. 
It follows from Theorem 15 that $ (x i)  = bi{xi) for all Xi £ Xi. Since Ci(alXi, | 
U) = high, for all Xi £ Xi, each high-connected game agent of player i will indeed 
choose the backward inductive action sf(x i) = bi(xi) at any Xi £ X i, respectively. 
Therefore, i ’s actual backward inductive strategy choice s f  = bi obtains. □
P roof o f Theorem  17
Proof. Consider some player i £ I  and for every opponent j  £ I  \  { j}  and 
node x £ Xi U {rro}, let b*(x) be the strategy that prescribes the unique ac­
tion on the path to x  at every node x' £ X j preceding x, and that prescribes 
the unique backward inductive action at every node x' £ X j  not preceding 
x. Fix type spaces Ti =  {ti} for every player i £ I  such that ii(ti) = bi and 
supp(Pi(ti, x)) = x {t j }) for all x £ (Xi U {xo})- Consider i £ I
and observe that U believes at every point in the game that his opponents initially 
as well as at all succeeding nodes actually choose their backward inductive ac­
tions. Since i has been arbitrarily picked, every player’s type believes throughout 
the game that his opponents initially as well as at all succeeding nodes actu­
ally choose their backward inductive actions. In particular, it thus follows that 
U £ FBHi.  Besides, note that U £ Ri, since ii(U) =  bi, which maximizes condi­
tional expected utility for his conditional beliefs which always assign probability 
1 to his opponents’ future play being in line with backward induction. Since i has
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been arbitrarily picked, U € Ri obtains for all i € I. As every type at every point 
in the game only deems possible opponents’ types that are rational, it follows in 
particular that ti G C S B R i. □
Chapter 6
Preference Change
Sum m ary. This chapter analyses temporal dynamics and gives an account of 
dynamic inconsistency. Two families of approaches to dynamic inconsistency are 
identified: firstly, those that use hyperbolic discounting functions to describe dy­
namically inconsistent decision-makers as myopic, and secondly, those that pos­
tulate multi-selves models that capture different motivations and time horizons 
which can lead a decision-maker to (fail to) control himself in the face of tempta­
tion. In order to achieve a simpler characterisation of dynamic inconsistency, 
we reconsider both hyperbolic discounting and multi-selves models in the more 
general model of connectedness in the multiple-self. A simple specification of this 
model can motivate hyperbolic discounting, and an extended version of it can be 
used to reformulate the multi-selves models, using a less complex structure that 
can be better motivated. Moreover, the latter allows us to distinguish between 
conflicts in connectedness and conflicts in goodness evaluation.
6.1 Introduction
Applications of decision theories usually assume that decision-makers have stable 
preferences. Yet, the preferences of real-world decision-makers often change over 
time: a gourmet might not want to eat at his favourite restaurant any more 
after learning that it hired a new chef, college graduates make career choices they 
would not have made before their education, and adolescents sneer at the music 
they listened to when they were children. Such changes in preferences can have 
diverse reasons, as these examples suggest: they can stem from changes in beliefs, 
for example through acquiring information or learning, or from changes in tastes,
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for example through habituation. As reviewed in Chapter 2 , such changes in 
preference can be modelled by theories of Bayesian conditionalisation as well as 
newer approaches that deal with changes in taste.
Changes in preference can also occur in less laudable circumstances, such as 
when individuals appear to contradict themselves over time: for instance, consider 
someone who plans to eat a salad for dinner as part of a healthy diet only to choose 
steak when ordering and then again trying and failing in adhering to a healthy 
diet later on, or someone joining a gym, stopping to go after a while and then 
renewing the membership at the next opportunity without going more often later 
on, or someone making an attempt to quit smoking, succumbing to the habit 
soon after and then making a new attempt, and so on. These examples suggest 
that decision-makers can have conflicting preferences. To be sure, weighing up 
different desires is part of any decision-making process. It does not seem to be 
inherently irrational to have both a desire to eat a steak and a desire to be healthy. 
Yet, there is still something tragic about the individuals in the above examples, 
in the sense that they oscillate between fulfilling incompatible desires, thus failing 
to achieve long-term goals. It is hard to imagine them as satisfied.
The changes in preferences associated with the above examples do not seem 
to be very well motivated. Indeed, a lot of mitigating details would need to be in 
place to defend a decision-maker as rational who switches preferences constantly, 
for example when first salad is preferred to steak (when planning a healthy diet), 
then steak is preferred to salad (when ordering), and then again salad is preferred 
to steak (the day after). Yet, individuals axe prone to exhibit such patterns of 
preference change from time to time. Indeed, preference change as described 
above has been researched extensively in behavioural economics, where it is often 
described as ‘failure to self-control’ and more generally labelled as ‘dynamic in­
consistency’. This literature has collected compelling evidence for the persistence 
of such phenomena, through experiments as well as empirical studies of con­
sumer behaviour (Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), Loewenstein (1996), Connor 
et al (2002), Loewenstein and Read (2003)).
The empirical evidence raises the question of how dynamic inconsistency 
can be modelled. More precisely, how can dynamic inconsistency be predicted, 
explained, and resolved, i.e. reconciled with standard decision theories? One 
important modelling device consists in hyperbolic discounting functions (Strotz 
(1956), Laibson (1997), Frederick et al (2002), Angeletos et al (2001)). Hyper­
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bolic discounting functions capture extreme short-sightedness of decision-makers 
and can therefore model those types of dynamic inconsistency that are due to 
a strong bias for the present and near future. Another important family of ap­
proaches consists in the so-called ‘multi-selves’ theories (Schelling (1980), Thaler 
and Shefrin (1981), Schelling (1984), Benabou and Pycia (2002), Fudenberg and 
Levine (2006), Read (2006)). In these models, a decision-maker is assumed to 
consist of a far-sighted ‘planner’-self and short-sighted ‘doer’-selves. The interac­
tion between planner and doers is modelled in extensive-form games and dynamic 
inconsistency occurs when the doer-selves retain the upper hand in such interac­
tions. This permits us to model a wide range of types of dynamic inconsistency, 
including cases of lack of self-control in the face of temptation. They also allow us 
to outline how precommitment strategies can resolve dynamic inconsistency (for 
instance, when someone instructs a friend before dinner to order salad in order 
to prevent himself from choosing steak). The multi-selves models are mostly con­
sistent with hyperbolic discounting -  in fact, many accounts of both hyperbolic 
discounting and multi-selves show how the two modes of modelling can be form­
ally equivalent (Fudenberg and Levine (2006), Xue (2008)), and Ainslie (1992, 
2001, 2005) combines aspects of hyperbolic discounting and multi-selves in his 
‘picoeconomics’ approach.
This chapter analyses such behavioural economics’ accounts of dynamic in­
consistency. In a first step, we show in what sense the two types of accounts fullfil 
the modelling goals of predicting, explaining and resolving dynamic inconsistency. 
Simply put, hyperbolic discounting offers predictively accurate models of dynamic 
inconsistency, yet they have explanatory deficiencies, and few resources to resolve 
dynamic inconsistency. Multi-selves models attempt to elucidate the processes 
that lead to dynamic inconsistency and its resolution, yet their structure is often 
complex, and it is unclear how it relates to standard decision-theoretic frame­
works.
To improve on these deficiencies, we introduce multiple-self models of per­
sonal identity over time, and reconsider the approaches of hyperbolic discounting 
and multi-selves in this framework. This discussion provides both a more explicit 
motivation for hyperbolic discounting models, and a simpler structure for the 
multi-selves models in the literature. The multiple-self models of personal iden­
tity over time introduced here thus combine and improve on the virtues of both 
hyperbolic discounting and multi-selves approaches; in particular, their structure
191
CHAPTER 6. PREFERENCE CHANGE
is simpler, and they make transparent the additional assumptions required in 
standard-decision theoretic approaches to model dynamic inconsistency.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 6 . 2  introduces two salient examples 
of dynamic inconsistency, highlighting the problems of present bias and tempta­
tions. Section 6.3 critically scrutinises hyperbolic discounting and ‘multi-selves’ 
approaches in behavioural economics that attempt to predict, explain, and resolve 
dynamically inconsistent behaviour. Section 6.4 presents multiple-self models of 
personal identity and shows how they complement and elucidate existing models. 
Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2 Preference Change and D ynam ic Inconsistency
Changes in preferences can occur in many different circumstances. As mentioned 
in the introduction, they are often well-motivated, for instance when they reflect 
some kind of learning. For example, take an agent who prefers going to the beach 
over staying at home. Suppose she listens to the weather forecast and learns that 
it is likely that it is going to rain tomorrow. The agent might now prefer staying 
at home over going to the beach. Such changes in preference that stem from 
learning can be modelled as cases of Bayesian conditionalisation. In addition to 
models of learning, there is a recent literature (as reviewed in Chapter 2) that 
develops more permissive models that allow one to explain preference change by 
well-motivated taste changes, such as in habituation or when developing refined 
tastes (such as Bradley (2009a), Dietrich and List (2009)).
Some changes in preference cannot be explained and defended as rational 
by underlying processes such as learning and habituation. For instance, take a 
decision-maker who switches back and forth between different preferences over 
time without any good reason to do so. While not all such changes in preferences 
are flatly irrational, many of them cannot be particularly well motivated. In 
the behavioural economics literature, the term ‘dynamic inconsistency’ denotes 
such changes in preferences that leads to behaviour which is hard to defend as 
rational. In the following, we consider two particularly interesting examples of 
dynamic inconsistency.
P resen t Bias. Consider an agent who is presented with two choices. Firstly, 
she is choosing between receiving one apple today and two apples tomor­
row. Secondly, she is choosing between receiving one apple in 999 days and
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receiving two apples in 1,000 days. For simplicity, suppose that the agent 
has to make a choice, i.e. declaring her indifference is not an option. Then, 
four possible combinations of choices are possible: two ‘symmetric’ ones 
where she chooses either one apple or two apples in both of the choices, 
and two ‘asymmetric’ ones where she chooses differently in the two choices. 
Real-world agents often choose ‘asymmetrically’ by choosing to receive one 
apple today in the first choice and two apples in 1 , 0 0 0  days in the second 
choice.
Now consider the implications of the four possible choices. It is easy to see that 
the two symmetric choices axe compatible with recommendations from standard 
decision theories, as either one of those choices can be taken as reflecting prefer­
ences that are representable by a utility function. However, the two asymmetric 
choices are troubling. Consider the choice pattern of receiving one apple today 
in the first choice and two apples in 1,000 days in the second choice. Since the 
agent has firstly chosen to receive one apple today over two apples tomorrow, 
after 999 days she will prefer to receive an apple on that day, rather than waiting 
for receiving two apples on day 1 ,000. Yet, this goes against her earlier choice of 
receiving two apples in 1,000 days rather than one in 999 days. Moreover, ‘giving 
up’ on her preference for receiving one apple on day 999 at this point for the sake 
of avoiding a contradiction does not solve the problem, as it implies this: on day 
999, she will now have a preference for receiving two apples tomorrow rather than 
one today, which goes against her earlier choice. (This problem holds vice versa 
for the other ‘asymmetric’ choice.) It seems that by choosing ‘asymmetrically’ 
in the above set-up, decision-makers will have inconsistent preferences over time, 
due to the fact that after waiting 999 days, the second choice becomes equival­
ent with the first one. 1 Choosing differently when the same options axe at stake 
implies dynamically inconsistent preferences.
Dynamic inconsistency is revealed in the ‘asymmetric’ choices, which leave 
the decision-maker with options that she does not prefer at either one of the later 
days. It seems that an obvious normative recommendation in this type of choice 
is to demand the decision-maker to settle for one of the ‘symmetric’ choices. From 
a descriptive point of view, a prominent explanation for the type of choice cited as
lrThat is, we assume here that the preferences that lead to the initial choices remain fixed, 
such that choosing one apple today over two apples tomorrow implies that on a different day, 
there will be a preference for choosing one apple on that day. Then, the two choices become 
equivalent after 999 days and the inherent inconsistency in the initial preferences is exposed.
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the popular one in the above example is that it is due to a bias for the present, or 
near future. This kind of ‘myopia’ of agents is captured in hyperbolic discounting 
functions, indeed, the above example is frequently employed in the hyperbolic 
discounting literature, and has become one of the standard examples to illustrate 
its mechanism (such as in Laibson (1997)). Dynamic inconsistency of the sort 
described in the above example will be henceforth called ‘present bias’, as it seem 
to primarily arise out of an initial bias for the present, or the near future.
The above case of dynamic inconsistency and its explanation are reason­
ably straightforward. Yet, there are also cases in which the explanation of why 
decision-makers exhibit dynamically inconsistent preferences is more involved, 
such as in the following one.
T em pta tion . Consider an agent who is about to finish his day’s work in the 
office, and who can choose between going home directly and going to the 
pub. Once in the pub, he can choose whether to have one drink and go 
home or to stay longer and get drunk, waking up with a hangover the next 
day. Suppose that the agent, while in the office, finds that the best option 
would be to (a) have one drink and go home, the second best option to 
(b) go home directly, and the third best option to (c) get drunk. Further 
suppose that the agent finds it highly likely that once in the pub, he will be 
unable to go home after one drink and rather stay and get drunk. Finally, 
suppose that the agent also finds it likely that on the next day, he will assess 
the three possible options in the same way he assesses them when still in 
the office. Despite all this, anecdotal evidence suggests that in such choices, 
real-world agents often end up choosing what is ultimately the third best 
option.
Consider the three possible courses of action in the example. The preferences 
a over 6 , and b over c can be thought of as the decision-maker’s ‘overall’ evaluation, 
as both before and after all consequences have materialised, that is his evaluation. 
Yet, when attempting to pursue the best option by going into the pub, it so 
happens that his preferences change momentarily and he prefers c over all other 
outcomes. This change in preference, however, is reversed again to the overall 
evaluation by the time the hangover starts. It is hard to defend going to the 
pub in the pursuit of a in this type of scenario, as the disastrous effects of this 
choice were well established beforehand. However, this does not prevent real- 
world agents from making choices of this type. Dynamic inconsistency of this
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sort will be called a case of ‘temptation’ in the remainder of the paper, as it 
arises out of temptation for an option that is associated with the wrong kind of 
preference change.
Theoretical approaches in behavioural economics have attempted to model 
these more complex cases of dynamic inconsistency by envisaging a decision­
maker as composed of different ‘selves’ which compete for influence on the behar 
viour. Early treatments of such approaches are in Strotz (1956), Peleg and Yaari 
(1973), Schelling (1980), and Schelling (1984). In those models, different selves 
embody the diverging evaluations of the decision-maker that lead to dynamically 
inconsistent preferences: a planner-self assesses the prospect, only to be under­
mined by a doer-self. Such ‘interactions’ between selves that axe often modelled 
as dynamic games in the recent literature, which permit us to discuss how both 
dynamic inconsistency and successful self-control can arise.
The two cases of dynamic inconsistency discussed here, ‘present bias’ and the 
‘temptation’, share a common structure: they depict changes in preferences that 
lead to contradictions in behaviour which cannot be easily defended as rational. 
While different in their degree of complexity, and different in the kinds of ex­
planations that would elucidate them, they pose the problem of how to explain 
such changes in preference. Many other examples of dynamic inconsistency are 
variants of those two cases. Consider again the cases of dynamic inconsistency 
that were briefly mentioned in the introduction, such as unhealthy eating, unsuc­
cessful fitness regime, reluctant addiction, or cases of procrastination. It seems 
that in most of those cases, both temptation and a bias for the present could play 
a role in explaining dynamically inconsistent behaviour. Indeed, the theories re­
viewed in the next section have advocated different, yet ultimately compatible, 
approaches to do so.
Before reviewing those theories, a few terminological remarks are in order. 
Dynamic inconsistency as discussed in the above refers to ill-motivated changes 
in preference that lead to irrational behaviour. Note that in the literature that 
exclusively deals with a normative assessment of dynamic inconsistency, it is 
sometimes understood as a property of choice, such as in Hammond (1976). The 
discussions in this literature focus on similar examples as described above. In­
deed, the temptation case is a variant of the popular case of ‘Ulysses and the 
Sirens’, the potential addict in Hammond (1976), as well as the piano player 
in Bratman (1996). Furthermore, note that in the behavioural economics lit­
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erature, ill-motivated preference change is sometimes labelled more generally as 
‘preference reversal’ which includes ill-motivated preference change due to fram­
ing effects, risk preferences, and rules-of-thumb. 2  We will proceed using the 
term dynamic inconsistency as it specifically refers to the temporal aspect of the 
changes in preferences. We now turn to review theories that attempt to model 
dynamically inconsistent decision-makers.
6.3 Theories o f D ynam ic Inconsistency
This section discusses approaches to modelling dynamic inconsistency that have 
been put forward in behavioural economics. Two families of approaches, hyper­
bolic discounting and ‘multi-selves’ models, are discussed. A number of papers 
have demonstrated that the hyperbolic discounting and multi-selves approaches 
axe compatible, such as Xue (2008). Indeed, Fudenberg and Levine (2006, 1469) 
also maintain that their multi-selves model is consistent with quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting (Laibson, 1997). In reviewing these two families of compatible ap­
proaches, we will show that hyperbolic discounting theories have some explanat­
ory deficiencies, and that the ‘multi-selves’ approaches have a complex structure 
that is difficult to motivate. This motivates the development of simpler models 
of dynamic inconsistency, by employing multiple-self models of personal identity 
over time in the next section.
6.3.1 H yperbolic D iscounting
In hyperbolic discounting theories of dynamic inconsistency, decision-makers are 
modelled as short-sighted, discounting much more heavily in the short-run than 
in the long-run. Roughly speaking, any hyperbolic discounting function charac­
terises three time horizons of a decision-maker: (i) the present and immediate, 
which is given full weight, (ii) the horizon, in which discounting factors are sharply 
declining between different periods, and (iii) the far future, in which discounting 
factors are very similar between different periods.
2In a strict sense, the ‘dynamic’ aspect of the inconsistency in the present bias case is by and 
large implicit. However, note how the inconsistency in this case reveals as the result of time’s 
passage: only on day 999 it becomes apparent that there is an inconsistency. This is different 
from other cases of preference reversals, such as those observed in the example due to Allais 
(1953). While it is possible to analyse Allais-type cases as sequential decisions (Steele, 2007), it 
cannot be said in those cases that the preference reversal is closely connected to the temporal 
dimension.
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As a simple example, take discounting for delay, given by D{t) = j ,  where t 
equals the length of delay (Ainslie, 1975, 1992). In this function, the present and 
immediate are periods 0 and 1, which are given full weight, i.e. D{0) =  1 and 
D( 1) =  1. In the horizon, which starts after period 1, the discounting factor is 
sharply declining (compare, for instance D(0) = 1, to D (2) =  .5 and D (3) — |) .  
In the far future, the discounting factors are similar between the different periods 
(such as Z)(999) «  .001 and D (1,000) — .001). As reviewed in Chapter 4, different 
hyperbolic discounting functions have been proposed that yield slightly different 
numerical values for the three time horizons.
Capturing the myopia of decision-makers is the key property of hyperbolic 
discounting in the context of discussing dynamic inconsistency. It is immediately 
obvious that, for instance, discounting for delay captures present bias. As seen 
above, the difference in the discounting factors between periods 1  and 2  in the 
near present is much larger than the difference between periods 999 and 1000, 
which is negligible. Applying those discounting factors to the example of present 
bias given earlier, we see how the difference of one period has a much larger impact 
in the short run than in the long run, leading to the preference of an immediate 
apple over two apples in the horizon, and preferring two apples over one apple 
in the far future. Once the far future becomes the present, the dynamic incon­
sistency is revealed. Other functions, such as generalised hyperbolic discounting 
and quasi-hyperbolic discounting give similar (and in many contexts slightly more 
accurate) results. The diversity of the hyperbolic discounting proposals is due 
to their quintessentially descriptive nature: their primary role is to capture the 
myopia or short-sightedness of agents in many different circumstances, in order 
to include more precise characterisations of attitudes to intertemporal prospects 
in consumer models. As such, hyperbolic discounting theories lend themselves to 
modelling dynamic inconsistency. As an example for applications for such models, 
consider consumer behaviour in the fitness and dieting industry where dynamic 
inconsistency as suggested by the ear her examples is persistent and widespread. 
This suggests that such straightforward examples of present bias can be modelled 
adequately by hyperbolic discounting functions.
Can hyperbolic discounting functions also model the more complex cases of 
temptation? Applying hyperbolic discounting to the pub example suggests that 
correct predictions can be made in such cases: a short-sighted decision-maker 
will give full weight to the immediate benefits of going to the pub and heavily
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discount next day’s after effects, while at the same time resolving to not repeat 
such behaviour in the next week, where both costs and benefits of the pub de­
cision are weighted with similar discounting factors. Other cases of temptation 
can be captured in a similar way, with the decision-maker giving full weight to 
immediately enjoying a steak or cigarette while at the same time resolving to 
eat healthier or quit smoking in the far future, where costs and benefits of the 
decision are weighted with more or less similar discounting factors.
In what sense, then, axe hyperbolic discounting theories good and successful 
models of dynamic inconsistency? In a general sense, hyperbolic discounting 
is parsimonious, predictively accurate and can be adopted in a wide variety of 
circumstances. Especially the theories of hyperbolic discounting for delay and 
quasi-hyperbolic discounting offer valuable extensions for models in consumer 
theory. Hence, in terms of prediction, hyperbolic discounting models of dynamic 
inconsistency have been successful.
In terms of explanation, hyperbolic discounting reduces dynamic inconsist­
ency to a problem of attitudes to time. This is problematic for a number of 
reasons: first of all, as suggested in Chapter 4, time discounting is a complicated 
and not well-founded concept: often enough, the conceptual motivation for time 
discounting is unclear or ambiguous, i.e. it is unclear what exactly time discount­
ing is supposed to capture. More specifically, while hyperbolic discounting can 
predict dynamic inconsistency, it does not offer much explanation in terms of how 
such dynamic inconsistency arises, i.e. how it is produced, what its mechanisms 
are, and what other factors it is influenced by.
This suggests that hyperbolic discounting approaches are not capable of ex­
plaining all aspects of more complex cases of dynamic inconsistency, such as 
temptation. Consider again the pub example: while dynamic inconsistency in 
this case can be predicted by hyperbolic discounting, it does not seem to fully 
capture the underlying mechanisms that lead to it. First of all, as demonstrated 
in Chapter 4, discounting needs to be underpinned by a substantial conceptual 
motivation to be well-founded, and to offer a satisfactory explanation in this con­
text. Secondly, rather than because of short-sightedness that could be captured 
by hyperbolic discounting, the decision-maker could be motivated to go to the 
pub by various momentary desires, such as an urgent desire to drink, to converse 
with his friends, or to watch a rugby match. This line of critique is reinforced by 
Read (2006) who maintains that there are other sources of conflict than attitudes
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to time.
Moreover, hyperbolic discounting is also ill-equipped to explain why agents 
differ in their dynamic inconsistency over different domains. Consider the case 
of a PhD student who drinks heavily, yet wants to quit drinking at the same 
time. The occupation of PhD student suggests that the decision-maker is capable 
of undertaking long-term projects, foregoing earnings in the short-run to have 
a more satisfying career in the long-run. At the same time, the PhD student 
cannot bring himself to quit drinking. While it is possible to postulate different 
discounting functions for different domains -  an exponential one for his career 
and a hyperbolic one for drinking -  it remains a limitation of the hyperbolic 
discounting model to not offer more specific resources to elucidate such differences 
in the dynamics of an agent’s diverging interests.
Likewise, in terms of resolution of dynamic inconsistency, hyperbolic discount­
ing is limited. As discussed in the above example, hyperbolic discounting can be 
used to predict dynamic inconsistency. However, such drastic changes in pref­
erence need to be supplied with a motivation in order to discuss how to resolve 
them. On this question, hyperbolic discounting theories do not lend themselves 
to give explanations as to why seemingly irrational behaviour as described above 
can be sufficiently well motivated. It is possible to view hyperbolic discounting 
as the expression of a taste for the immediate, yet, the above examples show 
how such a taste potentially undermines all other tastes an agent has. Offering 
little resources for understanding and explaining dynamic inconsistency, hyper­
bolic discounting is thus also not capable of formulating how agents might resolve 
dynamic inconsistency.
6.3.2 ‘M ulti-Selves’ Approaches
Complementing hyperbolic discounting theories, is a diverse literature which uses 
what Elster (1986) describes as the metaphor or idea of ‘Faustian Selves’ -  the 
idea that there are two opposing groups of selves that make up the decision­
maker, to explain and resolve dynamic inconsistency (as introduced in Chapter 
2). The essence of those approaches is that they understand the decision-maker 
as populated by two (groups of) selves desiring different, mutually-exclusive out­
comes and ‘battling’ for control over behaviour. To give an example, (Schelling, 
1980, 58) says that
‘people behave sometimes as if they had two selves, one who wants
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clean lungs and a long life and another who adores tobacco, or one who 
wants a lean body and another who wants dessert, or one who wants 
to improve himself by reading Adam Smith’s theory of self-command 
and another who would rather watch an old movie on television.’
That is to say, such ‘multi-selves’ approaches seek to elucidate the inner con­
flicts of decision-makers that lead to dynamic inconsistency by identifying differ­
ent (groups of) interests and motivations within them. Such approaches often 
provide different labels for the diverging interests in a decision-maker, including 
those of ‘dual selves’, ‘hot and cold’, ‘planner-doer’, ‘strong and weak’, ‘far-sighted 
and short-sighted’ and so on. The target phenomena of those approaches are first 
and foremost similar to those in the case of temptation. Indeed, this literature 
often refers to dynamic inconsistency as ‘the problem of self-control’.
In the following, we review different specific proposals of ‘multi-selves’ ac­
counts, starting with the ‘picoeconomics’ approach (Ainslie, 1975, 1992, 2 0 0 1 ) 
that has foreshadowed the more formal models. The common starting point in 
those more formal models is that temptation and lack of self-control is modelled 
as a game between one ‘planner’-self and many ‘doer’-selves. Concerning such 
more formal models, we focus on the approach by Thaler and Shefrin (1981) 
followed by the approach of Fudenberg and Levine (2006).
Picoeconomics
Ainslie’s ‘picoeconomics’ (Ainslie, 1992, 2 0 0 1 ) describes intrapersonal bargaining 
processes with explicit reference to hyperbolic discounting. 3 His theory of ‘pi­
coeconomics’ introduces the idea of micro-micro economics, i.e. the economics 
within one decision-maker. It can be understood as an investigation into the 
psychological mechanism that can underlie and produce hyperbolic discounting, 
supplementing the latter with a multi-self interpretation.
Ainslie (2005, 637) explicitly considers hyperbolic discounting (for delay) as 
a starting point for his theory:
Hyperbolic discounting offers utility theory a rationale for why people 
should so frequently have impulses that contradict their own recog­
nized best interests. These highly bowed curves shift the main prob­
3Indeed, Ainslie was one of the proponents of the delay theory of hyperbolic discounting which 
has been already used as a simple example of hyperbolic discounting as discussed in Chapter 4 
and in Section 6.3.1 of this chapter.
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lem. We axe no longer at a loss to explain choices that are short­
sighted and temporary; now we have to account for how people learn 
the self-control that lets them adapt to a competitive world. How 
does an internal marketplace that disproportionately values immedi­
ate rewards grow into what can be mistaken for the long-range reward- 
maximizer of conventional utility theory?
The earlier analysis of hyperbolic discounting suggests that this statement is 
too quick: it is not clear in what sense hyperbolic discounting offers a rationale 
and an explanation for short-sightedness; all it offers is a modelling tool in which 
short-sighted behaviour can be predicted. To be sure, it is possible to supple­
ment hyperbolic discounting with the right kind of interpretation, which gives a 
substantive meaning to the phenomenon of short-sightedness in agents (we will 
make a proposal for this in the next section). Hence, it seems that an account 
of self-control in the sense that Ainslie is aiming at will also have to include an 
explication of the processes that lead to present biases and temptation, before of­
fering possible resolutions to those problems. Ainslie recognises this (implicitly), 
and develops a multi-selves account that explains hyperbolic discounting, as well 
as how it can be overcome:
The orderly internal marketplace pictured by conventional utility the­
ory becomes a bazaar of partially incompatible factions, where, in 
order to prevail, an option has not only to promise more than its 
competitors, but to act strategically to keep the competitors from 
later undermining it. The behaviors that are shaped by the compet­
ing rewards must deal not only with obstacles to getting their reward 
if chosen, but with the danger of being unchosen in favor of immin­
ent alternatives. An agent [... ] will be a succession of estimators 
whose conclusions differ; as time elapses these estimators shift their 
relationship with one another from cooperation on a common goal to 
competition for mutually exclusive goals. (Ainslie, 2005, 642)
That is, in Ainslie’s view, a decision-maker becomes a collection of viewpoints 
that ‘compete’ for determining behaviour. This appears to support the intuition 
behind modelling the interaction between selves as dynamic games, which will be 
discussed in the next section. Furthermore, Ainslie maintains that the pattern
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of the competition often results in behaviour that can be captured by hyperbolic 
discounting functions.
Hyperbolic discount curves create a relationship of partial coopera­
tion among your successive motivational states. Their individual in­
terests in short range rewards, conflicting with their common interest 
in longer range rewards, create incentives much like those in the much 
studied bargaining game, repeated prisonerSs dilemma. Choice of the 
better long range alternative at each point represents ‘cooperation,’ 
but this will look better than impulsive ‘defection’ only as long as you 
see it as necessary and sufficient to maintain your expectation that 
future selves will go on cooperating. (Ainslie, 2005, 642)
The picoeconomics, i.e. the bargaining processes between different motiva­
tional states, can hence be taken as elucidating how exactly individuals fail to 
control themselves and how they do so successfully. Bargaining processes and re­
peated games that Ainslie alludes to are not explicitly modelled by him. Rather, 
Ainslie (2 0 0 1 ) provides different processes by which individuals can constrain 
themselves, including commitment strategies such as
•  extrapsychic commitment, such as physically reducing future choice options 
(Ainslie, 2001, 74ff.),
• manipulation of attention, such as choosing to be ignorant (Ainslie, 2001, 
76f.),
• preparation of emotion, such as cultivating the forestalling of affects (Ainslie, 
2001, 77f.), and
• personal rules, such as making a resolution, and using willpower (Ainslie, 
2001, 78ff.).
After outlining how such strategies can be successful in avoiding dynamic 
inconsistency (Ainslie, 2 0 0 1 , Chapter 6 ), he also investigates how such strategies 
can backfire, as rules can
• overshadow goods-in-themselves (Ainslie, 2 0 0 1 , 147f.),
• magnify lapses (Ainslie, 2 0 0 1 , 148f.),
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•  lead to misperception (Ainslie, 2 0 0 1 , 149ff.),
• lead to compulsive behaviour, (Ainslie, 2 0 0 1 , 155f.), and
• lead to an efficient will that can undermine appetite (Ainslie, 2001, 161ff.).
Along similar lines, though even less formally than Ainslie, Elster (2000) also 
considers strategies that are available to individuals to constrain their short-term 
action in order to achieve long-term goals.
In a general sense, Ainslie’s theory describes possible resolutions of dynamic 
inconsistency and their respective problems from a psychological point of view. 
This suggests that perceiving of individuals as multiple selves can deepen our 
understanding of conflicts of motivations, especially in intertemporal settings.
We will now consider two models of the ‘multi-selves’ approach that aim to 
capture the processes described by Ainslie in a more formal way.
Dual Selves I: Competing Preferences
Thaler and Shefrin (1981, 394) model a decision-maker ‘as having two sets of 
preferences that are in conflict at a single time’. One set of preferences is un­
derstood as the ‘doer’ and the other as the ‘planner’. The planner is concerned 
with lifetime utility and the doer ‘exists’ only for one period and is completely 
myopic (this, in fact, implies a doer-self for each period in time). Furthermore, 
the doer is supposed to have direct control over the decision that is taken at the 
period at which he is active. At the same time, the planner has the possibility 
to influence the doer in certain ways. In this framework, present bias and lack of 
self-control in cases of temptation can be explained by an unconstrained doer-self 
maximising her utility in the given period. Introducing different selves which 
carry competing preferences hence formalises the above idea of conflicting mo­
tivations and explains dynamic inconsistency by giving up the idea of synchronic 
consistency.
The main objective of Thaler and Shefrin (1981) is to discuss in what way 
self-control can be achieved in the face of temptation, assuming the above setup. 
They introduce the idea of ‘psychic technology’ that the planner-self could use in 
order to constrain doer-selves and hence maximise lifetime utility. Two techniques 
axe introduced:
‘(1) The doer can be given discretion in which case either his prefer­
ences must be modified or his incentives must be altered, or (2 ) the
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doer’s set of choices may instead be limited by imposing rules that 
change the constraints the doer faces.’ (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981,
395)
Concerning (1), the planner can exercise discretion by introducing self-binding 
mechanisms or plans (such as dieting programmes) or explicitly altering incentives 
(such as an alcoholic taking Antabuse which makes a person ill when drinking 
alcohol, or an academic agreeing to give a paper thus providing a proximate 
incentive to write it) (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981, 396f.). Such monitoring and 
persuasion is costly, and hence the planner can also (2 ) adopt rules that change 
the doer’s constraints (such as spendthrifts imposing a ban on borrowing, dieters 
who never go to lavish dinner parties and gamblers who avoid Las Vegas) (Thaler 
and Shefrin, 1981, 397f.). Formally, such techniques are captured by a ‘preference 
modification parameter’ which changes the utility function of the doer such that 
they (axe more likely to) choose according to the planner’s utility maximisation. 
The lower the doer’s consumption as a result of such modification is, the more 
modification according to one of the above resources is required.
Hence, in Thaler and Shefrin (1981), the synchronic consistency of the decision­
maker is given up, allowing one to characterise present bias by the doer-self choos­
ing the one-apple option and the planner-self endorsing the two-apples choices 
(and failing to influence the doer-self to comply with him). In the same vein, 
the temptation case can be elucidated, with the planner-self endorsing the overall 
assessment of the goodness of the three options and the doer-self undermining 
the assessment.
More recent models, such as Benabou and Pycia (2 0 0 2 ), Fudenberg and Levine 
(2006), and Read (2006) build on this basic framework of two types of selves, 
modelling the processes by which decision-makers can exercise self-control in a 
much more detailed way. In particular, the modification techniques mentioned 
by Thaler and Shefrin (1981) are explicitly modelled as dynamic games between 
short-sighted and far-sighted selves in Benabou and Pycia (2002) and Fudenberg 
and Levine (2006).
Dual Selves II: Competing Time Horizons
Fudenberg and Levine (2006) model the interaction between a planner-self and 
doer-selves as a dynamic game. In their model, both types of selves have the same 
preferences, and only differ with regards to how they value the future. That is, in
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contrast to Thaler and Shefrin (1981), their model retains synchronic consistency 
of the decision-maker and conceives of the diverging interests as one that is due 
to different time horizons of different selves.
Indeed, Fudenberg and Levine (2006, 1449) propose that ‘many sorts of de­
cision problems should be viewed as a game between a sequence of short-run 
selves and a long-run patient self.’ The interaction between selves is modelled as 
a stage game. In the first stage, the long-run self chooses, at a cost for both the 
long-run self and the short-run self, an action that changes the utility function of 
the short-run self (similar to exercising discretion in Thaler and Shefrin (1981)). 
In the second stage, the short-run self, which is assumed to be completely myopic, 
makes a decision. This is repeated for each interaction between the long-run self 
and any short-term self. In this characterisation of the interaction between selves, 
the short-run self in each period has overlapping interests with the long-run self, 
as both share the same preferences over outcomes. However, the long-run self’s 
utility is also determined by the outcomes of the stage-games with other short- 
run selves and will take an action in each of the first stages of the stage-games 
so as to maximise utility over all those interactions.
Consider again the two examples of present bias and temptation given earlier. 
Fudenberg and Levine (2006) retain synchronic consistency by postulating the 
same momentary preferences for both types of selves, yet endow the planner and 
doer with different time horizons. While this is a significant difference in model­
ling, the two examples are explained in very much the same way as with Thaler 
and Shefrin (1981). This suggests that both examples of dynamic inconsistency 
can be modelled, as well as explained, by those theories. Both types of mod­
els can capture different motivations than pure short-sightedness, by endowing 
different selves with competing evaluations or competing time horizons. For in­
stance, concerning the temptation case, the models can capture the conflict in the 
decision-maker by conceiving of a doer-self that values getting drunk or watch­
ing rugby much more than avoiding the hangover, and a planner-self that values 
an avoided hangover. Furthermore, as suggested above, both theories render it 
possible to describe possible resolutions of dynamic inconsistency, by allowing 
the planner-self to adopt strategies to influence or constrain the doer-self. For 
instance, in the pub case, we can now conceive of the planner-self adopting such 
actions as to go out of the office with no money so as to not allow the doer-self to 
go into a pub. If such strategies of influencing (via constraints, incentives or pre­
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commitment) axe successful, dynamic inconsistency can be avoided. The much 
richer framework of the dual-self theories hence delivers additional insights into 
complex cases of dynamic inconsistency when compared to hyperbolic discounting 
theories.
Problems
We now turn to some problems that are implied by the above multi-selves frame­
works. The above analysis suggests that the multi-selves models capture the idea 
advanced in Schelling (1980, 1984) that dynamic inconsistency can be explained 
by considering the interaction of selves. However, the way those models approach 
the task of modelling multi-selves or dual selves raises some problems.
Firstly, it can be asked what the above models add to the metaphor of the 
multiple-self. Loewenstein (1996, 288) maintains that we ‘do not believe that 
there are little selves in people with independent motives, cognitive systems, and 
so on’. This, in turn, leads to the question of what exactly they add beyond the 
multiple-self metaphor. -  We will show that by employing multiple-self models 
of personal identity over time, such concerns can be alleviated, as the latter can 
be motivated by substantial criteria of personal identity over time, as reviewed 
in Chapter 3.
Secondly, dual-self models claim to model the ‘interaction’ between selves. It 
is not immediately obvious what the term ‘interaction’ refers to here. Certainly, 
an individual can deliberate about courses of action from different perspectives, 
weighing the pros and cons according to the respective points of view. Yet, it is 
hard to see in what sense this amounts to an interaction between selves. A more 
convincing reading of the notion of interaction between selves is the idea that 
there are different points in time at which the different motivations can become 
actual. For instance, an individual that is planning to adhere to a more healthy 
diet can be depicted as having a planner-self that forms, endorses, and seeks 
to enforce actions that cohere with it. Moreover, the daily challenges of eating 
healthy can be depicted as temptations faced by the doers-selves that correspond 
to that point in time.
Thirdly, the approaches that use dynamic games to model interaction between 
selves are complex. As discussed in detail in Chapter 5, dynamic games bring with 
them an array of formal structure that needs to be interpreted. Even without 
endorsing any particular approach to game theory, all formal elements of the
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extensive form need to be interpreted as depicting a game between opposing 
selves. Furthermore, when analysing such a dynamic game between selves from 
an epistemic perspective, the hypothetical reasoning of opponent-selves also needs 
to be captured by devices such as epistemic models, characterising beliefs and 
their revision, to finally motivate strategies in those games. Yet, it seems that 
in order to proceed in such a fashion, we would need to presume a higher degree 
of faction within a decision-maker to motivate the game-theoretic concepts (such 
as backward induction reasoning) than the degree of faction that we would like 
to explain. Yet, all this is needed if we axe to draw on dynamic games as a 
modelling device. Maybe the conclusion to draw here is that we should not 
interpret the approach of modelling the interaction between selves as dynamic 
games too literally, adopting an cas-if’ interpretation of such models. However, 
while this will weaken the premise of endorsing extensive-form games between 
dual selves, it also weakens the extent to which such dual-self models can explain 
and resolve dynamic inconsistency. One of the very aims of the multi-selves 
approach was to explain (lack of) self-control connects, and the dynamic game 
models were supposed to provide a structure for this -  one which is difficult to 
motivate in an explicit way.
Fourthly, due to their complexities, the dual-self models do not lend them­
selves to convenient and direct comparisons to normative decision theories. That 
is, the models do not reveal how much the different cases of dynamic inconsist­
ency imply a departure from normative decision theory, which would give us a 
better understanding of the kinds of irrationality such cases bring with them.
More generally, the explanatory deficiencies of hyperbolic discounting theor­
ies and the complexities in the structure of the existing multi-selves approaches 
motivate the introduction of multiple-self models of personal identity over time 
to explain dynamic inconsistency in the next section.
6.4 D ynam ic Inconsistency in M u ltip le-Self M odels o f  
Personal Identity  over T im e
In this section, we analyse problems of dynamic inconsistency with multiple- 
self models of personal identity over time. In particular, we introduce a simple 
multiple-self model which is consistent with hyperbolic discounting and an ex­
tended multiple-self model which is consistent with hyperbolic discounting and
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in the spirit of the ‘multi-self’ models introduced in the preceding sections.
The main advantage of the multiple-self models of personal identity over time 
lies in the fact that their structure is simple, and that it is motivated by capturing 
of intertemporality for the deliberations of the decision-maker. This makes trans­
parent what kind of assumptions in standard decision-theoretic representations 
need relaxation in order to capture dynamic inconsistency.
6.4.1 Present Bias in a Sim ple M ultip le-Self M odel
Recall the simple multiple-self model as introduced in Chapter 2, which postulates 
a set of temporal selves and characterises their degree of connectedness. Further­
more, as shown in Chapter 4, the model of a decision-maker as a collection of 
temporal selves can be used to motivate time discounting. Indeed, comparisons 
between the respective connectedness of temporal selves can be used to obtain 
values for time discounting functions. That is to say, time discounting can be 
motivated by the fact that the decision-maker considers changes in her future 
selves to influence her current evaluations.
To give a simple example, if all selves are different so that all temporal selves 
between each subsequent time points have a similar difference, a constant time 
discounting factor which gives the familiar exponential discounting function can 
be motivated. For this, one has to accept the assumption that under one of 
the connectedness interpretations, there is a constant degree according to which 
temporal selves change over time, i.e. S 2 differs from S3 by the same degree as 
S 3  from S4 , which gives the same degree of connectedness 0 2 ,3  =  0 3 ,4  =  ct-\,t 
and the connectedness between non-subsequent selves is obtained by combining 
the connectedness between all subsequent selves between them. Under these as­
sumptions, a connectedness function can be constructed that reflects a uniformly 
behaved degree of connectedness. This type of exponential discounting due to 
connectedness was discussed in more detail detail in Sections 4.6.2.
As pointed out in Chapter 4, connectedness need not behave in such a uniform 
way. Diminishing psychological or empathy connectedness can behave in many 
different ways. In hyperbolic discounting, connectedness between subsequent 
selves in the near future diminishes faster than between those in the far future. 
More specifically, in order to endorse weightings given by hyperbolic discounting 
functions, connectedness between nearer selves needs to be perceived as relat­
ively lower. Such an interpretation of hyperbolic discounting as reflecting one
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of the two types of connectedness is an improvement over standard-theories in 
the explanation of dynamic inconsistency. More formally, and in the termino­
logy developed in Chapter 4, connectedness needs to motivate a time distance 
representation that coheres with a concave correspondence between time and 
clock-time. Indeed, rather than an ad hoc appeal to the fact that agents discount 
the future hyperbolically, the connectedness interpretations offer more detailed 
accounts as to why they might do so, namely because of diminishing psychological 
or empathy connectedness between their future selves.
Consider the example of present bias. In the psychological connectedness in­
terpretation, the steeper discounting in the near future is due to a large perceived 
degree of taste change in the near future. It is intuitively plausible that an agent 
will know a lot more about her circumstances in the next few days and can easily 
depict many changes in tastes in this period of time, whereas her belief in the 
taste change in the far future will be much less differentiated. Hence, it could 
be the case that the agent does not discount the present at all (due to co,o =  1 ), 
yet the near future quite substantively (for instance, due to co,i =  .8 ). This 
can lead to drastically devaluing an additional apple at t\ (for instance because 
diet plans, activities, health, mood, etc. suggest many taste changes till then). 
However, the degree of taste change between two periods in the far future can be 
much less. For instance, an individual could foresee many taste changes in the 
far future, when compared to her tastes today. Accordingly, for the 999-th period 
she could adopt a discounting factor determined by 0 0 ,9 9 9  =  .1. Now suppose the 
agent thinks about the likely taste changes on an even later date, yet she cannot 
perceive of a great difference between the two selves, so she might ascribe the 
same discounting factor to the the 1 ,000-th period, due to co,iooo =  -1- Then, the 
additional apple in the far future is not so much devalued as the degree of taste 
change associated with the two selves in the far future is very similar. Hence, the 
choice of an apple today over two apples tomorrow, combined with the choice of 
two apples in 1,000 days over one apple in 999 days can now be modelled. To 
continue with the example, on day 999, the agent evaluates her connectedness to 
her self at 1 , 0 0 0  and now finds changes in taste as likely as between to and ti, 
hence ascribing co,iooo =  -8 . As per the analysis given earlier, employing such 
discounting factors reveals dynamic inconsistency.
The example was analysed with psychological connectedness, but it is also pos­
sible to employ empathy connectedness, which offers broader possibilities for the
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conceptual motivation of hyperbolic discounting. This suggests that the multiple- 
self model over time can motivate hyperbolic discounting, and its application in 
cases of dynamic inconsistency.
6.4.2 A  D ual M ultiple-Self M odel
The model of temporal selves as introduced previously is limited in the sense 
that all conflict is, as in the hyperbolic discounting theories, reduced to a purely 
temporal one. However, there are also cases of dynamic inconsistency, such as 
the temptation cases, in which two points of view in a person axe conflicting at a 
time, where one decision-maker has conflicting evaluations.
To model such cases, we introduce two (or more) ‘rows’ of temporal selves, 
which reflect the fact that there can be two competing points of view at a time 
(which are then each associated with a collection of temporal selves). That is, 
a decision-maker is modelled in a dual-self model, as introduced in Section 2.3.3 
in Chapter 2. For simplicity, we will also refer to such a model as a ‘two-row’ 
model.
Firstly, there are two personalities, the planner and the doer, named P  and 
D. Secondly, the two personalities have temporal selves associated with them. 
Hence, we have the following multiple-self model:
Time to ti tk
Planner Po Pi Pk
Doer Do Di Dk
Table 6.1: Dual Selves in a Two-Row Model
The two rows of selves can now be interpreted analogously to the one-row 
model given earlier. That means that there are also two types of connectedness 
that can be used to characterise the temporal selves.
The two-row model will allow us to reconsider the recommendations of Thaler 
and Shefrin (1981) and Fudenberg and Levine (2006). While those models en­
dorse similar structures of selves to the one above, here the additional tool of 
connectedness is introduced, which ‘replaces’ the modelling device of dynamic 
games.
We will comment in greater detail on the exact status of the two ‘person­
alities’ P  and D  and their associated selves when discussing the two cases just 
mentioned. However, as a general remark, recall that such multiple-self models
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can be employed as devices that capture the deliberations of the decision-maker 
about the intertemporal aspects of prospects. That is to say, even the above 
two-row model can still be used in addition to a standard-decision theoretic rep­
resentation that gives an evaluation, while the above model depicts a conflicting 
evaluation of the intertemporal aspects.
Temptation as a Connectedness Conflict
Indeed, in the Fudenberg and Levine (2006) model, the utility functions of the 
planner and the doer are assumed to be the same such that there is a standard 
decision-theoretic representation in the background. We show that by using the 
multiple-self model introduced above, the Fudenberg and Levine (2006) approach 
can be conceived as depicting a conflict in connectedness between selves. For this, 
we introduce an initial utility evaluation in which the planner and doer agree, 
and combine them with conflicting connectedness between the planner-selves and 
the doer-selves.
Consider the temptation example given earlier, and suppose that the utility 
of the two prospects is evaluated as follows.
t i t 2
Pub e cr II o u(Pub2) =  2
Home u(Homei) =  2 w(Home2) =  12
Table 6.2: A Utility Evaluation
At to j the two prospects Pub and Home are evaluated, by ascribing utilities 
u to the individual consequences of each of the two prospects at t\ and ^  as 
depicted in the above table. Such an evaluation is consistent with the Fudenberg 
and Levine (2006) model in that it depicts a uniform evaluation of planner and 
doer. Note that the above evaluation assumes a separability of utility at different 
times. If the evaluation were to be concluded at this point without any further 
consideration, then the two prospects could be evaluated by their respective ag­
gregate utilities, such as u(Pub) =  12 and ■u(Home) =  14. However, individuals 
often fail to maximise utility in those cases.
Following Fudenberg and Levine (2006), we consider that there are two selves, 
the planner and the doer, who have different time horizons. On the account de­
veloped here, this can be characterised as different degrees (and, possibly, kinds) 
of connectedness between the planner-selves and the doer-selves. Since the plan­
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ner is concerned with lifetime utility, it is natural to endow him with a high degree 
of (psychological) connectedness c between all planner-selves. The doer, on the 
other hand, might be characterised as lacking empathy for different temporal 
selves, and hence can be endowed with low empathy connectedness c*.
Analogous to the conclusions of the Fudenberg and Levine (2006) model, 
these different degrees of connectedness can then determine whether an indi­
vidual chooses according to the planner or the doer. For this, we assume that 
it is possible to weight the goodness evaluation of prospects with the respect­
ive connectedness, as in the hyperbolic discounting approach. Since the utility 
evaluation above is endorsed by both the planner and the doer, all depends on 
the comparison of strength of connectedness c between the planner-selves and c* 
between the doer-selves which will, in turn, have an impact on the final aggrega­
tion of the utilities for each prospect.
As a simple illustration, suppose the doer-selves are only perfectly connected 
between to and t\ and not at all connected between to and t 2 , such that Cq i = 1  
and Cq 2  =  0. Further suppose that the planner-selves are high-connected such 
that co,i =  cq,2  =  1 , depicted in the below table.
t l *2
c 1 1
c* 1 0
Table 6.3: Connectedness of Planner- and Doer-Selves
Weighting the above utility evaluation with connectedness, it makes no dif­
ference to the outcome whether we weight the utility evaluation with each of the 
two connectedness values and then aggregate the utilities for each prospect and 
comparing their values,4  or whether we first consider aggregate connectedness 
and then weight the utility evaluation . 5 In both methods, the aggregate utility 
evaluation yields 11,4 (Pub) =  1 1  and u^(Home) =  8  such that now going to the 
pub is preferred over going home, due to the extremely low connectedness between 
doer-selves. Yet, it is easy to see that for a better connected doer, the joint con-
4When adopting this method, we weight the utilities with c and c* first. For the planner, 
the weighted utility evaluations are, as before, up(Pubi) =  10, up(Pub2) =  2, up(Homei) =  
2, up (Home2) =  12. For the doer-self, the weighted utility evaluations are U£>(Pubi) =  10, 
ur>(Pub2) =  0, it£»(Homei) =  2, U£>(Home2) =  0. Aggregating those utilities yields liA(Pub) =  
11 and itA(Home) =  8.
5When adopting this method, we consider the aggregate connectedness Co,i =  1 and Coi2 =  -5 
and weight the utility evaluation such that ^^(Pubi) =  10, ttA(Pub2) =  1, u^(Homei) =  2, 
u>i(Home2) =  6 which yields u>i(Pub) =  11 and u a (Home) =  8.
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nectedness could become higher such that eventually, going home becomes the 
recommended course of action.
In this context, consider that Xue (2008) develops hyperbolic discounting 
along similar lines, by depicting a decision-maker as two selves, one extremely 
myopic and one extremely far-sighted. More specifically, two (exponential) dis­
counting functions are considered, one extremely myopic and the other extremely 
far-sighted (this roughly maps on to the above table with perfect connectedness 
c and imperfect connectedness c*). Xue (2008) shows that aggregating those two 
discounting functions yields hyperbolic discounting. That is to say, all three of 
Fudenberg and Levine (2006), Xue (2008) and the above procedure allow us to 
analyse dynamic inconsistency in similar spirit.
In addition to what is offered by the models in Fudenberg and Levine (2006) 
and Xue (2008), connectedness gives a motivation for why the planner and the 
doer have a different outlook on the future. Indeed, the formulation adopted here 
also suggests that the interaction or bargaining models can be dispensed with 
when considering the different degrees and interpretations of connectedness, and 
to collapse the model back into one of hyperbolic discounting, where aggregate 
connectedness performs the role of a discounting function that is determined by 
c and c*. Note though, how the connectedness interpretations permit us to make 
sense of successful self-control. For instance, stable tastes in a planner and some 
empathy in a doer can lead to weights that result in a higher aggregate utility 
for going home in the above example. Indeed, the above model permits us to 
formulate the exact conditions of connectedness for successful self-control, i.e. it 
permits us to investigate what combinations of planner- and doer-connectedness 
result in the aggregate utility for going home to be higher than in the pub case.
The above characterisation makes explicit a vital difference between the Fuden­
berg and Levine (2006) model and the Thaler and Shefrin (1981) model, which 
will be discussed shortly. In the former, the conflict between the selves is perceived 
as one of connectedness, and not as one of evaluation. That is, the goodness of 
each particular consequence at a time (such as a hangover, or a visit to the pub) 
is not disputed between the selves.
Temptation as a Utility Evaluation Conflict
Cases of temptation, including the above, can be interpreted as a more funda­
mental conflict in the evaluation of the actual consequences. It could be the case
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that one self values being at home much more, and the other self perceives more 
vividly the hedonic pleasures of a pub visit. We now turn to an analysis of the 
above example that coheres with such a view.
In line with the Thaler and Shefrin (1981) model, the structure of the two- 
row model is now interpreted by considering two different utility functions for 
the planner and the doer. That is, there are two selves that have a genuine, 
synchronic, conflict in the evaluation of prospects, reflecting different desires. 
That is to say, the standard decision-theoretic representation is given up at this 
point in order to analyse deep conflicts in the decision-maker. More specifically, 
it is now assumed that the decision-maker has not one utility evaluation, but two 
utility evaluations that need to be reconciled.
We now consider a case in which the planner and the doer give the competing 
utility evaluations. Firstly, suppose the following utility evaluation of the planner:
t i t 2
Pub u (P u b i) =  10 u(Pub2) =  2
Home u(H om ei) =  2 u(Home2) =  12
Table 6.4: Utility Evaluation of the Planner-Self
As before, the two columns depict the distribution of utility over time. The 
table shows that the planner prefers to go home as u(Pub) =  1 2  is lower than 
u(Home) =  14. Now suppose the following utility evaluation of the doer:
t i t 2
Pub u (P u bi) = 12 u(Pub2) = 2
Home u(H om ei) = 2 u(Hom e2) — 10
Table 6.5: Utility Evaluation of the Doer-Self
The doer prefers to go to the pub, as w(Pub) =  14 is higher than u(Home) =  
1 2 . This decision-maker has hence a genuine conflict in the evaluation of the 
acts, such that his evaluations cannot be given by one overall utility evaluation. 
However, as per the example above, the decision-maker has developed two fully 
formed, yet conflicting points of view that can both be characterised as giving a 
utility evaluation.
Intuitively, we could also think of an individual with such a conflict as em­
bodying different social roles which lead to different evaluations: for instance, 
evaluating the prospects from the perspective of being a father could yield a 
planner-type evaluation, and evaluating the prospect as someone who wants to
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see an old friend in the pub might yield a doer-type evaluation. Both of these per­
spectives might be salient to the personality of the decision-maker and therefore 
capable of motivating the above evaluations.
Accepting that we are dealing with a decision-maker who has a deep eval­
uation conflict, we can attempt to resolve it. One possibility would simply be 
to aggregate the two evaluations. That is, the decision-maker is conflicted, but 
can still form two evaluations, and might consider to take them to account with 
equal weight. However, in the above example, such an aggregation does not yield 
a solution, as the aggregated utilities simply yield u^(Pub) =  u^(Home) =  13 
(when considering both views with equal weight).
However, we can still apply connectedness to the above evaluations. As per the 
dual-self model introduced earlier, we have again two degrees of connectedness, 
one for the planner, denoted c, and one for the doer, denoted c*. As before, let 
the degree of connectedness between the selves at to and the respective temporal 
selves at t\ be perfect. That is, the connectedness between Pq and Pi is given by 
the unit weight, written co,i =  1 , and likewise for the doer, Cq x =  1 .
Now suppose that the connectedness between the selves at to and the re­
spective temporal selves at t2 are such that the doer is relatively lowly connected 
and the planner is relatively highly connected. Indeed, for simplicity, we assume 
perfect connectedness of the planner, such that co,2 =  1  which means that we 
can still consider his initial utility evaluation as per above, even after weighting 
with connectedness. For the doer, we consider two cases. Firstly, let Cg 2 =  -5. 
Weighting his evaluation gives the following:
t i t 2
Pub u (P u bi) =  12 u(Pub2) =  1
Home u(H om ei) =  2 u(Hom e2) =  5
T ab le 6 .6 : Connectedness Weighting of the D oer’s Evaluation I
That is, the consequences at are now devalued, such that the overall eval­
uation of the doer yields u(Pub) =  13 and u(Home) =  7. Secondly, consider the 
case of Cq 2  — 0. Weighting his evaluation gives the following:
t i t 2
Pub u (P u bi) =  12 u(Pub2) =  0
Home u(H om ei) =  2 u(Hom e2) =  0
Table 6.7: Connectedness Weighting of the D oer’s Evaluation II
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Now, consequences at t<i are completely devalued, such that the overall eval­
uation of the doer yields u(Pub) =  12 and u(Home) =  2.
We now have the planner’s utility evaluation on the one hand, and two cases 
for the weighted utility evaluation of the doer. As before, we can now aggregate 
the different evaluations. Yet, different methods of aggregating the weighted 
evaluations of planner and doer can lead to different results. We will discuss 
which method of aggregation to select in such situations in the next section.
A ggregation  Conflicts
Here we consider two possible ways of aggregating the weighted evaluations of the 
two selves. We first discuss what result those methods yield, before considering 
arguments for and against each of these methods.
A ggregation  over acts. Firstly, we could simply aggregate over acts, i.e. 
we add the respective evaluations of going to the pub and going home and divide 
by the number of selves (in this case two). That is to say, if a decision-maker 
has a deep conflict and has two opposing viewpoints, then she could first weight 
the evaluations of those viewpoints with their associated connectedness, then 
aggregate over times, and finally aggregate the evaluations over the different acts. 
This method, applied for each of the different connectedness cases considered here, 
yields the following table.
Initial Co 2 — -5 o o* to II O
tM(Pub) 13 12.5 12
u^(Home) 13 10.5 8
T able 6 .8 : Aggregation over A cts
For the initial utility evaluations, we get the aggregate utilities of Wyi(Pub) =  
u^(Home) =  13, as mentioned before. This is depicted in the first column of 
the above table. For the case of moderate doer-connectedness {d^  2 — *5), we get 
u^(Pub) =  12.5 and u^(Home) =  10.5, as depicted in column two. For the case 
of zero doer-connectedness, we get u^(Pub) =  12 and u^(Home) =  8 , shown in 
column three. Hence, on this method of aggregation, low doer-connectedness tilts 
the overall utility evaluation in favour of going to the pub.
A ggregation  over selves. Secondly, we could aggregate over selves. That 
is, we are comparing the four possible paths, considering the utilities that each 
self associates with the two different acts. Then, for each self, the connectedness
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weight is applied and the evaluation of each act is aggregated over times. Finally, 
the act that yields the highest utility is selected for each self, and compared in 
the below table for the different cases of connectedness considered hre.
Initial C0,2 — *5 c0,2 ~  0
Doer 14 13 12
Planner 14 14 14
Table 6.9: Aggregation over Selves
We can now check whether there is a dominating act-self combination. For 
the initial evaluation, we have the planner valuing going home with 14 utils, and 
likewise the doer valuing going to the pub with 14 utils. In each of the weighted 
cases, however, the evaluations of the doer are lowered, such that the planner’s 
evaluation of going home is the best overall act under this method.
How are we to decide between these methods of aggregation? The first method 
assumes that we can simply add the utilities of both evaluations. This is plausible, 
because the initial evaluation conflict suggests that we have really do have two 
equally viable points of view in the decision-maker. Indeed, this conflict has 
induced two rows of selves and their utility functions, which in turn makes it also 
plausible to consider connectedness separately. After weighting the evaluations 
with their respective connectedness, it is more plausible to assume intrapersonal 
comparability of utility (as differences in the future stability of the evaluations 
are now taken into account), and aggregation yields an overall evaluation.
However, in the above example, this means that because of low connected­
ness of the doer, the option of going home is valued less, and hence the pub is 
recommended. While this might ring true descriptively, it does not seem to be a 
particularly good reason not to go home: we would expect that the low connected­
ness of the doer results in his perspective counting less than the high-connected 
planner. -  Yet, the objection against the low connectedness of the doer having 
an influence on the decision is flawed. It seems that it rests on the intuition that 
the doer’s perspective is not on a par with the planner’s perspective. If that is 
the case, then the model with two conflicting utility functions is misapplied and 
the case should simply be modelled as a conflict in connectedness.
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Temptation as a Test of Character
This leaves the question of whether the second method of aggregation should 
be preferred. The first method of aggregation takes the connectedness-weighted 
utilities at face value and aggregates over acts. The second method of aggregation 
also appears to take the utilities at face value, indeed, it seems to take the utilities 
almost literally. Instead of asking which act is the best one, it is asking which of 
the selves has the best evaluation of an act.
Note how the second method of aggregation implies a slight, yet important, 
change in the question. The above exercise has started as an analysis of con­
flicting evaluations over acts, asking how to reconcile them by aggregating the 
evaluations after weighting them with connectedness. That is, the initial ques­
tion has considered the best act (or prospect) in terms of its consequences, and 
the first method of aggregation has used connectedness to identify it by weight­
ing the compating evaluations of the available acts. Yet, the second method 
of aggregation analyses competing evaluators. That is, the question has shifted 
from considering the ‘best act’ to considering the ‘best self’, i.e. the one which 
yields the best evaluations. In the second method, we are hence asking which 
perspective is superior -  and if one of the perspectives is associated with lower 
connectedness, it will count less in the aggregation.
In terms of the temptation case, this change in question is quite telling: intu­
itively, if a decision-maker is able to conceive of a temptation he faces as a test 
of character, then successful self-control can be described by the third method of 
aggregation. Cases of dynamic inconsistency, i.e. lack of self-control in the face 
of temptation, can be captured by low connectedness of the doer, combined with 
the first method of aggregation. That is, if a decision-maker deliberates about 
the problem and tries to decide between going home or going to the pub in this 
way, he will go to the pub. However, when a decision-maker deliberates for a 
longer time about this problem -  which also makes postulating two selves with 
different utility functions more plausible -  then the deliberations might not stay 
exclusively with considering the goodness of the acts and the future stability of 
the desires.
Indeed, it is natural that in such cases, the decision-maker might ask himself 
what kind of character he wants to be: someone who enjoys hedonic pleasures or 
someone who is prudent? If a case of temptation leads a decision-maker to enter­
tain such more fundamental questions, then it is natural that the second method
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of aggregation becomes more plausible, as it answers the question which character 
or standpoint will maximise his overall utility, and the low connectedness of one 
of those standpoints has the impact of lowering the influence of that particular 
standpoint. Especially if one of the selves has significantly higher connectedness, 
this could be taken as indicator of the stability of that viewpoint when it comes to 
implementing the recommendation it gives. That is to say, successful self-control 
in the face of temptation can be explained by the decision-maker perceiving of 
such situations as a test of character.
This concludes the analysis of dynamic inconsistency and intrapersonal con­
flicts by multiple-self models of personal identity over time. In a general sense, 
the above discussion suggests that the two-row model can describe present bias, 
temptation cases and deeper kinds of intrapersonal conflicts either in terms of 
connectedness conflicts or in terms of evaluation conflicts. In the connected­
ness conflict, sufficiently low connectedness of the doer can lead to present bias 
and failure of self-control, and a sufficiently high degree of connectedness of the 
planner can yield successful self-control. Evaluation conflicts allow us to model 
deliberation of a decision-maker who has a synchronic conflict between differ­
ent standpoints of preferences: namely, we can consider introspection about how 
likely it is that tastes that are associated with a particular point of view are go­
ing to change. The three methods of aggregation capture the differences between 
failure and successful self-control in the face of temptation. Moreover, the third 
method of aggregation also allows us to characterise deeper kinds of intrapersonal 
conflict that lead the decision-maker to deliberate about character planning.
6.4.3 Theories o f D ynam ic Inconsistency R evisited
Here we reconsider the problems and deficiencies in the hyperbolic discounting 
and multi-selves models in the fight of the multiple-self models of personal identity 
over time offered in this section.
Firstly, we questioned what the models add to the metaphor of the multiple- 
self. In the multiple-self model of personal identity over time, the metaphor is 
cashed out in terms of a decision-maker’s stability over time, characterising the 
degree of connectedness between selves. It was shown in Chapter 3 that the 
structure of the multiple-self models coheres with theories of personal identity 
over time, such that they can be used to motivate and constrain the models, for 
instance by introducing the interpretations of psychological and empathy connec­
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tedness. This does not mean that the models have a fundamental metaphysical 
character. Rather, it suggests that the objects and concepts it poses have a 
substantial interpretation, which can be a very reductive one, such as when con­
sidering selves as sets of preferences and connectedness as a rough measure of 
diachronic similarity of preferences.
Secondly, the multi-self models in the literature are complex, postulate ad­
ditional structure in the model of the decision-maker. This has also made it 
difficult to understand to what extent they require us to depart from stand­
ard decision-theoretic accounts. Introducing the notion of temporal selves and 
their connectedness makes transparent how those models relates back to stand­
ard decision-theoretic representations of decision-makers and in what sense those 
models can be endorsed as picturing rational agency.
For instance, it is a relatively small departure from standard decision theory 
to consider one row of temporal selves, measuring the similarity of their tastes 
to determine connectedness. Each further step that can be taken in the model, 
such as using connectedness as discounting factors, and introducing further rows, 
and non-reductive interpretations of selves makes clear to what extent standard 
decision theory is enriched, and departed from. Connectedness conflicts in a 
two-row model are a more significant departure: the way evaluation conflicts are 
modelled and the aggregation conflicts they raise demonstrate that conflicts which 
induce different points of view that are modelled as competing utility functions 
are a rather significant departure from standard decision theories. Nevertheless, 
they still offer an analysis of such cases of deep intrapersonal conflicts, which 
permits us to understand in what way exactly standard assumptions of decision 
theory need to be relaxed.
Finally, while the above multiple-self model of personal identity over time is 
not dynamic in a direct sense, note how it is capable of modelling the differ­
ences between success and failure in self-control. Moreover, the dynamic aspect 
of accounts such as Ainslie (1992, 2001) and Fudenberg and Levine (2006) is also 
partly due to modelling hypothetical repetitions,.which is also possible with the 
above model. For instance, by considering repeated interactions between plan­
ners and doers, more introspective evidence is amassed about the connectedness 
associated with each perspective. Successfully executed plans, for instance, can 
be used to update the connectedness of the planner. Likewise, an individual 
could learn over time what kinds of hedonic pleasures are stable ones, boosting
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the connectedness of the doer. This suggests that the above model can also be 
considered in a dynamic sense.
6.5 Conclusions
We have analysed a particular type of preference change in intertemporal de­
cisions, namely that of dynamic inconsistency. Received accounts in behavioural 
economics that attempt to predict, explain, and resolve dynamic inconsistency 
have been critically scrutinised. The more general model of connectedness in the 
multiple-self has been used to re-describe some of the features of the aforemen­
tioned accounts and their recommendations, which has led to some improvements: 
the multiple-self model makes it possible to better motivate the additional struc­
ture, relating it back to standard decision theories.
In a general sense, as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the 
multiple-self model allows us to more carefully consider to what extent (hyper­
bolic) discounting approaches can be employed to model dynamic inconsistency. 
It has been shown that if such models are developedto reflect connectedness in the 
multiple-self, they can even be used to analyse conflicts in evaluation. That is to 
say, discounting functions which reflect a coarse-grained evaluation of distance in 
time can, when interpreted with connectedness, and when applied to rows of con­
flicting selves, even be used to elucidate aspects of complicated cases of preference 
conflicts. To be sure, not all preference conflicts have an explicit intertemporal 
dimension, and even if they have, there is no guarantee that connectedness will 
conclusively analyse or even resolve the conflict. Yet, many preference conflicts 
that are cases of dynamic inconsistency can be analysed fruitfully with connec­
tedness.
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Conclusions
7.1 T im e in D ecisions and G am es
This thesis has been concerned with the analysis of intertemporality in decisions 
and games. We have identified three questions about intertemporality in de­
cisions and games, namely the problems of (i) the correct evaluation of temporal 
distance by time discounting functions in Chapter 4, (ii) belief revision about 
other decision-makers in interaction over time by backward induction reasoning 
in Chapter 5, and (iii) preference change by accounts of dynamic inconsistency 
in Chapter 6 .
Concerning the evaluation of temporal distance by time discounting function, 
we have identified two goals that theories of time discounting may have: one, 
postulating a correct time discounting function, and two, offering an accurate un­
derlying conceptual motivation. Since both of those concerns can be understood 
either descriptively or normatively, this creates four problems of time discounting. 
Reviewing existing theories of time discounting and their representation frame­
works, we have seen that it is difficult to state in what sense they address the four 
goals of time discounting theories, as their frameworks of representation entangle 
matters of goodness evaluation on the one hand and time feature evaluation on the 
other hand. We proceeded by presenting a general representation framework for 
time discounting which initially separates goodness and time feature evaluations. 
Adopting a measurement-theoretic framework, we outlined the requirements that 
time discounting functions have to fulfill in order to be well-founded in a numer­
ical representation of the qualitative notion of time distance. Furthermore, to 
state discounting functions as time-indexed weights, such a representation has
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to correspond to an externally given time-index. On the basis of this general 
framework, existing theories of time discounting have been critically scrutinised, 
making their underlying assumptions explicit and raising questions about their 
conceptual motivations. In a further step, we have shown that Parfit’s dictum of 
time discounting because of a weak connectedness to future selves in a decision­
maker can motivate the general representation, which has enabled us to address 
objections against his view. Furthermore, the general framework allows to derive 
exponential discounting from a notion of preference change. More generally, the 
requirements for time discounting theories developed here demonstrate that time 
discounting factors are restricted in the kinds of conceptions they can express.
Concerning interaction between decision-makers over time, we have analysed 
the reasoning method of backward induction that is standard in dynamic games. 
We analysed the sequential structure of dynamic games with perfect information. 
A three-stage account was proposed, that specifies set-up, reasoning and play 
stages of dynamic games. Accordingly, we have defined a player as a set of agents 
corresponding to these three stages. Moreover, the notion of agent connectedness 
was introduced which measures the extent to which agents’ choices are sequen­
tially stable. In a next step, a type-based epistemic model was augmented with 
agent connectedness and used to provide sufficient conditions for backward in­
duction. Besides, an existence result was given to ensure that our conditions are 
indeed possible. Our epistemic foundation for backward induction makes expli­
cit that the epistemic independence assumption involved in backward induction 
reasoning is stronger than usually presumed. Furthermore, in the three-stage 
account, players can explicitly be understood as multiple-selves, which makes 
available connectedness accounts motivated by theories of personal identity over 
time. Thus describing dynamic games allows a more fully understanding of stra­
tegic interaction over time and gives a more realistic representation of players for 
game-theoretic applications in economics and social sciences.
Concerning preference change over time, we have analysed theories of dynamic 
inconsistency. Two families of approaches can be identified: those that use hyper­
bolic discounting functions to describe dynamically inconsistent decision-makers 
as myopic, and those that postulate multi-selves models that capture different 
motivations and time horizons which can lead a decision-maker to (fail to) con­
trol himself in the face of temptation. We have analysed those accounts and have 
pointed out that hyperbolic discounting functions have explanatory deficiencies
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as they reduce it to a specific evaluation of temporal distance. Concerning multi­
selves models, we have shown that their structure is complex, as they employ 
dynamic games (analysed in Chapter 5) to model the interaction between selves. 
In order to achieve a simpler characterisation of dynamic inconsistency, we have 
reconsidered both hyperbolic discounting and multi-selves models in the more 
general multiple-self model of personal identity over time. A simple specification 
of it can motivate hyperbolic discounting, and an extended version of it has been 
used to reformulate the multi-selves models by using less formal structure that 
can be better motivated. Moreover, the latter allows to distinguish between con­
flicts in connectedness and conflicts in evaluation, with the latter also being able 
to enhance our understanding of intrapersonal conflicts more generally.
In general, analysing those three aspects of intertemporality in decisions and 
games has shown that while their interrelations axe intricate and plentiful, it is 
important to analyse those different concerns separately, at least in an initial step. 
In paxticulax, ad hoc appeals to time discounting axe problematic in other axeas of 
analysis, such as in dynamic games or in the analysis of preference change. This 
is due to the fact that many regularity assumptions axe required in order to con­
struct well-founded time discounting functions, as demonstrated by the general 
representation framework of time discounting in Chapter 4. Furthermore, stand­
ard frameworks of describing interaction over time contain many implicit stability 
assumptions, such as those about the stability of preferences and strategies in 
extensive-form games, as analysed in Chapter 5. Making such stability assump­
tions explicit and presenting models that allow us to relax those, and consider 
specific explanations for why stability breaks down (or how it can hold) improves 
our understanding of interaction over time. In a similax vein, the analysis of pref­
erence change in Chapter 6  has shown how simple and dual multiple-self models 
can capture explain and resolve dynamic inconsistency, making transparent the 
assumptions that we need to relax in normative decision theories in order to 
model dynamic inconsistency.
7.2 T he M ultip le-Self in D ecisions and G am es
The three accounts of intertemporality in decisions and games presented in this 
thesis have been facilitated by introducing multiple-self models of personal iden­
tity over time. While most of the formal results and main arguments in the
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aforementioned accounts do not depend on endorsing such devices as extensions 
of standard decision theories, we found that the analysis of each of the problems 
has been enriched by their explicit consideration.
The multiple-self models of personal identity over time have two main ele­
ments, as introduced in Chapter 2. In a first step, we view the decision-maker 
as a collection of temporal selves. In a second step, the degree of connected­
ness between the temporal selves gives a characterisation of the decision-maker’s 
stability over time. We have shown in Chapter 3 how such multiple-self mod­
els structurally cohere with theories of personal identity over time, which are 
concerned with how persons persist and change over time. By characterising 
the connectedness between selves, a multiple-self model can be interpreted and 
further constrained by specific accounts of theories of personal identity over time.
Through applying the multiple-self models of personal identity over time in 
the three accounts of intertemporality in decisions and games, many specific 
interpretations have become available. Firstly, we have shown in what sense 
time discounting can be motivated by diminishing connectedness between selves. 
Secondly, we have shown how connectedness between different selves can help 
to locally relax stability assumptions in dynamic games, and we have motiv­
ated new sufficient conditions for backward induction with this notion. Thirdly, 
re-describing theories of dynamic inconsistency with multiple-self models better 
motivates their often complicated structure and renders clear in what sense they 
require us to depart from normative decision theory.
Intertemporality in decisions and games, it seems, calls for what Sen (1977) 
has labelled as a need for ‘more structure’ in decision theory. While this assertion 
was made in the context of pointing out deficiencies in some of the descriptive 
and ethical implications of standard normative decision theories, it is a fitting 
slogan for the multiple-self models developed in this thesis. Two initial observar 
tions have motivated their development. Firstly, standard decision theories are 
not geared towards explicitly taking into account the temporal dimension of de­
cisions in greater detail, as shown in Chapter 2. Secondly, the extensive literature 
on topics such as time discounting, dynamic games and dynamic inconsistency 
suggests that time is a key factor in decisions and games that is often subjec­
ted to separate analysis. This raised the question of how such analyses relate to 
the foundations of decision and game theory. It is hoped that the multiple-self 
framework developed in this thesis contributes to the investigation of this ques­
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tion. Indeed, the multiple-self model has been developed so as to be able to track 
what kinds of assumptions in addition to standard decision-theoretic frameworks 
need to be given up in order to analyse intertemporal decisions and games with 
regards to the three problems identified in the literature.
7.3 Future Work
The simple, and yet general, character of the multiple-self models of personal over 
time developed in this thesis offers various routes for further research.
One route is to generalise the idea of connectedness between selves to one 
of connectedness between individuals to study distance between individuals in 
social decisions. In particular, amending utilitarian frameworks with a notion of 
connectedness could explain the effect of spatial distance in failures to maxim­
ise aggregate utility. Furthermore, by modelling group decision-making in the 
multiple-self, different formal specifications of connectedness can be related to 
existing frameworks of deliberation and aggregation.
Offering further accounts of problems of intertemporality is another possible 
route, such as (i) in-depth characterisations of specific time discounting functions, 
and extending the general representation framework for time discounting to in- 
tergenerational decisions in which population changes suggest shifting domains, 
(ii) characterisations of backward induction in an imperfect information frame­
work, and characterisations of forward induction, and (iii) exploring the links 
between connectedness and recent models of preference change in philosophical 
decision theory, as well as further investigating how connectedness can be used 
to elucidate the differences between descriptive and normative decision theory.
In general, I hope to have shown that connectedness models of intertemporal­
ity can improve our understanding of the role of time in rational decision-making, 
in virtue of elucidating the accounts of time discounting, backward induction, and 
dynamic inconsistency which have been proposed as answers to the three ques­
tions of time in decisions and games considered in this thesis.
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